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The Ideological Fertility Divide

June 2026 | by Graham Flynn, Isaiah Harold, Zoe Pritts, Josh Steiner, Wade Watkins, Timothy W. Taylor, Ken Burchfiel

June 2026

by Graham Flynn, Isaiah Harold, Zoe Pritts, Josh Steiner, Wade Watkins, Timothy W. Taylor, Ken Burchfiel

This IFS and Verity research brief finds that liberals are more likely to cite certain anxieties related to fertility decisions relative to conservatives.

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Liberals More Likely to Hold Beliefs Linked to Fewer Kids

Executive Summary

Birthrates have been declining precipitously throughout the United States since the Great Recession and more broadly since the postwar Baby Boom. Within this broad trend, a fertility "gap" has emerged between the American left and right. This report, based on survey results from a sample of over 7,000 Americans ages 18-54, analyzes ideological differences1 in anxieties related to parenting and self-perceived competence. To a limited extent, this report finds that liberals are more likely to cite certain anxieties related to fertility decisions relative to conservatives. For each of our sections, we find that the differing survey responses account for significant differences in fertility outcomes. 

Here are our major findings:

  • Liberals have fewer children than conservatives. Conservative respondents report 1.40 children compared to 1.09 for liberals. Similarly, 51% of liberals report zero children compared to 40% for conservatives. Both of these differences are statistically significant.
     
  • Parenting concerns are more prevalent among liberals than conservatives. For example, 18% of liberals are unsure whether they would be a good parent, compared to only 9% of conservatives. Similarly, whereas 36% of liberals view parenting as “very complicated, difficult, and stressful,” only 24% of conservatives do. Given that both beliefs are associated with fewer children, their increased prevalence among liberals may help explain the ideological fertility gap. 
  • Liberals are more likely to report genetic and mental health concerns. For example, 18% of liberals, but only 10% of conservatives, report worries that they will pass on bad genes or inheritable conditions to their children. Similar percentages of liberals (19%) and conservatives (10%) say that their mental health is currently not good enough for them to have children. Both statements are correlated with lower numbers of children—and may thus shed additional light on the conservative-liberal fertility gap.

Together, these findings indicate that concerns about parental competence, stress, mental health, and genetic conditions might, at least in part, account for the emerging fertility divergence between the American right and left.

Introduction: The Gap

It is a well-known fact that fertility has been decreasing across America over the last 65 years, yet the growing partisan fertility gap has only recently emerged as a measurable phenomenon. Research from 2024 found that, among women who were born in the years 1975 through 1979, conservatives had 2.1 children, moderates 1.8, and liberals just 1.5. Further research conducted by IFS in 2024 showed that more conservative counties have a dramatically higher number of children than more liberal ones.

Recent literature also shows that the number of desired children also differs between liberals and conservatives. For example, a 2024 study found that the gap in desired children has existed between the left and right since 1989, the first year they began tracking for the discrepancy. In this paper, the gap was initially explained by differences in religiosity between the two groups. 

However, in recent years, this gap has grown and can no longer be explained purely by religious differences. Ideological gaps in desired and actual fertility exist in our survey results as well. Among Americans ages 18-54, liberals have 1.09 children on average whereas conservatives have an average of 1.40 children, a difference of 29%. This gap proves statistically significant even when accounting for several important confounding variables including sex, religion, race, income, age, marital status, and education.


Figure 1. Mean number of children by ideology

This gap also manifests itself in accordance with the ideal family size. When asked within our survey if a person could choose exactly the number of children they wanted, conservatives report 2.71, moderates 2.43, and liberals 2.16. The differences between conservatives and both moderates and liberals remained statistically significant after accounting for our selected control variables. Lyman Stone, the director of the Pronatalism Initiative at IFS, and Scott Yenor reported that the partisan gap is only appreciable after 1994, meaning that this ideological gap in fertility preferences is a relatively recent discovery. 

Much has already been said about the emergence of this gap. However, much less has been done to explore the underlying reasons why this gap exists. This brief’s objective is to further the discussion of what these reasons might be. While survey data limits our ability to make conclusions about causality, we can still explore and identify the characteristics of this disparity.

We find that the ideological fertility gap operates along two related dimensions. First, conservatives report substantially greater confidence in their ability to parent well. Second, liberals are significantly more likely to be anxious about their mental health or genetic conditions. 

Liberal and Conservative Views on Parenting

We find that concerns about parenting have a particularly strong relationship with fertility outcomes. When people are not sure they would be good parents, or when they perceive parenting to be incredibly difficult and stressful, they have dramatically fewer kids than those who do not. We also find that liberals are more likely to endorse these concerns than conservatives. 

The following chart shows a notable difference in parenting fears between liberals and conservatives, with 18% of Liberals unsure whether they would be a good parent compared to only 9% of conservatives. A large majority of both groups do not believe they would be bad parents. However, among those who fear being a bad parent, the partisan gap is quite large—and, even when controlling for parental status and other variables,2 statistically significant. 


Figure 2. Percent of adults who agreed with statement, by ideology

Liberals are more likely to express uncertainty about their parenting ability. We can only hypothesize why this is, but it may relate to a greater sense of anxiety around parenting in general. 

Regardless of why this difference exists, it correlates closely with decreased fertility. Individuals who fear they might be bad parents have, on average, 0.50 kids compared to 1.35 children among those who think they would be good parents. In other words, respondents who believe they might not be good parents report 63% fewer children on average than those who do not hold this belief. It is hard to overstate how significant a difference this is. It represents the largest difference observed among the variables examined. This speaks strongly to the power of perceived competence in parenting.

As already shown, liberals are likely to hold this belief to a much higher degree than conservatives. It follows that one reason the fertility gap exists is that liberals have greater reservations about their ability to parent. In fact, after controlling for uncertainty about being a good parent, the difference in childlessness percentages between conservatives and liberals is no longer statistically significant.

Viewing parenting as difficult could also influence one’s fertility. Those who see parenting as stressful and complicated have only 1.05 children on average compared to 1.31 among those who do not. Thus, respondents who hold this perception around parenting have, on average, around 25% fewer kids—a significantly lower number. This is an intuitive gap, given that many people try to avoid things they find to be incredibly stressful and difficult.

As with doubting one’s parenting abilities, we find that characterizing parenting as difficult also varies by ideology. Significantly fewer conservatives (24%) see parenting as “very complicated, difficult, and stressful” compared to liberals (36%). This gap, which remains significant when controlling for other potential explanatory variables (including parental status), gives credence to the idea that liberals view parenting as a more costly endeavor than conservatives.


Figure 3. Percent of adults who agreed with statement, by ideology

However, even conservative respondents who do see parenting as very difficult are significantly less likely to be childless (42%) than are liberals who share this view (62%). In contrast, there is not a significant difference in the probability of being childless between conservatives (40%) and liberals (45%) who disagree that parenting is difficult. This suggests that being liberal and viewing parenting as difficult may have a particularly strong impact on childlessness. 

Taken together, there appears to be a clear difference between the worldviews of liberals and conservatives. Conservatives are less worried about the potential stress and difficulty of parenting, and also have higher levels of confidence in their ability to parent well. Given that these beliefs are correlated with greater numbers of children, these two worldviews surrounding parenting could further influence the fertility gap.

One caveat in interpreting these results is that we cannot be sure about causality. It is certainly plausible that fearing that one will be a bad parent, and viewing parenting as difficult, will reduce one’s likelihood of having children. However, it is also possible that the experience of raising kids itself makes one realize that they are a good parent—and that parenting, despite its challenges, is not as stressful and difficult as they once believed. Future longitudinal surveys could help us identify whether parenting worries are resulting in fewer kids; whether having kids lessens one’s parenting concerns; or whether some other factor is influencing both of these outcomes. 

Anxieties Across the Divide

The ideological differences in our survey results extend beyond parenting concerns. We also find that liberals are more likely than conservatives to report concerns about passing on bad genes; in addition, they more frequently cite their mental health as a reason for postponing children. Groups that identify with each anxiety tend to have significantly fewer children, on average, than those who are not worried about each topic. In particular, worries about genetics and mental health both reflect concerns about what kind of world or situation a child could be born into. Though few people in the aggregate endorse these concerns, liberals have cited genetic and mental health concerns as influencing their fertility preferences considerably more than their conservative counterparts.

To begin, those who are concerned about passing on genetic conditions tend to have fewer children. We asked survey respondents to either agree or disagree with the following statement: "I am worried I will pass on bad genes or inheritable conditions to my children." Potentially, people who are worried about passing on bad genetic traits may fear the burden it would place on themselves as the parent and on the development and life of the child.

We find a wide and statistically significant gap in fertility between those who affirmed this statement and those who did not. Within the survey, those who are worried about passing on inheritable conditions have, on average, 0.88 children, while those who disagree with the statement have 1.30 children. This shows that those who reported genetic concerns have 32% fewer children than those who were not worried.

Additionally, 18% of liberals are worried about passing down poor genetic conditions to their offspring; this percentage is significantly higher than that of conservatives (10%), even when controlling for parental status and other potential confounds. These results are striking, not only because only around 3.9% of American children have a genetic condition, but also because we would expect genetic conditions to be randomly assorted within our sample (thus preventing any relationship between ideology and genetics). 

Despite the presumably equivalent chances of having inheritable diseases, there is a significant divergence between liberals and conservatives on genetic concerns. This divergence holds even when applying controls. 


Figure 4. Percent of adults who agreed with statement, by ideology

Additionally, while 65% of liberals who affirm this statement are childless, the same is true for only 48% of those who do not affirm it. Meanwhile, we did not find a significant difference in childlessness shares between conservatives who affirm this statement (52%) and those who do not (39%).  Thus, the relationship between genetic concerns and childlessness appears more pronounced for liberals than for conservatives. 

Genetic factors are by no means the only anxiety related to childbearing that respondents cite. Roughly 1 in 7 respondents endorse the statement that “my mental health is not good enough for me to have children right now.” This statement has a clear negative correlation with respondents’ fertility: Those who consider mental health a significant concern have—on average—0.84 children, while those who disagree with that statement have an average of 1.30 children.

Again, there is partisan disagreement on the relevance of mental health to fertility decisions. About 19% of liberals affirm this statement compared to only 10% of conservatives; this difference is statistically significant even when controlling for parental status and other variables.

Given these findings, mental health concerns may help mediate the relationship between political ideology and fertility. Indeed, when limiting the analysis to respondents who endorse mental health concerns, we find that the percentage of liberals who are childless (70%) does not differ significantly from that of conservatives (56%).  Similarly, among those who don’t report this concern, the percentages of liberals (47%) and conservatives (38%) who are childless do not differ significantly either.


Figure 5. Percent of adults who agreed with statement, by ideology

In summary, mental health worries, like genetic concerns and parenting fears, are correlated with lower fertility—and are also more prevalent among liberals than conservatives. Looking at both variables, there is a consistent trend: increased anxiety and worries are correlated with having fewer children. In addition to this finding, liberals are more likely to have these anxieties than conservatives. This could help bring to light the reasoning that liberals might give for why they are having fewer children or no children at all. It could also provide insight into some of the factors that influence their fertility decisions.

Conclusion: The Gap Explored

Across multiple measures, ideological differences in parenting confidence and anxiety are strongly associated with differences in fertility outcomes. Conservatives report greater confidence in their ability to parent and lower levels of concern regarding mental health and genetic risk. Liberals, by contrast, are more likely to express these anxieties. The consistency of these associations suggests that worldview and self-perception may play a meaningful role in the emerging partisan fertility gap.

There are limitations within both the data and the statistical models used to draw these conclusions. The methods employed in this report cannot determine whether identifying as liberal leads individuals to adopt these views and ultimately have fewer children, or whether individuals who already hold these views and have lower fertility are more likely to identify as liberal. In other words, the direction of causality remains unclear. Another limitation concerns how political ideology was measured. Respondents were grouped into three simple categories: liberal, moderate, or conservative, which are somewhat ambiguous. Future research could include push questions of sliding scales to potentially ascertain more accurate data on where respondents fall on the political spectrum.

