Reports And Briefings

When it comes to how Artificial intelligence (AI) will affect our lives, the response from industry insiders, as well as the public, ranges from a sense of impending doom to heraldry. We do not yet understand the long-term trajectory of AI and how it will change society. Something, indeed, is happening to us—and we all know it. But what?

Gen Zers and Millennials are the most active users of generative AI. Many of them, it appears, are turning to AI for companionship. “We talk to them, say please and thank you, and have started to invite AIs into our lives as friends, lovers, mentors, therapists, and teachers,” Melissa Heikkilä wrote in MIT Technology Review. After analyzing 1 million ChatGPT interaction logs, a group of researchers found that “sexual role-playing” was the second most prevalent use, following only the category of “creative composition.” The Psychologist bot, a popular simulated therapist on Character.AI—where users can design their own “friends”—has received “more than 95 million messages from users since it was created.  

According to a new Institute for Family Studies/YouGov survey of 2,000 adults under age 40, 1% of young Americans claim to already have an AI friend, yet 10% are open to an AI friendship. And among young adults who are not married or cohabiting, 7% are open to the idea of romantic partnership with AI.

A much higher share (25%) of young adults believe that AI has the potential to replace real-life romantic relationships. Furthermore, heavy porn users are the most open to romantic relationships with AI of any group and are also the most open to AI friendships in general.  

In addition to AI and relationships, the new IFS survey also asked young Americans how they feel about the changes AI technology may bring to society. We find that their reactions to AI are divided. About half of young adults under age 40 (55%) view AI technology as either threatening or concerning, while 45% view it as either intriguing or exciting.  

There are complex socio-economic findings, too, with young adults with lower incomes and less education being more likely than those with higher incomes and more education to fear how AI will affect society. At the same time, this group is more likely than their fellow Americans who are better off to be open to a romance with AI.¹

1 in 10 Young Adults Are Open to AI Friends 

When asked about the prospect of having an AI friend designed to simulate human interaction and provide emotional support, just over half of American young adults (57%) say that they are either against it for ethical reasons or just not comfortable with it. In contrast, 1 in 10 young adults (11%) are open to having an AI friend, with 1% already having one. Another one-third of young adults (32%) either have mixed feelings about AI friendships or are unsure whether they would befriend a chatbot. This large mixed/unsure group represents the possibility of a significant increase in users in future years.

Further analysis reveals some key demographic differences. Men are more open to AI friendships than women (13% vs. 9%). Liberals show greater openness compared to conservatives (14% vs. 9%), with conservatives more likely to express discomfort or opposition to the idea. 

Meanwhile, how much time young adults spend online appears to influence their openness to AI friends. Excluding online activities related to work or study, young adults who spend an average of more than six hours online per day are much more likely to express openness to AI friendships than those who spend less time online. About 1 in 6 young adults (16%) who spend more than six hours online in their spare time say they are open to having an AI friend (including the 1% that already have one), compared with 9% of young adults who spend less time online. 

7% of Single Young Adults Are Open to AI Romantic Partners

Among young adults who are not married or cohabiting, a small share (7%) say they see potential benefits and are open to having an AI romantic partner (including the fewer than 1% who already have one). A vast majority of young adults are not comfortable with the idea or are against it (71%); and 22% have mixed feelings or are unsure—again, representing the potential for a more significant uptake.

Interestingly, Gen Z adults without a romantic partner are more likely than unpartnered Millennials to oppose the idea of an AI romance (74% vs. 67%). Even though a similar share of Gen Zers and Millennials are open to it (7% vs. 8%), Millennials are more likely than Gen Zers to have mixed feelings about an AI girlfriend or boyfriend. 

Education and income also play a role. College-educated young adults without partners (including those who are currently in college) are more likely than those without a college degree to disapprove of an AI romantic partner (76% vs. 67%). At the same time, unpartnered young adults with higher incomes are more likely than those with lower incomes to reject the idea of an AI romance. More than 80% of unpartnered young adults under age 40 with an income of $100,000 or more say they are either opposed to, or are uncomfortable with, the idea of an AI romantic partner, compared with 64% of young adults with incomes less than $40,000.

Can AI Replace Real-Life Romance? 

One in four young adults believe that AI girlfriends and boyfriends have the potential to replace real-life romantic relationships, while most (75%) do not see AI as a viable replacement for human partners.