Even with these limitations, the overall pattern in the survey data is consistent. Liberals are more likely to report anxiety about their views on parenting and childrearing than conservatives. Although causal claims cannot be made, the cumulation of these associations suggest that political affiliation is linked to perceptions of parenthood and, in turn, to the emerging partisan fertility gap.

Editor's Note: To view the Appendix and reference notes, please download the full research brief below.

 


Report

Passing the Torch: How Faith Moves Across Generations

June 2026 | by Jesse Smith, Jane Lankes Smith

June 2026

by Jesse Smith, Jane Lankes Smith

This research collaboration between the Institute for Family Studies and Communio explores how parents can transmit lasting religious beliefs and practices to their children.

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Executive Summary

Religious affiliation and participation in the United States have declined steadily over the past several decades. Fewer Americans now attend worship services regularly, identify with a faith tradition, or describe religion as central to their daily lives. This shift is especially pronounced among younger cohorts, who are more likely than previous generations to report no religious affiliation and less likely to engage in institutional religious practices. While belief has not disappeared, it has become more individualized and less connected to church life. As a result, many religious communities now face a sustained pattern of generational decline rather than temporary fluctuation, raising concerns for churches and church members alike about the long-term vitality of their congregation.

Research consistently shows that families are the single most important factor in whether children adopt and maintain faith into adulthood. Congregational programs, clergy leadership, and peer networks matter as well, but they are most effective when reinforced within the home. Studies demonstrate that parental modeling, shared faith practices, and the quality of parent–child relationships are among the strongest predictors of adult religiosity. When faith is embedded in everyday routines through conversation, ritual, and visible commitment, children are more likely to internalize it as part of their enduring identity. Taken together, this body of evidence underscores the need for analysis of how family processes operate in practice and which specific parental behaviors most effectively foster durable Christian commitment.

Using data on American adults aged 25+ who were raised in a Christian faith, we examine how parents most effectively transmit faith to their children. Consistent with past research, we show:

  • Religious practice in childhood is highly predictive of religious practice in adulthood.
  • Higher parent–child relationship quality in childhood is associated with stronger retention of religious belief and practice in adulthood.
  • Higher parental marital quality is associated with greater faith transmission.
  • Congregational involvement on the part of both parents and adolescents is linked to higher levels of faith commitment when children reach adulthood.

Our findings suggest that if faith transmission from parents to children is to remain viable, efforts must focus on equipping both families and churches with practical tools and guidance for intergenerational faith formation. This includes helping parents integrate faith into everyday family life, providing robust faith communities and supports, promoting loving and stable family relationships in the household, and more. By centering families and supporting them intentionally, church communities can better address the decline of Christianity and sustain faith across generations.

We make the following recommendations for parents and pastors, which we elaborate on more fully in the report:

Recommendations for Parents

1) Be your children’s role model for faith

2) Prioritize strong marriages and parent-child relationships

3) Make faith formation a joint effort

4) Build religion into everyday family life

5) Make faith a regular topic of family conversation

Recommendations for Pastors

1) Guide parents—not just children—as part of religious education

2) Support strong marriages and coparenting relationships

3) Actively engage fathers

4) Create space for community

5) Invest in youth ministry

Introduction: The State of American Religion

Religious families in America are in a challenging situation. Religion in the United States is in decline by virtually every measure. Religious identification, worship attendance, and belief in God have all dropped by double-digit margins since the 1990s. Furthermore, research shows most of this decline is intergenerational. That is, rather than people becoming less religious over their adult lives, each new generation enters adulthood less faithful than the last one. This points to a decline that looks slow at first, since generational replacement is a slow process, but cascades into an avalanche over time as the most devout generations disappear and are replaced by more secular ones.

There is not any one reason for this decline, but rather several factors working together in a kind of “perfect storm.”

  • Social values have shifted away from authority and tradition, and toward individualism and autonomy. Children growing up in this cultural shift are primed to look at long-established religious institutions with suspicion. 
  • The end of the Cold War created a change in American identity where faith in God became less central
  • Early internet discourse in the mid-2000s and subsequent social media platforms exposed younger generations to doubts and atheist arguments and enabled them to form communities outside religious boundaries.  
  • Moral scandals on the part of Catholics and Protestants alike turned a lot of people off to organized religion.  
  • The partisan culture war led many on the political left and center to look askance at traditional religion, which they see as incompatible with their worldviews. 
  • Increased education and delayed family formation led young adults to stray further away from faith for longer periods of time, making return more difficult. 
  • As extracurricular activities in the teenage years and professional demands in adulthood have increased, for many people, faith was not so much abandoned as just crowded out.

In short, the decline of American Christianity is not due to any one thing, but rather multiple forces all working together.

Those who want to instill faith in younger generations are thus facing an uphill battle, and parents are the front line in that battle. While pastors and churches play a vital supporting role, they cannot minister to youth who never pass through their doors in the first place. Furthermore, they have lost the support of the larger culture, and so are not naturally viewed by younger generations as legitimate authorities. If children are going to learn the importance of religion, carry it with them into adulthood, and pass it on to their own children, this must happen most centrally in the home.

While the challenge is formidable, there is some good news. Research confirms that there is quite a lot parents can do to maximize the chances that their kids will carry on the faith.1 While these steps may be difficult or demanding at times, they are not mysterious. Indeed, for the most part they line up with common sense. Parents can pass down faith by practicing it themselves and preaching what they practice. Specifically: 

  • By modeling religion, they show their kids what it should look like. 
  • By making religion a family activity, they let their children practice it themselves and make it feel like a natural part of life. 
  • By talking about faith at home, they help their children understand religion and why it matters.

All this should be done in the context of a loving and stable home, and with the support of a strong church community, so children have a powerful sense of the many goods Christianity can provide. If parents do these things, it is far more likely that their children will develop faith commitments that endure even after they leave the nest, and someday build their own.

This report provides an overview of what empirical research tells us about what helps parents pass down the faith to the next generation. Drawing on a number of data sources, it examines the specific practices that are most effective in the task of faith formation. Though our primary focus is on family life, parents cannot do it alone. They not only need guidance and moral support but—as this report will show—they need programmatic support from their congregations as well. The key ingredients for passing on the faith are devoted parents embedded in strong, active church communities where pastors and leaders take faith formation seriously.

Faith Environment in Childhood

In previous eras of American history, parents could have a realistic expectation that Christian beliefs and values would be reinforced for their children by their larger social contexts, including friends, neighbors, schools, and the media. In most parts of the country, that is no longer the case today. If children are going to learn Christian beliefs and practices, this must happen first and foremost in the home and be guided by parents. 

Parents Are the First Role Models

Research confirms that the strongest predictor of how religious children become is how religious their parents were during their upbringing. Parents are the most important spiritual role models.

Religious commitment has multiple dimensions, with core characteristics including worship attendance, subjective importance of religion in people’s lives, and personal practices, such as regular prayer. The figures below show that when parents rate highly on these dimensions, their children are more likely to do the same later in adulthood. For instance, when parents reported attending church weekly while raising their children, a predicted 26% of their children did the same in their 30s and 40s, compared to only 12% whose parents were not weekly attenders.

Similarly, when parents identified religion as being very important in their lives, nearly two-thirds of their children were predicted to say the same as adults, compared to less than half of those whose parents did not affirm the high importance of religion. Finally, parents who prayed daily had a 47% chance of having children who did the same as adults, compared to less than one-third when parents did not pray daily.

Taken together, these patterns underscore a central point: children tend to mirror what they consistently observe in their parents’ lives.

Putting the "Practice" in Religious Practice

While modeling religious commitment is a good start, parents who want to raise faithful children must go beyond this and involve them in religious practices. While it is not always clear from the data, it is safe to assume that most parents who attend church are bringing their children with them, particularly when their children are younger. Such participation is critical for cultivating religious habits, transmitting teachings, and fostering a sense of embeddedness within a church community. 

At the same time, focusing only on weekly attendance may lead children to see faith as something limited to Sundays. To mitigate this, parents should make efforts to work faith into the rhythm of family life throughout the week.

Results from the National Study of Youth and Religion highlight two family-based spiritual practices that can make a difference: 1) saying grace before meals, and 2) praying together as a family (in addition to prayer at mealtimes or church services). Families that engage in these practices are more likely to raise children who remain faithful into adulthood, as reflected across multiple measures. Children who participate in these practices with their parents are more likely to go to church, say religion is very important to them, pray regularly, identify as Christian, and report belief in the divinity of Jesus Christ by the time they reach their mid-to-late 20s.

The results in this figure show that the foundations of Christian faith are more durable when they are formed in the rhythms of daily life in a family context.

Preaching What You Practice

A great deal of emphasis is rightly placed on religious practice in the family. Church attendance, acts of worship, prayer, scripture reading, and similar behaviors are all central to Christian life, not only as ways of turning toward God but also a way of developing faithful habits, feelings, and a sense of a shared community that bring Christianity to life and make it part of time and physical space. The importance of these practices for faith formation cannot be overstated. 

Yet they are also not enough. Parents need to be willing to not only practice but also talk about religion regularly at home. This is for several reasons:

  • Theological teachings can be complicated and nonintuitive, so children need instruction to understand them.
  • In a secularizing culture, even children in religious households may develop a sense that their religious lives at home, however positive, don’t have much to do with the concerns of the outside world like getting good grades, engaging in hobbies or extracurricular activities, or maintaining good friendships.
  • As kids get older and encounter arguments against Christian beliefs, they may find their faith shaken if they haven’t been prepared.

In short, to sustain faith commitments in a world that doesn’t support them, children need to understand the “What?” and “Why?” of religion, and it is up to parents (with the support of their churches and other sources) to articulate the answers to those questions. Spiritual formation must feed the mind as well as the body and soul.

This is clear in the data, which show that talking about religion at home growing up is one of the strongest predictors of becoming a religious adult. Children who grew up in a household where faith was discussed several times a week or more were over twice as likely to attend church, say religion was very important to them, and pray daily in young adulthood, and around 20 percentage points more likely to identify as a Christian and believe in the divinity of Jesus Christ.

These results contain an important lesson that runs counter to some modern conventional wisdom. Many parents worry about bringing up faith too much with their children for fear of driving them away or “jamming it down their throats.” Some may worry that they’ll be unable to answer their children’s questions, or shy away from talking about moral teachings that conflict with many modern views, especially about sex and marriage. Parents may hope that quietly modeling faithful lives and putting a good face on religion will be enough, and that too much religion talk might seem strange, off-putting, or drift into uncomfortable topics. We should not dismiss these concerns altogether. Some people do report being turned off to religion when their parents came on too strong, or having their faith shaken when adults could not answer their questions or when difficult conversations were handled poorly. Such discussions can come at a cost when parents come off as dogmatic, preachy, or ill-prepared.

Yet, according to the data, efforts to pass on the faith are more often undermined not by parents laying it on too thick, but by taking too light a touch. The relevance of Christianity in modern life isn’t affirmed by the larger culture, and if kids aren’t taught why and how faith matters, they are likely to assume that it does not matter—or at best, that faith is just one “lifestyle choice” among others. If they are not free to ask hard questions about religion, they may assume there are no answers. It thus falls on parents to set a tone in the household where talk of religion is normal and to prepare for the hard theological or moral conversations, especially as their kids get older. This is a key area where churches and religious leaders are in a position to offer guidance and serve as key resources for both parents and youth.

Forming a United Front

Parents must also work together to provide consistency. If parents present a united front on the importance of faith as well as the content of theological teachings, children are more likely to internalize these messages. On the other hand, if parents send their children mixed messages or undermine one another’s efforts, whether intentionally or not, children are more likely to conclude that faith is something optional rather than central. When parents are in religious tension, it will further be harder to integrate faith into the rhythms of family life where children are especially likely to feel its importance and develop religious attachments. Parent efforts oriented around a shared family vision are thus vital for both the concentration and consistency of faith formation. 

When comparing religious outcomes for adult children based on shared parent faith, we see that when parents are religiously alike, their children are more likely to exhibit religious commitments in adulthood.

Interfaith parents sometimes respond to theological differences by adopting a “choose for yourself” approach, emphasizing autonomy and delaying firm guidance until children are older. While well-intentioned, this strategy appears to weaken religious transmission. Research suggests children raised by interfaith or religiously discordant parents, especially those who leave religious choice entirely up to the child, exhibit lower levels of religious practice and belief in adulthood. This pattern reflects a broader sociological principle: identities are more likely to be adopted and maintained when they are modeled, reinforced, and treated as meaningful by authoritative figures, rather than presented as one option among many. 

Mixed-faith parents who share a goal of raising religious children but differ in preferred approach will face additional challenges. Still, the more they can find common ground around a shared religious messaging and practices, the more likely their children are to grow up valuing religion

The Importance of Fathers

In the United States, responsibility for children’s faith formation is disproportionately carried by mothers, even in households where both parents identify as devout. Mothers tend to take the lead in parent-child religious communication, initiating faith conversations more frequently than fathers and participating more consistently in religious discussions at home. For example:

  • When asked “Who is more responsible for how your children learn about religion?” just 17% of dads cited themselves, compared to 39% of moms. 
  • Teenagers who attend church are most likely to attend with both their mother and father. However, among those who only attend with one parent, 79% attend with their mother, compared with 21% who attend with their father. 
  • Even among regular churchgoers, mothers report significantly more frequent faith-encouraging conversations with their children than fathers.  

Yet intergenerational transmission of religion is strongest when both parents actively promote faith within the home. Children are more likely to retain Christian beliefs and practices into adulthood when they receive consistent messaging from both mothers and fathers rather than relying on one parent alone. In other words, two involved parents are better than one.

  • 41% of children who attend church weekly with both parents will go on to attend church weekly as an adult. This percentage drops to 29% if children attend with only one parent. 
  • Similar patterns exist for prayer, reading sacred texts, belief in God, and religious importance.

Individuals who had faith conversations with both parents in childhood also had significantly more faith conversations with their own children (p < .001), suggesting that parent–child religious interactions in one generation may shape how faith is transmitted in the next.

Thus, the evidence suggests that faith formation is most effective when it is a shared parental responsibility.

Making the Home a Haven

If the home provides the foundation for children’s faith formation, parents must do everything they can to ensure that this foundation is strong. Since religious life and family life are deeply intertwined, providing a happy and healthy family life helps children appreciate the value of religion. In contrast, kids who grow up with more negative or distant feelings toward their families are likely to feel detached from their childhood faith as well. Research points to two areas of family life that play a key role for faith formation: marital stability and family closeness.

Marital Stability

Children are most likely to grow up religious when they were raised by two married parents. This relationship can be explained by at least two possible direct pathways. 

First, as noted above, faith formation takes a lot of concentrated effort, and two committed parents may have the most time and energy to devote to these tasks. Establishing and maintaining religious routines, applying time and expertise to family religious discussions, recognizing and responding to children’s particular spiritual needs and struggles, and facilitating logistical or financial support for children’s religious activities are all demanding tasks for which more “manpower” might make a difference. If children’s faith formation is seen as a kind of investment, then two married parents will simply have more to invest, not only for particular children but for fostering an overall faith-based family culture. This pathway has received limited attention in existing research, but is consistent with both theories of religious investment and our findings:

  • Compared to non-married individuals, married individuals have significantly more faith conversations with their children, suggesting more frequent and intentional engagement within the home.
  • Consistent with this pattern, individuals who grew up with married parents have a higher likelihood of attending church weekly, praying daily, reading sacred texts, believing in God, and having high religious importance in adulthood.

A second plausible pathway relates to the perceived contradiction between Christian doctrine on marriage and a child’s lived experience. Catholic and Protestant denominations alike teach that marriage is an image or icon of Christ’s relationship with the church. When a child’s lived experience at home differs from the marriage “ideal” presented in the Bible, in sermons, or in Sunday school, this may create a form of cognitive dissonance that makes maintaining religious commitment more difficult as a child moves into adulthood.

The pathway may also be more indirect. For children, the experience of family breakups or single parents being stretched thin produces distress, and this may lead them to distance themselves from their childhood origins, both socially and emotionally in adulthood. This distance may extend to their Christian background. Whatever the reason, research is clear that children raised in a household with their own married parents will tend to be the most religious in adulthood. 

While the benefits of having married parents for religious transmission is a consistent finding, patterns for other family structures are less clear. In the Add Health data set, two distinctive results emerge. First, children are least likely to grow up to attend worship when they come from stepfamilies, and second, this effect is much stronger for boys than girls. Specifically, boys who grow up in married households have a 14% probability of attending regular worship in adulthood, compared to 5% for boys from stepfamilies—a gap of 9 percentage points. For girls, this gap is only 4 percentage points, and it is not statistically significant.

When examining the NSYR data set, however, we arrive at different findings. Here, the key difference is between married and single-parent households. Specifically, children from married households have a 19% probability of attending weekly worship in adulthood, compared to only 10% for those from single-parent households. In this case, the gap between married and cohabiting or stepfamily households is smaller and not statistically significant. We also see no differences between boys and girls. 

This mix of findings makes it difficult to draw strong conclusions about what religious transmission looks like for different family forms. The pattern does support the general point, however, that married parents have the most advantages when it comes to the faith formation of their children.

Marital Satisfaction

Importantly, religious transmission is shaped not just by marital stability, but also marital quality. When parents are in unhappy or high-conflict marriages, this may undermine their effectiveness in handing down the faith. Parents in troubled marriages are likely to have more difficulty coordinating the time and effort needed for effective faith formation. When children see loving, harmonious marriages preached at church but witness marital strife at home, this creates cognitive dissonance that makes Christianity harder to internalize. The distress of these experiences can contribute to distancing from both family and faith after children leave the home. Efforts to pass on faith thus benefit from not only stable but also happy and healthy marriages. 

The importance of happy marriages is affirmed in our analyses. Among parents currently raising children, those who were “completely” satisfied in their marriages reported having nearly five faith-related conversations with their children per week, compared to less than four when parents were “not very” or “not at all” satisfied. 

This reduced religious socialization may have long-term effects. Our longitudinal results showed that when parents reported being very happy in their marriages, their children showed a predicted 46% probability of praying daily in adulthood, compared to only 41% when parents had less happy marriages.

In summary, stable marriages support consistent religious practice, reinforce parental modeling, and provide a relational environment in which Christian beliefs and practices are more easily internalized and sustained into adulthood. In contrast, family structure disruptions, including divorce, are associated with declines in religious participation among adolescents and young adults. Overall, evidence suggests that marital stability creates social and relational conditions that make religious transmission more likely to succeed. 

Parent-Child Relationship Quality

In order for parents’ faith modeling, practicing, and preaching to be effective, they must form and maintain close and loving relationships with their children. Children who feel loved and understood are more likely to identify with their parents and remain open to their guidance. Strong relationships also improve communication, allowing parents to convey religious beliefs and practices more clearly and credibly. In this way, the quality of the parent–child relationship serves as a foundation for faith formation. 

Consistent with this, individuals who report close, supportive, and communicative relationships with their parents—particularly during adolescence—are more likely to retain their parents’ religious affiliation, attend services, and report higher levels of religiosity later in life. High-quality relationships appear to strengthen the intergenerational transmission of religion by increasing the credibility of parental modeling and making children more receptive to parents’ values and practices. Conversely, conflictual or distant relationships weaken this transmission process, even when parents are themselves highly religious.

Our findings align with this broader literature: the quality of the father–child relationship is strongly associated with faith in adulthood. Compared to those who had a very badsomewhat bad, or somewhat good relationship with their father growing up, those who had a very good relationship have…

The same pattern appears when examining relationships with mothers. Those who had a very good relationship with their mother in childhood have…

Once again, there is a compounding effect: adults who report strong relationships with both parents exhibit the highest levels of religiosity across measures. Those who had a very good relationship with both parents in childhood have…

Research suggests parent–child relationship quality does not transmit religion by itself, but it creates the relational conditions under which transmission becomes more likely. Warm, supportive relationships make parental modeling credible, increase openness to instruction, and strengthen identification with parents—processes that collectively raise the probability that children retain Christian beliefs and practices into adulthood. 

Media Oversight

One of the challenges of parenthood is striking a balance between being a friend on the one hand and an authority figure on the other. Parents are responsible for establishing warm and loving relationships with their children, but also for setting rules and boundaries. According to psychologist Diana Baumrind, children do best when their parents love them unconditionally but also hold them to a high standard.  This insight can be applied to faith formation.

One way that parents can set appropriate boundaries is by paying close attention to the children’s media diet. This is especially important today, when much of the available content is unfriendly to Christian values, social media addiction is rampant, and the threat of pornography looms large. 

Our findings confirm that when parents monitor their teens’ media more closely, they are more likely to produce religious children. When parents closely monitored TV time, their kids were more likely to attend worship, say religion is very important, pray daily, identify as Christian, and believe in Jesus in young adulthood. When they closely monitored internet access, the same result held for each outcome except weekly attendance, as the figure shows.

It’s worth noting the data on media exposure in childhood were collected in 2003, before widespread high-speed internet, social media, and the advent of smartphones. The long-term effects of contemporary children’s media environments—which are both more pervasive and more immersive—on adult religiosity have yet to fully emerge, though existing evidence raises significant concerns about their trajectories. As such, the importance of monitoring electronics in childhood is almost certainly even more central now than it was in previous decades. 

The Importance of Congregation and Community

This report has emphasized that parents play the single most important role in passing on faith to the next generation. A wealth of evidence supports this conclusion. But this does not mean that church leaders or congregations are left sitting on the sideline. For one thing, they make communal religious practice possible in the first place. Parents seeking to practice Christianity with their children need a church to worship in and a pastor to lead the service. At a bare minimum, religious leaders are needed to keep Christian institutions functional and available for the souls who need them, and this is no small task.

But the role of churches is much more than this. Parents need support, not only from clergy and ministers but from other believers, and supportive community is best fostered in the context of congregations. By embedding themselves in church communities, parents are able to show their children how religion can meet social, civic, psychological, or even professional, as well as spiritual needs. By intentionally creating communities that welcome youth and young adults, pastors can show that faith provides resources for navigating challenges at any stage of life. Though parents may be the front line, faith formation can be viewed as a partnership between parents, pastors, and congregations.

Church Isn't Just for Sundays

Parents can both embed their families in religious contexts and model strong commitment by attending church activities outside of Sunday services. By attending gatherings such as potlucks, holiday festivals, competitions, and similar programs, parents establish a social network with others who share their beliefs and commitments, reinforcing these for their children. This helps create a social world where religious commitment is not only normal but desirable—and establishes a buffer for children against a world where religion is either ignored, treated as a lifestyle choice, or viewed as an outright pathology. 

Institutional religion provides not just spiritual benefits or opportunities for socializing but also acts as a concrete vehicle for doing good in the world, whether aimed at fellow congregants or larger social causes. Through volunteering and ministry, parents can show their children the immense social benefits religion provides not only for individuals but for society as a whole. 

When parents either attend church activities outside of worship services at least once a month or engage in any amount of religious volunteering, their children are more likely to be highly religious in young adulthood 10 years later, as the figure illustrates.

Youth Programming Matters

Though parents play the central role in their children’s faith formation, this role changes as children get older. As they enter adolescence, kids develop a stronger desire for independence and both a mental and a social world more differentiated from their family environments. As many parents can attest, teenagers often appear more invested in their friend groups than their families. While this shift away from parents and towards peers is sometimes overstated, it is nonetheless a real phenomenon that parents and pastors alike must take seriously. 