Young men are more likely than young women to believe that AI has the potential to replace real-life romantic relationships (28% vs. 22%). As shown earlier, young men are generally more open to AI friendships than young women, which parallels the gender difference in their views of AI’s potential for romance. Differences across other demographic categories, including age, education, income, and religion, are small and statistically insignificant.

Porn Use and Views of AI Romance

Pornography has become a part of online life for many young adults today. About 1 in 10 Americans under age 40 watch porn online at least once a day, and 34% watch it on at least a weekly basis, according to a recent study the IFS conducted. Young adults who use porn frequently are more likely to experience loneliness and depression than those who do not. It is possible that young adults who use pornography heavily are also more open to AI companionship, especially given that so-called “sexbots” are already widely used.

Among unpartnered young adults, heavy porn users turn out to be the group most open to the idea of an AI girlfriend or boyfriend. Among single young adults, those who watch porn online at least once a day are twice as likely as those who rarely, if ever watch porn to say they are open to an AI romance. More than 10% of heavy porn users say they are open to it (which includes the 1% of young adults in this group who already have an AI girlfriend or boyfriend).  

When asked about the future of AI in romantic relationships, heavy porn users are much more optimistic than others. More than one-third of heavy porn users (35%) believe that AI girlfriends or boyfriends have the potential to replace real-life romance, compared with 20% of young adults who rarely watch porn.

Heavy porn users are also more favorable toward having an AI friend in general. More than 1 in 5 young adults who view porn daily (21%) say they are open to having an AI friend (including the 3% who already have an AI friend), compared with those who never or rarely view pornography online (8%). Heavy porn users are the only group that we surveyed in which less than half hold negative views about an AI friend, with 44% saying they are either against or not comfortable with having an AI friend.

Young Adults’ Divided Views on AI’s Future

In addition to AI’s role in relationships, we also surveyed young adults on how they view AI’s potential future effect on society. We find that their reactions to AI are quite divided. About half of young adults under age 40 (55%) find AI technology threatening or concerning, while 45% find it either intriguing or exciting.  

There is a sex divide in the attitude of young adults toward AI: Young women are much more likely than young men to perceive AI as a threat (28% vs. 23%) and are less likely to be excited about AI’s effect on society (11% vs. 20%).

Similarly, conservative young adults are more inclined to see AI as threatening or concerning compared to their liberal counterparts (60% vs. 55%). 

Socioeconomic differences are also a factor, with young adults in lower-income families being more likely to view AI as a concern or threat compared to those from higher-income households (60% vs. 49%). Additionally, young adults without a college degree are more concerned about AI than those who are in college or who have already earned a bachelor’s degree (57% vs. 52%).

Lastly, secular young adults show more concern about AI than their religious peers (60% vs. 49%); they are also less intrigued or excited about AI’s role in society (40% vs. 51%). 

Conclusion

In sum, these survey findings suggest that even though the majority of Gen Zers and Millennials are not yet comfortable with the prospect of an AI friend or romantic partner, a much higher share (25%) believe that AI could replace real-life romantic relationships in the future. There is also a significant share of the population that is unsure; meaning, we might just be seeing the beginning of a much larger social phenomenon. Young adults who spend more time online in their spare time are more likely to be open to AI companions in general. Further, young adults who are heavy porn users are the group most open to the idea of having an AI girlfriend or boyfriend—as well as an AI friendship.

There is an apparent class divide in how young adults view the future effect of AI on society. Young adults with lower incomes and less education are more likely to see AI technology as a destructive force in society. However, when it comes to the idea of having an AI romance, these young adults are more open to the idea than those with college education or higher income. 

That 1% of American young adults in the survey report having an AI friend is significant because it marks the beginning of profound change in how we relate to one another: from a world where humans connect and form romantic bonds with each other to a world in which humans engage romantically with machines. The greater openness to AI relationships among those with a pornography addiction may strike some readers as obvious, if not telling. But the complex reaction to AI among lower-income Americans certainly raises important and pressing questions. Is it related to the decline of marriage among lower-income and less educated Americans, who might feel forced to be more open to AI romance but also naturally fear the consequences? Could this further the class divide in marriage and family life, in which romantic relationships between humans and robots will be stratified by income?  These are necessary questions for further study and exploration.

Is the long-standing tie between the Republican Party and marriage fraying in an era when the party’s standard bearer has flouted so many of the institution’s values and virtues? Has the emergence of a post-religious right severed the affinity between marriage and the Republican party?