This means youth programming and ministries serve a vital function in keeping kids engaged. Our data suggest the availability of these programs can have a lasting impact on children’s spiritual trajectories. When parents encourage their children to participate in a youth group, they were more likely to exhibit high religiosity in young adulthood across multiple indicators. For instance, 22% of children who were encouraged to attend youth group as teenagers attended church weekly at ages 25–28, compared to only 9% who were not similarly encouraged.

We see similar effects for the availability of youth ministries. When parents reported attending a congregation that prioritized youth ministry, their children were once again more likely to exhibit high religious commitment across multiple outcomes. 

The importance of religious programming is further underscored when examining activities such as church camps and retreats. Children who reported having ever attended either of these when they were growing up were more likely to exhibit high religious commitment 10 years later, as shown in the figure.

This means it is both incumbent upon churches to provide these ministries, and upon parents to seek out congregations that offer this kind of support for their teenagers.

Tying It All Together

Taken together, our analyses support a kind of nested model of effective religious transmission down through generations. 

The first layer of this nest is the family household. Here, parents’ first priority should be to establish close, stable, and loving relationships both with one another and with their children. A happy, healthy home provides an ideal context where children look up to and identify with their parents, and so will be most open to their guidance. Once this “nest” is secure, parents are ready to lay a strong faith foundation in family life. This involves modeling strong religious commitments for children, facilitating their children’s own practices through regular worship and family rituals and routines, and making faith a regular topic of conversation so children develop a rational understanding of why and how religion matters. Faith should serve as a kind of glue that helps keep family bonds strong, and should be present seven days a week, not just one.

The second layer of the “nest” is the religious congregation. The congregation provides the supportive community and guidance that parents need as they take on the challenging task of their children’s faith formation. It provides a means of religious involvement outside the home and weekly services and therefore gives children a broader view of the expansive role Christianity can play in their lives. It provides opportunities for engagement and a social world that meets the needs of the whole human person, as well as a buffer against secularizing influences in the larger culture. It also provides programming to meet the distinctive social and developmental needs that come with the transition to adolescence, helping parents and teens alike to navigate what can sometimes be rocky territory.

As our data and an expansive body of existing research confirm, children raised in a strong religious nest of this kind are the most likely to carry their faith with them into adulthood—and hopefully, to their own children as well. Even with all these supports in place, many children still fall away. The challenges to maintaining strong religious commitments in a secularizing culture, both for our children and for ourselves, are formidable. But this report shows that there is plenty that parents and pastors can do to maximize the chances of their kids keeping the faith. Beyond these steps, there is no substitute for steady prayer and trust in the grace of God.

10 Recommendations for Fostering Lasting Religiousity

FOR PARENTS:

1) Be your children’s role model for faith

You are the first and most important religious figure in your children’s lives. You must show them what it means to live a life founded on faith.

In practice, this may look like:

  • Attending worship with children on a regular basis;
  • Letting them see you pray, read scripture, and engage in other devotional activities;
  • Making Christian images or symbols visible in the home and other regular environments;
  • Letting them know how faith shapes how you live life and make decisions; and
  • Prioritizing faith and church commitments over other things (going to social events, watching the game, traveling) when they conflict.

2) Prioritize strong marriages and parent-child relationships

Shared norms and beliefs are more readily established in families where parents form warm, close relationships with both one another and their children.

In practice, for marriage this may look like:

  • Continuing to date one another regularly, even if it’s something as simple as a coffee outing or movie night at home;
  • Having daily wind-down times for spouses to talk to one another without distraction, process the day, and share challenges and success; and
  • Annually participating in skills-based marriage retreats or classes that can enhance marital success.

For parenthood, this may look like:

  • Spending shared time (e.g., reading, talking at meals, playing, or working on small tasks together) to build familiarity and trust, which strengthens the emotional bond between all family members;
  • Listening attentively to children and taking their perspective seriously, ensuring that they feel heard;
  • Expressing affection and encouragement for children in order to communicate acceptance and support; and
  • Setting clear rules and maintaining calm, predictable responses during conflict to help children feel secure even when discipline is necessary.

3) Make faith formation a joint effort

Both mothers and fathers should take active, intentional roles in children’s faith formation.

In practice, this may look like:

  • Engaging in religious activities like going to church, praying, or reading scripture as a family;
  • Coordinating with one another to ensure consistency in what is taught to children;
  • Finding ways for each parent to engage and lead in ways they feel are consistent with their gifts. For example, if one parent is more inclined toward prayer and another more inclined toward study, the parent inclined toward prayer can be the one who calls the family to prayer, while the parent inclined toward study can lead in teaching. In either case, the other parent should be seen as being supportive;
  • In mixed-faith households, identifying what both parents agree on and organizing household religious activities around that; and
  • In households with only one religious parent, allowing the religious parent to take the lead and securing the support of the nonreligious parent as much as possible.

4) Build religion into everyday family life

Religion must be part of the normal family routine, not just something for Sundays.

In practice, this may look like:

  • Saying grace before meals;
  • Saying family prayers at bedtime or other points throughout the day;
  • Regularly reading scriptures or devotionals;
  • Having Christian music, TV, or other programming in the household; and
  • Normalizing Christian imagery or symbols in family culture, whether through artwork, clothing, bumper stickers, or whatever else feels comfortable.

5) Make faith a regular topic of family conversation

In a secularizing society, children need to be taught to engage with what faith means and how it is relevant to their lives. If they don’t learn this from their families, they likely won’t learn it at all.

In practice, this may look like:

  • Initiating conversations about scripture, church sermons, or other faith topics through a simple question or prompt during a car ride or while running errands;
  • Finding ways to insert Christian teachings, Bible stories, or other faith material in conversations where it is relevant;
  • Narrating the role of religion in personal thinking and decision-making (e.g., giving credit to God for blessings in life or work);
  • Listening as well as talking, ensuring children can express what they find compelling, confusing, or difficult in their religious lives;
  • Talking about moral situations children encounter at school or in the news and how we should think about them as Christians; and
  • Seeking avenues to develop one’s own moral and theological knowledge to be able to discuss it with children more effectively.

FOR PASTORS:

1) Guide parents—not just children—as part of religious education

Parents need a strong understanding of the central role they play in children’s faith formation, and support in carrying out that role.

In practice, this may look like:

  • Emphasizing the importance of parents in sermons and other messaging;
  • Balancing efforts at prompting parents to take their role seriously, affirm their efforts and struggles, and consult with them on particular challenges they face;
  • Providing classes, support groups, or other programming to offer parents assistance in faith formation;
  • Creating literature based on observed parental needs that provides guidance in faith formation; and
  • Encouraging specific podcasts, audiobooks, or small group pathways for adults to become more educated on scripture and their faith to feel comfortable guiding their children.

2) Support strong marriages and coparenting relationships

Many parents need help working together before they are ready to take on the challenging tasks of their children’s faith formation.

In practice, this may look like:

  • Preaching regularly (ideally monthly and not less than quarterly) on the importance of investing in your own marriage and discipling your children;
  • Developing an ongoing relationship and marriage ministry with multiple pathways to building both the spiritual and the human skills of living out Christian marriage, including skills-based programs that are delivered one-to-many, one-to-some, and one-to-one;
  • Having church leaders set a strong example where leaders are the first to participate in the relationship and marriage ministry appropriate for their situation. This helps everyone know that this is a ministry for the whole church and not just for people who are struggling;
  • Providing date night or other bonding opportunities for parents through organized activities or targeted provision of child care;
  • Finding ways to recognize and reward couples who complete and participate in a church’s marriage ministry, such as an annual, invite-only dinner in the pastor’s home for couples who completed the marriage ministry;
  • Providing qualified pastoral counseling for parents seeking to improve relationships; and
  • Identifying resources for different family situations (e.g., married couples, stepfamilies, and single parents in coparenting arrangements) based on congregant needs.

3) Actively engage fathers

Religious foundation is stronger when fathers are involved.

In practice, this may look like:

  • Emphasizing the importance of the father’s involvement in faith formation sermons and other religious messaging;
  • Encouraging fathers to adopt specific, distinctive roles at home such as regularly leading family prayer, so that men have a dedicated domain of responsibility;
  • Organizing men’s groups where fathers can both share challenges and hold one another accountable for involvement in the religious life of their families;
  • Thinking of ways to appeal to men specifically when developing marriage and family ministries; and
  • Organizing father-child activities such as dances (for daughters) or wilderness trips (for sons) that specifically target father involvement.

4) Create space for community

Parents need supportive communities to help with their children’s faith formation, both formally and informally.

In practice, this may look like:

  • Hosting potlucks, holiday celebrations, and other shared, informal social events;
  • Establishing hobby or shared interest affinity groups (e.g., hiking groups, fantasy football leagues);
  • Organizing informal athletic events (e.g., park “pick-up” sessions); and
  • Creating “skill-swap” volunteer events that bring congregants together for church maintenance.

5) Invest in youth ministry

Youth have distinctive needs. Teens in particular need their own spaces.

In practice, this may look like:

  • Hiring, where possible, a dedicated youth minister with demonstrated ability for engaging teenagers;
  • Hosting regular youth group meetings;
  • Hosting camps and retreats for more intensive experiences of youth spiritual formation;
  • Meeting youth where they are as individuals, such as by listening to their struggles and taking an interest in their activities; and developing “rite of passage” milestones, such as formal blessings, wilderness trips, or confirmation celebrations so that youth associate maturity with spiritual practices.

Editor's Note: Download the full report for the Data and Methods, Reference, and Appendix sections.



Report

Renewing Arizona Families: Why Strong Families are Central to Arizona’s Future

May 2026 | by Brad Wilcox, Grant Bailey, Sophie Anderson, Peter Gentala, Bob Trent

May 2026

by Brad Wilcox, Grant Bailey, Sophie Anderson, Peter Gentala, Bob Trent

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Introduction

Arizona is one of the top 10  fastest growing states in the U.S., attracting roughly 210 new residents every day. There’s a lot to love about the Grand Canyon State. 

Historian Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis held that American democracy and the American Dream were indelibly shaped by the existence of the frontier. By giving Americans settling in the West a shot at a new and better life, the frontier advanced economic liberty and social equality for the nation. Arizona has long played a central role in both advancing and embodying the American Dream as a frontier state.

The state motto, "Ditat Deus" (Latin for "God Enriches"), has been part of Arizona’s history since Abraham Lincoln recognized the Arizona Territory in 1863. The motto reflects the belief that the desert territory and the faithfulness of its inhabitants would yield remarkable prosperity. Throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the state attracted waves of pioneers drawn by promising opportunities: agriculture, ranching, mining, tourism, and more recently, a business-friendly and attractive retirement ethos. Throughout its history as a territory and state, Arizona has been a destination for Americans and immigrants seeking a new and prosperous life in the beautiful Southwest.

Today, the realization of the Arizona Dream depends, in no small part, on strong families. Children from healthy, thriving families and adults who head up such families are more likely to flourish socially, emotionally, and financially in the Grand Canyon State. 

This new, ground-breaking report explains how strong families matter to the fortunes of those seeking the Arizona Dream and what public policy can do to strengthen marriage and family life across the state.

Section I: Thriving Children

Getting off to a strong educational start is essential to realizing the Arizona Dream. This report shows that Arizona kids are more likely to get a good education when they come from strong and stable families. Teachers and school administrators will attest to this because they see its truth demonstrated every year in the students who pass through their classrooms. Children coming from intact families where the mother and father are both involved in their children’s lives are, on average, more likely to have the social, emotional, and financial resources they need to flourish in Arizona. 

This is consistent with what leading think tanks and scholars have found in the research on child well-being over the years. The Annie E. Casey Foundation notes, for instance, that children:

growing up in single-parent families typically do not have the same economic or human resources available as those growing up in two-parent families. Single parents also are more likely to experience high stress and depression–especially single moms–as well as limited social support. These factors can affect kids, with those growing up in single-parent families facing greater risks of academic, emotional and behavioral problems. 

Likewise, family scholars find that marriage boosts the welfare of children in a range of ways. In the words of economist Melissa Kearney:

… [S]tudy after study suggests that a married-parent family tends to confer benefits to children in the form of greater resources during childhood, and that these increased resources then translate into better opportunities and greater educational attainment, among other outcomes.

The data we analyzed in Arizona tell a similar story for children in the Grand Canyon State.

School Performance

Looking at Arizona children ages 6 to 17 in the National Survey of Children’s Health 2022-2024, we find that 85% of children living with their intact married parents received A’s and B’s compared to 64% of those from single-mother homes, and 65% with other family structures. Just 15% of children living with their married biological parents received poor grades (B’s and C’s or lower), compared to over a third from single-mother and other homes.
 
Figure 1. Percent of children ages 6-17 who earned poor grades by family status and sex.

This is a profound difference. Indeed, with controls for age, sex, race, income, and parental education and immigration status, children from non-intact families are about 91% more likely to be earning poor grades than children from intact families.

Reading Proficiency

The link between family and academic success also shows up at the community level. Arizona school districts with a higher share of married-couple households tend to have higher reading proficiency scores, a fundamental requirement for future academic and life success.

Figure 2. Percent of school-age children proficient in Reading/Language Arts by share of married households, by AZ school district.            

For instance, 60% of students in Higley Unified School District in Gilbert tested proficient in English Language Arts. It is no coincidence that 77% of households with children in this district are led by married parents. In Flowing Wells Unified District, on the other hand, where only 54% of households with children have married parents, 35% of students tested proficient in English Language Arts despite the district spending about 60% more per-student on classroom support than Higley ($1,138 per student vs. $734 per student). The trendlines of reading proficiency and per capita married-parent homes tend to track closely in school districts across the state.

Again, teachers and school administrators see this regularly. 

This trendline holds true when looking at married households by race and ethnicity. Children raised in married-parent homes have, on average, higher reading proficiency rates. This is true for Hispanic, Native American, Black, and White students in school districts across Arizona.

Figure 3. Percent of school-age children proficient in Reading/Language Arts by share of married households, AZ school district, and race.

For Hispanic, White, Native American, and Black Arizonans, school districts with more married families tend to have higher shares of children scoring proficient on the English Language Arts section of Arizona’s Academic Standards Assessment (AASA) for grades 3 through 8, and on the ACT Aspire for grades 9 and 11.

In a multivariate model, controlling for income levels within school districts and student population race, we find that the districts with the highest share of married-parent families have a 43-percentage-point proficiency advantage in English Language Arts over those districts with the lowest share of kids living with married parents. By contrast, the highest-earning school districts have a 27-percentage-point advantage in ELA proficiency over lowest-earning school districts, after controls for family structure and race. 

Figure 4. Estimated percent of AZ students proficient in English Language Arts by race and income.

A 27-percentage-point difference is significant. But crucially here, the married-parent household advantage is larger than income. In other words, children living in districts with more married-parent families tend to outperform those living in richer districts, all things being equal. 

After controls for district level income and share of family households headed by married adults, we find that non-White race and ethnic groups, including Hispanic, Black, and Native American student populations, still have lower reading proficiency rates than White students. But, again, family structure is more predictive of reading proficiency than race and ethnicity.

School Contacts for Misbehavior or Learning Problems

Children living in non-intact family households are also more likely to be contacted by the school for poor academic performance or behavioral conduct. 

Figure 5. Percent of children ages 6-17 who had parents contacted by school, by family structure and student sex.

Net of controls, Arizona students from non-intact families are 33% more likely to have their parents contacted by their school for behavioral or learning issues.

These trends also apply across most major racial and ethnic groups in Arizona: Whites, Hispanics, Native Americans, and Blacks. The next figure shows how school contacts vary significantly by intact vs. non-intact families, except for Hispanic children. What’s apparent is that kids from intact, married families in nearly all racial/ethnic groups are markedly more likely to get better grades and avoid school contacts for behavioral or academic problems.

Figure 6. Percent of children ages 6-17 who had parents contacted by school, by race and family status.

In general, then, Arizona children get a boost from strong and stable families when it comes to school. Let us now move from education to mental health.

Child Mental Health and Well-Being

Depression is a leading cause of disability and difficulty among young people today. Since 1990, rates of depression have increased by over 50% to epidemic proportions for those under age 30. More concerning, people born after 2000 show even higher prevalence of depression. One study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association reports the incidence of clinical depression has increased by approximately 60% for youth ages 5 to 22 in Arizona’s neighbor, Southern California.

Harvard social scientist Arthur Brooks noted last year that global research on happiness reveals “the United States dropped to its lowest ranking since that survey began—and that result was driven by the unhappiness of people under 30 in this country. So what’s going on?

What’s going on, indeed.

Family is definitely part of the story, both across the nation and in Arizona. Family instability is strongly associated with increased prevalence of depression in young people. As the figure shows, children in Arizona living in non-intact families are markedly more likely to be diagnosed with depression. Specifically, net of controls, girls are 60% more likely to be depressed and boys are 57% more likely to be depressed when they are raised in a home without both of their parents.

Figure 7. Percent of children ages 6-17 currently diagnosed with depression by family structure.

These findings are consistent with what Dr. Samuel Wilkinson, Professor of Psychiatry at the Yale School of Medicine and Associate Director of Yale’s Depression Research Program, has documented regarding the connection between family breakdown and the growing mental health crisis. As he wrote for the Institute for Family Studies, “Children, in particular, are more likely to experience mental health problems when they experience family breakdown.”

Arizona has a large minority of such children. And like kids across America, kids in Arizona are more likely to suffer emotionally when they do not enjoy the benefits of growing up in a stable home.

ACEs: Adverse Childhood Experiences

Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs) are “potentially traumatic experiences and events” in a child’s life that significantly impact their physical, mental, and emotional well-being, from ages 0 to 17. These can be experiences of domestic violence, neglect, natural disasters, parental separation or divorce, homelessness, being involved in a serious accident, or losing a close family member to suicide, and more.

ACEs are deeply consequential for children and adults in America. The U.S. Center for Disease Control explains,

Preventing ACEs could reduce suicide attempts among high school students by as much as 89%, prescription pain medication misuse by as much as 84%, and persistent feelings of sadness and hopelessness by as much as 66%. Additionally, preventing ACEs could also reduce many health conditions in adulthood, including chronic diseases and behavioral health conditions. Estimates show that preventing ACEs could reduce cases of heart disease by 22% and depression by 78% for adults.

According to the Arizona Department of Health Services’ 2021 ACE report, “43% of children in Arizona experienced one or more ACEs.” They add this “is slightly higher than the national rate of 39.8%.”

Intact, married families are a clear and substantial protection against children experiencing one or more ACEs. Below are four ACEs experienced by family form for children ages 6 to 17 in Arizona. The protective effect of intact, married families is demonstrable. Net of controls, school-aged children in non-intact families are remarkably 274% more likely to experience at least one or more of the following ACEs compared to their peers growing up in an intact family in Arizona.

Figure 8. Share of AZ children ages 6-17 with ACEs, by family structure.

Arizona Governor Katie Hobb’s office rightly notes,

Arizona’s success and prosperity are fundamentally linked to our commitment to nurturing and safeguarding our children. Unfortunately, adverse childhood experiences can significantly hinder their development and potentially lead to more serious issues in the future.

Strong, thriving families are powerfully protective for kids across the state. Arizona’s government, community agencies, news media, schools, and houses of worship must move to publicize the value of stable, married families and to help parents forge strong relationships.

Child Poverty

It is extremely difficult for children to prosper in life when they live in poverty. Their schooling suffers. Their health lags. Their confidence declines. Their opportunities shrink. Their mental health and sociability decline. 

Poverty can even negatively affect the brain structure of children and adolescents in the regions supporting language, reading, executive function, and spatial skills. This decline is most pronounced for the most disadvantaged children. Poverty is a social cancer, slowly eating away at otherwise promising lives of vast potential.

Scholars and policymakers from diverse political perspectives have noted childhood poverty’s close connection to family breakdown or the family’s failure to form in the first place. Brookings Institution scholar Isabel Sawhill observed that the “proliferation of single-parent households accounts for virtually all of the increase in child poverty since the early 1970s.” Similarly, Marco Rubio, then U.S. Senator (R-FL), noted: 

The truth is, the greatest tool to lift children and families from poverty is one that decreases the probability of child poverty by 82%. But it isn’t a government spending program. It’s called marriage.

Thus, it is no surprise that in Arizona, children in married, intact homes are much less likely to be living in poverty. In fact, less than 1 in 10 children in intact, married families live in poverty in Arizona, compared to over 1 in 5 children with cohabiting parents, and  1 in 4 children in single-mother families.

Figure 9. Percent of children below official poverty line in AZ, by family structure.

Using data from the Current Population Survey’s Annual Social and Economic Survey, we estimate that just 10% of Arizona children living in married, intact families fall below the official poverty line. This is far less than the 38% who live with single mothers, and 41% who live in cohabiting families. Therefore, it is not just the number of adults in the home, but the relationship between the adults and the children that seems most protective against child poverty in the state.

The Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM) accounts for unmarried partners who pool resources. Additionally, the SPM includes noncash benefits, adjusts for cost-of-living, and accounts for necessary expenses like taxes, child care, and child support payments. 

Using the SPM, we find that children from intact married families are less than half as likely to be living in poverty compared to children in single-mother or cohabiting-parent homes.

Figure 10. Percent of AZ children living in poverty, by race and family structure.

Family structure also explains much, but not all, of the disparities in child poverty across race and ethnicity in the state. 

Among White Arizonans, just 3% of children living in intact married families are in poverty, compared to 15% from unmarried or non-intact homes. Meanwhile, 14% of Hispanic, 20% of Native American, and 22% of Black Arizonan children living in intact married families live in poverty. This compares to 23% of Hispanic, 27% of Native American, and 31% of Black Arizonan children living in unmarried or non-intact families who are impoverished. So, even though there are racial and ethnic variations in the story, across the state, kids from a range of racial and ethnic backgrounds are less likely to endure the scourge of poverty if they live in an intact married family.

Figure 11. Changes in odds of poverty for children in AZ, by family structure, education, immigration.

Using data from 2005 to 2025, we estimated socioeconomic determinants of poverty, excluding income, in a multivariate analysis. Controlling for a child’s race, age, parental education, and parental immigration, we find that children from unmarried or non-intact homes are 104% more likely to be living in poverty. Children without a college-educated parent in the home are nearly 300% more likely to be living in poverty than those with a college-educated parent. Native American children are 163% more likely to be living in poverty than their White peers. These results indicate that family structure is one, but not the only, significant predictor of child poverty in Arizona.

Figure 12. Relative odds of family poverty in AZ, unmarried/nonintact vs. married intact families, by year.

We also conducted a multivariate analysis with an interaction term between family structure and year in the state. We discovered that in the past 15 years, family structure has become a stronger predictor of child poverty. In the late 2000s, Arizona children from unmarried or non-intact homes were 54% more likely to be living in poverty than their peers living with married parents. Remarkably, that number has risen to 136% for 2020 to 2025. In other words, family structure matters more than ever when it comes to protecting against child poverty in Arizona today.

But marriage does not only benefit children. Marriage benefits adults as well. This is what we examine next.

Section II. Successful Adults

There is no question that the Arizona Dream—the prosperity consistent with the state’s motto (“Ditat Deus”)—depends not only on children growing up in strong and stable families but also on adults forming such families. Just as marriage benefits children in Arizona, we also find that it benefits adults in much the same way.

A veritable mountain of research has demonstrated over the past half century that marriage boosts almost every important measure of physical, emotional, financial, and relational well-being for men and women. In fact, it would be impossible to capture all the benefits of marriage for Arizonans in one report. We know, for instance, from the broader research—including Brad Wilcox’s book, Get Married—that marriage surpasses health, money, education, and work as a predictor of adult happiness in America.