No, the data suggest that the relationship between the Republican Party and marriage has largely persisted amidst the Trump era. Even during a series of realignments reconfiguring the relationship between partisanship and key axes of identity in American life today, this Institute for Family Studies (IFS) research brief finds that Republicans continue to be markedly more likely than Democrats to be married—and this is true for several subgroups in the population.

 

 

 

The city of Springfield, Ohio, gained unwanted notoriety recently, but Springfield and other Ohio cities have genuine problems that have nothing to do with dubious claims of barbecued pets. In these cities, the majority of children under age 18 are being raised by single mothers (either never married or divorced/separated) who do not live with their children’s fathers or stepfathers. 

In Springfield, for example, only 44% of mothers were married and living with their husbands and children during the five-year period from 2018-2022. In Cleveland, only 33% were. In Youngstown, 32%; while in Cincinnati, 46%. By contrast, in the suburban community of Cleveland Heights, 63% of mothers were married, while in New Albany, Ohio, 91% were. In Ohio as a whole, 68% of mothers were married and lived with their husbands and children.

Executive Summary

America is facing a mental health crisis. Suicide, anxiety, depression, and drug overdose deaths have all risen to record levels. Younger generations have been hit especially hard during this crisis. Millennial men and women experience increased anxiety and depression compared to previous generations at the same age.

Some argue that the emotional state of young adults today is related to their financial precarity. Economic pressures such as student loans add stress in young adults’ lives, and Millennials have also encountered many obstacles in the workforce, including a challenging job market and longer work hours.

Meanwhile, there is a path that young adults who aspire to move up the economic ladder and establish a financially secure foundation should follow: Get at least a high school education, work full-time, and marry before having children. Among Millennials who followed what is known as the Success Sequence, 97% are not poor when they reach adulthood, and 90% reach the middle class or higher. Young adults who manage to follow this sequence—even in the face of various disadvantages—are much more likely to flourish financially.

In addition to offering robust financial benefits, could the Success Sequence also help young adults flourish emotionally and achieve better mental health outcomes? Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), a new report from the Institute for Family Studies explores the link between the Success Sequence and mental health among young adults when they reach their mid-30s.

We find that the Success Sequence is strongly linked to better mental health among young adults. Our analysis of the Mental Health Inventory (MHI-5) in the NLSY97 demonstrates that the incidence of high mental distress at ages 32 to 38 drops dramatically with each completed step of the sequence. Millennials who completed all three steps are much less likely to be highly emotionally distressed by their mid-30s, compared with those who missed these steps (9% vs. 30%).

At the same time, there is a gender gap in mental distress among Millennials. Women are consistently more likely than men to report experiencing emotional distress. The gender gap is the largest among Millennials who missed all three steps of the Success Sequence (38% vs. 22%). But even among those who followed all three steps, women are still more likely than men to experience higher emotional distress (12% vs. 7%).

A racial gap also exists in mental distress among Millennials. White young adults who missed all three steps of the sequence by their mid-30s seem especially more likely to suffer from mental distress than other racial groups. Among this group, 38% of white young adults reported being highly emotionally distressed, compared with 23% of black and 26% of Hispanic young adults. This racial gap narrows with the completion of each step of the Success Sequence and is almost closed among young adults who have completed all three steps.

It is tempting to link better mental health to the financial success of the young adults who completed the Success Sequence, but the findings suggest that even after controlling for income, the sequence remains a significant factor in predicting your adult mental health. The odds of experiencing high emotional distress by their mid-30s are reduced by about 50% for young adults who have completed the three steps of the Success Sequence, after controlling for their income and a range of background factors, including gender, race, and family background. 

Why does the Success Sequence contribute to better mental health? Further analysis suggests that the sequence is closely linked to family stability, which is key to mental well-being. Millennials who married before having children are more likely to have stable marriages. Among Millennials who followed this path, 73% are in intact families (married and never divorced) by their mid-30s, compared with only 30% of those who had children before or outside of marriage.

Furthermore, among Millennials who have been married and have children, those who became parents before marriage are about twice as likely to be divorced or separated by their mid-30s compared with their peers who married before having children (27% vs. 14%). Even after controlling for confounding factors like education, race, and family background, we find that marrying before having children is linked to a 32% decline in divorce among those who have ever married and have children.