Among married people, who is happiest of all? That would be married couples with children—and by notable margins. This chart from Get Married breaks down the different relational categories.

Figure 13. Percentage of U.S. adults who are happy, by marital and parental status.

Beyond this happiness story, thousands of social science studies demonstrate that married men and women live longer, have healthier lives, earn and save more money, recover more quickly and successfully from illness, stay out of trouble with the law, are dramatically less likely to attempt and commit suicide, and are more likely to be emotionally healthy. In Arizona, for instance, medical research conducted at the University of Arizona College of Medicine–Phoenix demonstrates that those

who were divorced, widowed or never married had a 42 percent greater risk of developing cardiovascular disease and a 16 percent greater risk of developing coronary artery heart disease compared with people who were married.

Let us now move to another important well-being indicator: financial security.

The Financial Benefits of Marriage

There is no question that men and women who are married in the United States are better off financially. They enjoy higher household incomes, save more, and accumulate more assets over time. Across America, as married women and men head towards retirement, in their fifties, for instance, they “have a staggering ten times more assets than their divorced or never-married” peers with all other things being held equal.

One important financial factor that most people consider essential in realizing the American Dream is homeownership.

Homeownership

In the latter half of the twentieth century, homeownership surged in Arizona. This was a key mark of the state’s success in advancing the Arizona Dream. But homeownership has been on the decline among middle-aged adults in Arizona in the last four decades. In 1980, over 4 in 5, or 83%, of Arizonans ages 35–55 owned their home.

Figure 14. Percent of adults who own their own home in AZ, by year.

However, homeownership among middle-aged adults bottomed out in 2017 with 53% of adults ages 35–55 owning their home. Since then, homeownership has ticked up. Today, 62% of middle-aged Arizonans own their home.

Figure 15. Percent of AZ adults ages 35-55 who own their own home, by marital status.

But the post-1980 decline in homeownership was concentrated among unmarried Arizonans, who are markedly less likely to own a home, and increasingly so over this period. Consequently, the homeownership gap has clearly widened in favor of the married in recent decades.

If we wish to boost Arizonans chances at realizing the American Dream through owning a home, one way to do so would be to promote marriage. That’s because, by increasing income and assets, marriage dramatically strengthens the odds that men and women have the means to buy a home.

Figure 16. Percent of AZ adults ages 35-55 who own their home, by education.

This dynamic is clearly visible across educational lines in Arizona. Among married Arizonans ages 35–55, 84% of college-educated and 68% of less-educated adults own their home. This is dramatically higher than the 43% of unmarried college-educated and 25% of unmarried less-educated adults who own their own homes. 

Marriage also increases the likelihood of homeownership for those across various income groups in Arizona.

Figure 17. Percent of AZ adults ages 35-55 who own their home, by marital status and household income.

Among Arizonans ages 35 to 55, 51% of married adults in the bottom income quartile own their home, compared to just 36% of unmarried adults in the top income quartile. This demonstrates that across all income levels, married Arizonans are more than twice as likely as their unmarried peers to own their own home. 

Figure 18. Change in odds of homeownership in AZ by various characteristics

Indeed, in a multivariate model, being married is by far the strongest predictor of homeownership in Arizona among adults ages 35 and up, surpassing factors like income, education, and race. 

Homeownership is not just a personal benefit, either. It is clear that greater homeownership strongly improves the lives of others. It stabilizes and improves entire communities. It seems to foster the educational attainment of children in demonstrably positive ways. Few things determine the safety, quality, and security of Arizona’s neighborhoods more than owning a home. Thus, where marriage is stronger, so, too, is the fabric of communities across Arizona.

Marriage and Public Benefits

If homeownership is an indicator of prosperity, welfare receipt is an indicator of material want. Not surprisingly, marriage powerfully predicts lower public assistance, as measured by the receipt of food stamps, Medicaid coverage, cash welfare, or Social Security disability insurance in Arizona. While marriage protects both men and women from welfare dependence, it is a more powerful protector for women. This is because unmarried women are more likely to be caring for children than unmarried men. Specifically, only 15% of prime-aged (25-55) married men and women in Arizona receive welfare compared to 24% of unmarried men and 34% of unmarried women.

Figure 19. Share of AZ adults ages 25-55 receiving public benefits by marital status and sex.

These numbers likely underestimate total benefits received. National surveys tend to underreport the number of Americans who are receiving public benefits.

Arizona Families and the Common Good: The County Story 

Marriage doesn’t just benefit individual children or adults in Arizona; it also delivers fiscal savings and strengthens entire communities. We have already seen that children do better, at the district level, when they live in communities where marriage is the dominant norm. We see similar patterns when we look at county trends in family structure, crime, and poverty.

At the county level, Greenlee, Yuma, and Yavapai are most likely to have married prime-aged adults (25-54). These counties have, respectively, 61%, 59%, and 55% of such adults who are married. By contrast, Apache is least likely to have married adults, with just 35% of its prime-aged adults married. Mohave and Graham are tied at 51%, and Gila, Navajo, and Coconino are tied at 49 percent. The remaining counties, Pima, La Paz, Pinal, Maricopa, Cochise, and Santa Cruz, have between 50% and 54% of prime-aged adults who are married.

Figure 20. Percent of married adults ages 25-54 by Arizona county.

Research by economists Raj Chetty and Joseph Price indicates that communities marked by greater family instability across the United States have more incarceration and less economic mobility. We see parallel trends in Arizona. With the exception of Apache county, the county data generally indicate that violent crime is lower in counties across the state that have more married adults (ages 25-54).

Figure 21. Violent crimes per 1,000 AZ county residents against the share of married adults ages 25-54. 

Likewise, poverty is lower in counties with more married adults. For instance, in Maricopa county, 53% of men and women ages 25-54 are married, and the poverty rate is just 9 percent. By contrast, in Apache county, 35% of men and women in this age group are married, and the poverty rate is 29 percent. 

Figure 22. Share of prime-aged adults below poverty and share married by county in Arizona.

For a more prosperous Arizona, where communities and individual men, women, and children are happier, stronger, safer, better educated, less dependent on welfare, and better protected from poverty and abuse, we must promote a greater appreciation and respect for the power of marriage and healthy family life in the state. Increasing rates of marriage are essential for more Arizonans to realize the American Dream.

The State of Arizona Unions

We have made a research-based case for the ways that strong and stable families elevate well-being for men, women, and children across Arizona. But what is the state of Arizona families as a whole? The Family Structure Index, developed by the Institute for Family Studies (IFS) in collaboration with the Center for Christian Virtue, tracks three key family metrics: marriage, fertility, and intact families. Specifically, we look at the share of prime-age adults (25 to 54) who are married, the number of children women will have in their lifetime, and the share of teens who will grow up with married parents.

With these three key metrics, we calculate a family structure score, which is then used to provide a ranking among states each year. Arizona has, unfortunately, consistently trailed most other states in the Family Structure Index. Using the latest data from 2024, we find that Arizona ranks 35th in the Union.

Figure 23. Arizona family structure rank among the 50 states.

Arizona’s consistent ranking over the years between 33 and 39 hides some nuance in the state’s changing family landscape. Relative to the whole United States, Arizona has a smaller share of prime-age married adults and teens in intact homes. Since 2020, the gap between the rest of the U.S. and Arizona has shrunk on these metrics, if just slightly. As we will show later in the report, the share of all children in Arizona living with married parents has been rising steadily since 2010.

Arizona’s total fertility rate has fallen at a significantly faster pace than the U.S. over the past 15 years, though it has remained near national levels since 2020. Together, these trends mean Arizona has jumped four places on the Index, from a rank of 39 to 35, since 2020.

Figure 24. Arizona and U.S. Family Structure Index.

Each of these components of the Family Structure Index—marriage, parenthood, and intact families—contribute to the health and flourishing of Arizona. We will now take a closer look at the underlying dynamics driving these trends, beginning with marriage.

Marriage Rate

Unfortunately, the marriage rate has fallen in the United States in recent decades. The same is true for Arizona.

In 2000, there were 45 newlyweds for every 1,000 single adults in Arizona. The marriage rate fell to about 30 in 2013 before flattening out for the next decade, following national trends. Overall, this means that fewer Arizonans are now able to take advantage of the benefits that marriage provides to men, women, and their children of all races and socio-economic classes than was the case at the turn of the century.

Figure 25. Arizona newlyweds per 1,000 single adults by year.

Divorce Rate

At the same time, Arizona’s divorce rate, like the rest of the nation, has been declining steadily since the mid-1980s. Is this because marriages in Arizona are more durable? 

Figure 26. Divorces per 1,000 married adults in Arizona by year.

In simple terms, yes. Arizona marriages have been more durable in recent years than they were at the turn of the century. This is partly because marriage has been declining, which makes the adults who do tie the knot more selective and intentional, and less likely to land in divorce court. This is good news for those Arizonans who are getting married. But the bad news is that dramatically fewer adults across the state are married.

Percent of Arizona’s Married Adults

Another way to measure marriage dynamics is the percentage of all adults living in married-headed homes. Nationwide, the  share of men and women who are married has recently declined to about 1-in-2.

Figure 27. Percent of AZ adults ages 18 to 66 who are married by year.

This flattening trend follows a broader U.S. pattern. It is up to Arizona’s various community institutions—churches, families, schools, city, county, and state governments, and individuals—to work toward the common goal of boosting the state’s marriage rates in order to elevate individual and collective well-being. 

One cause for the decline of marriage in Arizona is delayed marriage. In Arizona, as in the whole nation, young adults are often strongly encouraged to save marriage for their thirties. Additionally, a declining share of young adults report success in finding a partner. As a result, the average age of first marriage has steadily risen in Arizona. Using annual marriage data from the American Community Survey, we find that the average age of first marriage in Arizona rose from 28.8 in 2008 to 30.2 in 2024, following national trends.

Figure 28. Age at first marriage in Arizona.

As Brad Wilcox has recently argued, young adults are not benefiting from the movement towards later-in-life marriage. Encouraging marriage among young adults in their twenties is one way to build a strong marriage and family culture in Arizona.

Married and Unmarried Birth Rates

One of the most important indicators for child well-being is being born into a married home with one’s own mother and father and remaining there through adolescence. 

Figure 29. Percent of births to unmarried women in Arizona and U.S. by year.

The leveling off of nonmarital childbearing plus the decline in the divorce rate have important implications for the share of Arizona children who are living with married parents. The share of children living with married parents reached its lowest point in 2011 at 58 percent. Since then, Arizona has seen a small but steady trend upward. In 2024, 62% of Arizona children lived with married parents. This is an encouraging trend to be sure, but it is just under the trend for the nation,which is 63%, according to the 2024 ACS. Again, at least the trendline is going in the right direction. The state would be wise to boost it.

Thus, the share of children being raised by married parents is one of the most important indicators for future community growth and population well-being, as this drives so many other factors: physical and mental health, child longevity, educational success, behavioral problems at school and in the community, protection from abuse, and poverty.

One factor driving this trend is the unmarried birth rate in Arizona, which is 45.6% of total births, notably above the national average (of 40%).  However, following national trends, Arizona’s unmarried birth rate has leveled out since the late 2000s and remains generally steady. 

Figure 30. Percent of children living with married parents in Arizona and U.S. by year.

Unmarried Births by Race

Unmarried birth rates vary across race and ethnicity, both nationally and in Arizona. Arizona is just above the national average for unmarried births for Whites and Hispanics, and notably under for Black women.

Figure 31. Percent of total births to unmarried women by race and ethnicity for AZ and U.S.

As it stands now, White Arizonans make up the majority of the population. According to the 2024 American Community Survey, 51% of Arizonans are White, 31% are Hispanic, 4% are Black, 4% are Native American, and 9% are non-Hispanic of two or more races. 

Yet, the racial and ethnic character of the state is changing. Arizona is becoming more Hispanic by notable margins, while the White population is shrinking significantly with each decade. Among children, Hispanics are the largest group, followed by Whites. Other minority groups—Black, Native American, and Other races—are holding constant among Arizonans below age 50. 

Figure 32. Racial and ethnic composition of AZ residences by age group.

The changing racial and ethnic composition of Arizona will have an effect on future demographic outcomes, like the unmarried birth rate. Thus, the marital trajectory of births in the state will likely depend in large part upon whether or not unmarried childbearing among Hispanic women trends downward.

Unmarried Births by Educational Status

Trends in non-marital childbearing in Arizona also vary by education. A majority, or 85%, of children born to college-educated parents are born in marriage. But only 42% of children born to less-educated parents are born in marriage.

Figure 33. Percent of births in AZ to unmarried women by education.

The State of Arizona Family Structure

Still, most Arizona children (58%) live with their married, biological parents, although this is markedly below the national average of 65 percent. Overall, a majority of children in Arizona benefit from the premium of being raised by their own married mother and father.

About one-fifth of Arizona kids live with their single, biological mother, and just 6% live with cohabiting biological parents.

Figure 34. Percent of children in Arizona by family type.

When it comes to race, 69% of White Arizona children live with their married mother and father. Similar percentages of Native American and Black Arizona children (at 36% and 39%, respectively) are living with their own married mother and father. 

Meanwhile, 42% of Black children, 27% of Native American children, and a quarter of Hispanic children are being raised by single mothers.

Native American children in Arizona are twice as likely as Hispanic children to be living with cohabiting parents at 14% and 7%, respectively. Only 6% of Black children live with cohabiting parents, as do an even smaller percentage of White children.

Figure 35. Percent of children in Arizona by family type and race.

Hispanic children make up the plurality of children in the state, at 42 percent. White children make up 37% of the child population, followed by 8% who are Native American (subdivided into 5% who identify as Native American only, and 3% as two or more races), and 5% who are Black, 3% Asian, and 5% two or more races.

Where Do Arizonans Come From?

Just 39% of Arizona residents were born in the Grand Canyon State. Most of the migrants into Arizona hail from other American states—with 15% of those coming from the Midwest, while 18% are Westerners who decided they liked Arizona better. Just 7% came from the South, and 6% are from the North. 

But a large minority come from out of the country. According to the 2023 American Community Survey, 15% are foreign born, with 7% of those from Mexico, and 8% coming from elsewhere. These numbers, however, likely underestimate the share of foreign-born Arizonans, as response rates are significantly lower among Latin American immigrants and noncitizens ineligible for a Social Security number.

Figure 36. Percent of Arizona residents by birthplace.

Nativity and ethnicity are also related to family structure. Hispanic children in Arizona who have two U.S.-born parents are less likely to be in a married-intact family and more likely to be in single-father households, or to have no parents present, compared to those with one or more immigrant parents.

Figure 37. Percent of Hispanic children in AZ by family type and parent nativity.

Hispanic children with at least one foreign-born parent are more likely to be living in a married family than their peers with only U.S.-born parents. Something about being born and raised in the United States for Hispanic adults may be discouraging marriage as a foundation for their children’s lives.

Arizona Population Dynamics

As early as 2003, the Arizona fertility rate was well above the national average. Since then, the total fertility rate has plummeted and is about equal to the national level at 1.60.

Figure 38. Births per woman in Arizona and U.S. by year.

Fertility is a critical indicator of future well-being for Arizona. A state that is failing to have tomorrow’s children is one that will soon have a disproportionately mushrooming elderly population without the next generation of doctors, nurses, caregivers, farmers, business owners, inventors, innovators, teachers, and police officers—not to mention taxpayers and social security benefactors—that Arizona will need. 

Babies grow into the adults that make society work better in the future. States with a fertility rate as low as Arizona’s will have to rely heavily on outside immigration. The bad news is that nearly all developed countries (including Mexico), as well as surrounding states, are also now experiencing fertility rates well below replacement. They will be fighting to keep their own young adults from emigrating.

Sadly, peak fertility in Arizona was reached in 1990, after which the fertility rate dipped until a brief rise in 2007 to near 1990 levels. After 2007, it dropped significantly, resembling the slope of a daring playground slide. There will likely not be as many children born in Arizona as were born in 1990 for any time in the foreseeable future.

Figure 39. Average age at first birth for women in AZ and U.S. by year.

As with national trends, one cause of the fertility increase is the rising age of first birth. In Arizona, women typically become mothers around age 27—a steady increase from historical levels and 2.5 years older than in 2007. 

Drastically declining fertility is a very real and pressing problem for Arizona and its dream of a prosperous future. That’s because a thriving tomorrow requires plenty of babies being born today. That is clearly not happening.

Migration

Given these fertility trends, in this millennium, the majority of Arizona’s population growth will have to come from domestic and foreign migration. As shown below, foreign migration is powering population growth in Arizona right now, while domestic migration is falling. Census data indicate that the largest increases in international migration have come from Mexico and Latin American countries in recent years. But given today’s political climate and falling fertility in Latin America, it is unlikely that Arizona can rely on immigration to sustain its population indefinitely.

Figure 40. Components of changing polulation in Arizona (various) by year and income.

Section III: Policy Prescriptions

Arizona is a beautiful state with a profound outlook for the future. To fully realize its promise, Arizona must do the following to strengthen families: 

  • Increase the rate of marriage formation, as well as improve the health, stability, and longevity of its marital unions;
  • Make marital childbearing and childrearing important personal and civic goals, while also making parenthood and homeownership more affordable for all working couples;
  • Increase positive (e.g. involved family time, shared meals, books read, and games played together) and reduce negative (e.g., domestic violence, addiction, infidelity) aspects of family life;
  • Increase the time that parents are able to spend with their children; and
  • Educate the rising generation about the value of marriage and parenthood.

What steps can the state take to strengthen marriage and family life to advance these goals? The first step Arizona should take is to teach and promote what social scientists call the “Success Sequence.”

Success Sequence Education

The social sciences have discovered that some paths are more conducive to flourishing than others for today’s young men and women. One path, called the “Success Sequence”— advanced by Brookings Institution scholars Ron Haskins and Isabel Sawhill—is especially valuable for young adults.

The Success Sequence is a very basic and specific set of milestones in life associated with avoiding poverty and moving into the middle class or beyond. It is based on three basic life choices that can be accomplished by most people:

  1. Graduate from high school 
  2. Get and maintain a full-time job in one’s twenties
  3. Marry before having any children 

Young adults who complete these three steps are substantially more likely to realize the American Dream. In fact, they are nearly guaranteed  to do so.

Social science research informs us that a stunning 97% of young men and women who follow this simple sequence succeed in avoiding poverty in their late twenties and thirties.

Specifically, over 90% of Black, Hispanic, and young adults from poor families will avoid poverty as they move into young adulthood, if they follow this sequence. Finally, 86% of Millennials who followed the Success Sequence reached at least the middle class as young adults.

This makes the Success Sequence something that every young Arizonan should learn many times over throughout their developing years. They should learn it from their parents, schools, pediatricians, communities of faith, coaches, and extended family. The power of education, work, and marriage to lift people out of poverty is not widely known. Children and young adults in the Grand Canyon State deserve to learn this recipe to success.

This is especially true because the benefits of the Success Sequence extend beyond financial gain. Recent research by Wendy Wang at the Institute for Family Studies and Samuel Wilkinson at Yale University finds that the sequence is also associated with the emotional well-being and family stability of young adults. Young men and women who have followed all three steps are significantly less likely to be emotionally distressed and are substantially happier than those who have not. Isn’t that what we want for all Arizonans, young and old?

Specifically, young adults who follow each of the three steps have 50% lower odds of being emotionally distressed than their peers who have not, even after factors like race, ethnicity, education, and income are considered. They also enjoy more stable family lives.  For example, young women and men who followed all three steps were twice as likely to still be married in their thirties compared to their peers who had a child before or outside marriage, even after controlling for a range of sociodemographic factors.

Arizona’s young people deserve to know how education, work, and marriage are tied to greater financial security, emotional well-being, and family stability as they move into adulthood. The Success Sequence will give them a profound boost towards a happy and successful life, and each step in the sequence is relatively easy to follow. Arizona has the resources to do this. 

A range of curricula and programs convey the time-tested wisdom of the Success Sequence for young adults. Groups like the A&M Partnership, The Dibble Institute, The Ridge Project, Encompass Connection Center, and the Center for Relationship Education provide valuable resources that incorporate the sequence into curricula and programs providing relationship education to children and teens. 

For instance, outcome research on Love Notes from the Dibble Institute indicates that teens who participated in the program were 46% less likely to be become pregnant, significantly less likely to be sexually active, and more likely to avoid multiple sexual partners compared to similar teens who did not participate in the program.

What is more, opinion polling indicates that a clear majority of Americans—including a majority of Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites—support teaching the Success Sequence in public schools.

Accordingly, the Arizona Department of Education, along with local Arizona school districts, should incorporate the Success Sequence in various ways throughout schools across the Grand Canyon State. 

First, the Success Sequence ought to be incorporated into family life instruction in middle and high school. It should also be added to financial literacy instruction, which often occurs in high school. Schools should specifically explain how:

  1. A high school education, full-time work, and marriage before having children substantially decrease young adults’ odds of being poor and maximize their likelihood of moving into the middle class or higher;
  2. Marriage is associated with less loneliness, more meaning, and greater happiness for men and women today;
  3. A stable marriage increases the odds that children flourish educationally and socially, minimizing the odds they have trouble in school and with the law; and,
  4. Sequencing marriage before parenthood increases the odds that young men and women forge stable families and enjoy greater financial stability.

To do this, the Arizona Department of Education should consider the following policy suggestions as they incorporate the Success Sequence into public schools across the state:

  • Require high school students to complete, at least one course fully explaining the Success Sequence prior to high school graduation or receiving any general education degree. They should also demonstrate an understanding of the social science research on its links to poverty, economic success, happiness, and family stability;
  • Create a state-level committee that includes members of school boards and parents of children attending Arizona’s K-12 schools to review the grade-level standards, expectations, and instructional content that covers the Success Sequence; and,
  • The Arizona State Superintendent of Public Instruction should solicit evaluations that measure how well students are learning the three steps. The Superintendent should also sponsor evaluations of Success Sequence-related curricula to measure the influence on adolescent relationships, teen pregnancy, and marriage and family attitudes.
  • Schools should have older young adults who have followed and benefited from the Success Sequence regularly visit and speak at events,  and create social media resources featuring these adults to explain how following the sequence helped them attain a rewarding Arizona middle-class lifestyle.
  • Finally, the state and/or nonprofits should fund a Success Sequence PSA campaign that targets adolescents and young adults. This campaign should focus on offering compelling messages about the benefits of the sequence on social media platforms viewed by young adults.

Young Arizonans deserve every opporunity to realize the American dream. The Success Sequence is one of the most powerful, fiscally-responsible, achievable, and well-calibrated tools to give them.

Strengthening Marriage in the Grand Canyon State

As we have shown, marriage is associated with essential and substantial benefits for men and women, children, and the entire state of Arizona. Unfortunately, in recent decades, dramatically fewer Arizonans are choosing or able to marry. The reasons for this retreat from marriage are complex, encompassing culture, policy, and economic factors. 

In response to this retreat, the Arizona State Legislature should act to strengthen marriage in a variety of ways, including by educating  the public about the value of marriage for child well-being and human thriving, reducing the barriers that cause Arizonans to delay or forego marriage, and partnering  with community nonprofits that are doing relationship education for youth, as well as nonprofits that are counseling engaged and married couples. These efforts could be funded by allocating 10% of the state’s Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) budget to these activities, given that TANF is charged in part with promoting marriage and two-parent families.