Among the report’s other key findings:

• The order of marriage and parenthood plays an important role in young adults’ overall well-being. Marrying before having children is not only linked to a lower risk of emotional distress but also to better general health and overall happiness. Millennials who married before having children are less likely to experience high emotional distress by their mid-30s compared with those who had a baby first (12% vs. 19%). They are also more likely to report being in great health (65% vs. 52%) and feeling happy all or most of the time (82% vs. 74%).
   
• Millennials who have never married and are childless by their mid-30s (about one in five) report higher levels of mental distress compared with those who followed the path of marrying before having children (20% vs. 12%). They are also less likely to report being happy (71% vs. 82%).
   
• Among Millennial women in their mid-30s, those who are currently divorced and had children before marriage experience the highest rate of mental distress (33%). In contrast, those who are currently married and had their children after marriage experience the lowest level (12%). About 21% of married, childless women experience higher levels of mental distress, as do 23% of never-married, childless Millennial women. 

The family is the fundamental unit of society. As Pope Saint John Paul II so eloquently stated, “as the family goes, so goes the nation, and so goes the whole world in which we live.” Unfortunately, ratesof marriage and family formation have hit record lows across the nation in recent years. This report focuses on family dynamics in Texas, identifies barriers to marriage and family formation in the Lone Star State, and proposes a pro-family policy agenda for the state.

A growing minority of young men are floundering. “Failure to launch” is a description that’s all too common. Public intellectuals like Reeves, Scott Galloway, and Jonathan Haidt have blamed the falling fortunes of young men on shifts in our economy, schools that don’t do a good job of serving our boys, or technology that distracts adolescent males from real life. But they have largely overlooked an even more fundamental factor in a boy’s life: whether or not he grew up in an intact, married home with his father. 

This research brief remedies this gap by looking at young men’s likelihood of graduating college or ending up in prison or jail in terms of their family structure growing up. The most striking finding is that young men from non-intact families are more likely to land in prison or jail than they are to graduate from college, whereas young men raised by their married fathers are significantly more likely to graduate from college than spend any time in prison/jail.

With fertility falling to record lows in the United States, it is increasingly important to understand what factors may be preventing Americans from having the families they want to have. One factor that many people immediately think of is housing, cities, and density. Because children require a degree of space, people from a wide range of perspectives argue that housing affordability, open space, and housing density could all matter for family formation.

But this debate takes a particularly sharp turn in relation to the modern “YIMBY,” or “Yes In My Back Yard,” political movement seeking to eliminate laws that restrict supply of new housing. Many YIMBY advocates believe that removing these laws will lead to housing becoming more affordable (which most people believe can boost fertility), even as it will also lead to Americans living in denser communities (which some people believe may reduce fertility). In this post, I won’t settle the question over whether removing zoning laws would actually increase density (it really depends on what exact laws are changed). Rather, I’ll focus on: What would happen to fertility if density increased?

“Demographic Rearmament” in Southern Europe

Executive Summary

Plummeting fertility rates in southern Europe have led governments across the region to begin considering pronatal policy. Italian Prime Minister Meloni recently spoke alongside Pope Francis about the importance of boosting Italian fertility, Spain’s fertility rate is at record lows, and even tiny Malta’s Parliament has called low birth rates an “existential challenge.” Most recently, France—which, as this report discusses, has historically experienced high birth rates—has begun to see declining fertility, leading French Premier Emmanuel Macron to call for “demographic rearmament.” 

This report undertakes the task of assessing where fertility in southern Europe is headed, what factors are driving its decline, and whether anything can be done. In brief, we find that there are reasons for hope: pronatalism has worked where it has been seriously undertaken, and sources of demographic underperformance are readily identifiable in many countries.

That said, in this report, we do not attempt to provide a blueprint for pronatal policy, for the simple reason that no such blueprint will look the same in any two countries. Despite some broad similarities, the challenges facing Spain are not the same as those facing Italy, and similar headline fertility rates often mask quite large underlying differences. Policies implemented in one context cannot be expected to have the same effects in other contexts, where underlying economic structures and cultural norms may be different.

Key Findings:

• Fertility rates within marriage remain fairly high in much of southern Europe, and only Spain has seen a major decline in married fertility in the last 40 years. However, marriage rates have fallen sharply in all countries. As a result, most of the decline in fertility can be directly attributed to decreasing exposure to marriage.
• Differences in nonmarital fertility alone do not account for cross-national differences in overall fertility: high fertility societies have high rates of childbearing within marriage.
• Fertility differences around Europe are not primarily due to differences in prevalence or sources of immigration, but rather to differences among native-born women in each country. For example, high immigration is not the source of France’s high fertility.
• Desired family size is relatively low in southern Europe, perhaps due to adverse economic conditions leading young people to reduce their family ambitions. Examples of adverse economic conditions could include extended coresidence with parents, lack of independent household formation by young men, and low prevalence of stable, formal employment for young adults.
• France’s pronatal policies undertaken between 1920 and 1950, and expanded in subsequent decades, have caused French fertility to remain durably elevated (0.1 to 0.3 more children per woman) throughout the last century. This has led to France’s population being several million people higher today than it otherwise would have been.
• Because the exact dynamics of marriage, housing, and work vary considerably across countries, the best path forward for governments interested in pronatal policy is a harmonized multinational data collection effort entirely focused on assessing factors shaping fertility and marriage, similar to the country-specific surveys fielded in Spain and Portugal in the late 2010s.

On March 8, 2024, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a Texas law requiring age verification measures to guard the state’s kids from pornography sites. The decision is a major win for the children of the Lone Star State. It also represents a vindication of the policy work of scholars from the Center for Renewing America, the Ethics and Public Policy Center, and the Institute for Family Studies, who have fought a David-and-Goliath battle against powerful interests to see such laws enacted through- out the country.

In August 2022, scholars from these three organi- zations published a joint policy brief titled, “Protecting Teens from Big Tech: Five Policy Ideas for States.” The overarching objective of this brief was to provide legislative strategies to states seeking to protect children online and empower parents. Because of the inaction of Congress and some misguided rulings by the Supreme Court—decided long before social media and smartphones were invented—social media platforms and pornography sites have been free to addict America’s children and expose them to obscene content with impunity, all of which has fostered a mental health crisis among adolescents on a historic scale. The brief encouraged states to take action to protect children, rather than wait for the breaking of Congressional gridlock, and gave guidance for how states could do this effectively and constitutionally.

The very first policy idea that our scholars proposed was to require age-verification for pornography sites and age-verification with parental consent for social media platforms. In 2023, nearly a dozen states implemented one or both of these measures. In 2024, by some counts, more than a dozen additional states are considering following their example.

But these efforts have not come without challenge. Lobbyists representing Big Tech and Big Porn, aided by the American commentariat, have been fiercely contesting these laws throughout the country, with an undue confidence that courts would find them unconstitutional. These gargantuan companies have taken a shock and awe approach, suing every such law passed, trying to scare states away from taking action or causing them to second guess the underlying logic of their bills.

From the beginning of this effort, the scholars of the Center for Renewing America, the Ethics and Public Policy Center, and the Institute for Family Studies have maintained that judicial precedent only superficially weighed against these measures. A closer analysis of the relevant rulings shows that the underlying factual predicates upon which these decisions relied have been radically undermined by advances in technology, and, therefore, the precedents are ripe for revisiting.

Our scholars have always maintained that the implementation of these laws was going to entail a ferocious battle, but that it was one that states could ultimately win. Therefore, we were vindicated and overjoyed, but not surprised, when the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the following:

Applying rational-basis review, the age-verification requirement is rationally related to the government’s legitimate interest in preventing minors’ access to pornography. . . . Therefore, the age- verification requirement does not violate the First Amendment.

We believe that the logic of this ruling can also be applied to age-verification for social media platforms. With this decision, we strongly encourage lawmakers in more states to adopt these types of laws, and prepare to fight for them all the way up to the Supreme Court. What we are striving for is nothing less than the heart and soul of America’s children.

In 2023, the Surgeon General of the U.S. issued an advisory on the apparent upsurge in youth mental health problems, calling it the “crisis of our time.” But amid the many reports issued by professional associations and federal and state agencies, a curious lack of attention has been paid to the roles that family dynamics play in creating or ameliorating stress for children. Nor has there been much mention of the part that families play in seeking out and working with professional psychological help when their offspring need it.

One of the major federal population surveys on children’s health issues, the National Survey on Children’s Health (NSCH) provides periodic information on both the health services that young people get, as well as on key characteristics of the different types of families in which they live.² What follows is my examination, using these data, of how a child’s family structure relates to his or her need for and receipt of mental health services.