Specifically, we recommend that the Arizona State Legislature:

1. Create a $20 million public education and media campaign focused on increasing the Arizona’s marriage rate and promoting strong and stable marriages.

This campaign should focus on young people, helping them to learn that marriage not only improves their lives, but the lives of any children they have, and the community at large. This campaign should particularly spotlight the emotional, financial, and social benefits of marriage for young adults, but also spell out the ways that strong and stable marriages benefit children and communities.

2. Address marriage penalties that discourage lower- and middle-income Arizona couples with children from marrying. 

In a whitepaper on fixing broken incentives in Arizona’s welfare system, the Foundation for Research on Equal Opportunity observed, “Arizona’s existing social welfare system can actively discourage work” by dramatically cutting back on means-tested benefits when family income rises, “impeding an important element for getting out of poverty.” Their point also applies to marriage. 

Consequently, the legislature should direct the state government to detail any marriage penalties associated with programs run by the state, including the Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG), Medicaid, and TANF. Then, where the state has authority to adjust program eligibility, it should minimize marriage penalties by doubling thresholds for married couples with children under the age of 5 (compared to single parents with the same number of children). Where the state lacks authority to adjust program eligibility, it should seek a waiver from the federal government to allow Arizona to make changes to programs like Medicaid to minimize their marriage penalties for lower-income families in the state. Finally, the state should use TANF funds to grant $1,000 to any married families with children under 5 who can document a net marriage penalty (based on potential lost child care subsidies, food stamps, housing, and Medicaid), using a platform like the Tax Policy Center calculator at the Urban Institute and Brookings Institution. 

3. Reform the state’s standard deduction to be more marriage friendly.

To be fair, the state avoids several common structural features that penalize marriage. The flat personal income tax ensures couples are not bumped into a higher bracket if they get married. The Dependent Tax Credit, modeled on the federal Child Tax Credit, sets the phaseout threshold at a very high level and avoids marriage penalties by doubling the threshold for married parents ($400,000) relative to single parents ($200,000).

But Arizona has one major provision that penalizes marriage for single parents. Like many other states, it uses the federal standard deduction to set its own standard deduction. The value of the standard deduction varies based on filing status. In 2026, the standard deduction is $16,100 for single filers and $32,200 for married filers.  By doubling the standard deduction for married filers relative to single filers, Arizona avoids penalizing marriage for those without children. The problem is that Arizona also provides an additional filing status for single filers with dependents—Head of Household (HoH)—that provides a more generous standard deduction ($24,150 in 2026) relative to single filers without dependents. This creates a unique marriage penalty for single parents who are likely to see their taxes go up if they get married.

Simply eliminating HoH filing status and having parents file as either single or married would eliminate marriage penalties—but also make single parents worse off and do nothing for struggling married parents who have been facing rising costs for years. Instead, the legislature could pair HoH elimination with an increase in the Dependent Tax Credit from $100 to $305 for children under age 17, to ensure all families are made better off by focusing tax relief on hardworking parents raising the next generation of Arizonans. 

4. Create new and boost existing programs that help couples create strong, thriving marriages, from the start.

This can be done by improving premarital education and promoting it to the public. First, the Arizona legislature should pass a law waiving all marriage license fees for couples who show proof-of-completion of an approved premarital education course. This can be implemented through a website that helps Arizona couples find and connect with religious and secular providers of premarital education in their local communities. Connecting individual couples with others in their communities who can serve as teachers, champions, and cheerleaders for their marital success is essential to building a pro-marriage culture that succeeds. Indeed, research shows that couples who receive premarital education are more likely to forge successful marriages. 

Second, Arizona should publicize the value of premarital education for married couples and the marital license discount they receive by taking it. This can be part of a multifaceted public education and engagement campaign to promote marriage across Arizona. In boosting premarital counseling, Arizona should look to the experience of neighboring states like Utah, Oklahoma, and Texas. 

These states have enacted policies to encourage and incentivize couples to engage in premarital education. Each have met with varying degrees of success. A study examining the effectiveness of these state programs found that oversight and implementation were the key factors influencing their success. For instance, one study found that Texas’s early efforts at providing formalized premarital education programs, which began in 2007, were successful and correlated with a 1.5% decrease in the divorce rate statewide. The authors of the study noted that while the decrease in divorce rate may seem small, the measure focused on all marriages, including those that began before the state implemented its premarital education policies. Based on this, the authors conclude that the actual divorce-rate reduction effect attributable to the Texas program is likely higher. Arizona has the benefit of being able to learn from both the successes and failures of states that have done important marriage innovation before them.

Spreading the Word. One lesson from this research is that Arizona should launch a public campaign to promote the benefits of premarital counseling and the locations where it can be accessed. Utah launched such a campaign in 2008 and focused on “18- to 29-year-olds with a strong (but not exclusive) emphasis on promoting increased use of premarital education services.” Based on data from market research, the firm contracted to run the campaign developed ads for television, radio, print, and internet sites targeted at the key demographic. A study of the campaign’s effectiveness published in the Journal of Couple & Relationship Therapy discovered that over the course of five years, the effort:

  • Increased awareness of the program from a baseline of 17% at its inception to 38% at its apex. Young couples became two to three time more likely to be aware of the program and the services it provided through this media campaign.
  • The percentage of persons who participated in premarital education increased from 32% to 39% over a five-year period.

Clearly, a well-designed and implemented public education ad campaign can have a measurable effect on the public, influencing citizens to take a desired action. Arizona should launch an effort to do just this when it comes to premarital education. 

Arizona has been a world leader in business innovation and development. It can grow beautiful, world-class golf courses in the desert, after all. It can certainly take the lead in promoting marriage and family. 

The Grand Canyon State can help its young people rise above poverty and soar into middle class life with creative thinking and a strong drive to not only raise awareness about the value of marriage among diverse populations but, like Utah, also direct the public to accessible, research-backed premarital education resources that propel them to sustained success. 

Bridging Arizona’s Gender Gap

One of the reasons marriage and family life are in retreat across America today is the decline in the fortunes of young men.  As the Brookings Institution’s Richard Reeves documented in Of Boys and Men, too many men are floundering in school, work, and life. Subpar academic performance, lower rates of college enrollment, and rising rates of idleness and underemployment among young men matter not only for them but also because they make them less “marriageable” in the eyes of young women. Today’s growing gender gap—where young women are doing comparatively better at school, work, and life, while young men are doing worse—is a recipe for disaster when it comes to family formation and human happiness. 

This gender gap is also playing out in Arizona. For instance, 67% of the lowest GPAs for school children in the state are among boys, versus 33% among girls,  and 60% of full-time college students are female, whereas only 40% are male. To bridge this gap, and lift the fortunes of adolescent and young adult men, the state legislature, Arizona Department of Education, and schools should take three steps:

  1. Make schools more boy friendly. Schools should hire more male teachers, extend recess time for children in elementary school, and revisit their pedagogy and curricula with an eye to creating an educational context where boys are about as likely as girls to do well. The state should also introduce single-sex charter schools. All of these measures would give boys in K-12 schools a chance to see their performance and attachment to education rise.
  2. The Arizona legislature should also double the funding for Career and Technical Education (CTE) and apprenticeship training. Right now, the state devotes markedly more money to conventional 4-year colleges and universities than it does to CTE for high school-aged and young adults. But the evidence suggests that high-quality CTE can boost the employability, wages, and marriageability of young men. Moreover, most Arizona young adults, especially young men, will not earn a 4-year degree. Accordingly, the Arizona Department of Education should double the funding it spends on CTE and apprenticeship training and, if necessary, take that money out of the budget it devotes to conventional higher education in the state.
  3. Finally, the legislature should target the gaming industry, given the role that gaming plays in degrading the social and human capital of teenage boys and young men. Arizona should tack a 20% sin tax on gaming platforms, gaming software, gaming apps, and in-game purchases. This money could then be spent on a public campaign to educate teenage boys and young men about the costs of excessive gaming and to motivate them to turn their time and attention to real-world activities. Hopefully, the added costs of gaming and this public campaign would discourage adolescents and young men from wasting excessive amounts of time on gaming. 

Young women across the ideological spectrum have expressed frustration with how few of their male peers measure up to their expectations regarding education, employment, and maturity. Taking steps like these would help Arizona boys and men flourish, which would be good for them, the women in their lives, and the fortunes of dating, marriage, and family formation in the state. 

Family Friendly Technology in Arizona

The last decade-and-a-half has witnessed the rise of “electronic opiates”—social media, video shorts, gaming, and now, AI companions—that are degrading our children’s capacity to concentrate, read, and learn, inhibiting the development of their social skills, and polarizing them ideologically by sex. These developments have had profoundly negative consequences for the quantity and quality of parent-child relations, dating, and marriage.

Arizona has already passed important laws to protect children from the negative effects of Big Tech, including requiring age verification of pornography sites, as well as a law to ban smartphones during school time. These are critical steps to keep children safe in the digital age and to recover a freer, more beautiful childhood. Arizona can build on these gains in four ways.

  1. Require age verification for users of human-like AI and restrict access to adults. AI systems are intrinsically unsafe, with "alignment," the technical challenge of ensuring that AI systems pursue pro-social ends, being currently unsolved. It may never be solved. But whatever the case, we have already seen that AI chatbots, especially those that are marketed as AI "companions," have willingly fed into the delusions of the mentally unstable and have preyed upon the depressed, even going so far as convincing young Americans to commit suicide. In fact, Google and Character.AI recently settled a major lawsuit brought by the parents of Sewell Setzer III, who, at age 14, killed himself to be with a Character.AI companion forever, after it had tricked him into becoming romantically enmeshed with it. IFS has endorsed the Young People's Alliance Human-like AI Framework for regulating AI that is designed to evince human-like features. This would protect Arizona's kids from predatory AI chatbots.
  2. Pass the App Store Accountability Act (ASAA). In 2023, IFS co-produced the first paper ever to argue for the value of requiring age verification through the app store. Many of the fundamental problems that children face online come through apps—not on the free internet—most of which are accessed through the app store. Furthermore, because data is the most precious commodity available online, the app store is structured to convince children to give away their data with the downloading of every app, which they agree to do when they perfunctorily agree to the terms of service. That is, app stores are systematically facilitating the formation of contracts between underage Americans and Big Tech companies, often at the price of their extremely sensitive personal data. ASAA disrupts this system by requiring formal age verification and informed parental consent for every app download and in-app purchase. This addresses the root causes of childhood addiction to apps. 
  3. Arizona should build on its policy to remove smartphones from schools by also advancing policies to minimize screen time in the classroom. Arizona is one of 21 states (and counting) that have passed laws to remove smartphones from schools. This is common sense legislation that will pay enormous dividends for kids, families, and schools. But a growing body of research is showing that educating children by screen, through school-issued Chromebooks, is driving steep declines in reading and math scores. It also is the open door to pornographic material for many kids, who, as research by Common Sense shows, are accessing porn on school-issued devices. Recently, Utah passed legislation to become the first state in the country to limit access to classroom technology to prescribed times and tasks. This cutting-edge policy is likely to foster a far richer (and safer) educational environment in Utah, and Arizona should do the same. 
  4. Bonus: Follow Australia's lead and ban adolescents under 16 from accessing social media in Arizona. This is a narrower policy than the App Store Accountability Act, which covers apps in general, not just social media apps, but it would save many kids in Arizona from succumbing to anxiety, depression, and worse.

The Faith Factor: Religious Participation and Family Stability

Strong, stable families do not form in a vacuum. They are sustained by institutions and communities that provide support, guidance, and a normative framework for navigating the challenges of marriage and parenthood. Among these institutions, religious communities play an outsized role. 

A substantial body of research demonstrates that regular religious participation—particularly weekly church attendance—significantly strengthens marriage, family stability, and child outcomes across all the metrics examined in this report. Adults who attend religious services regularly are more likely to marry, less likely to divorce, and less likely to have children outside marriage. Their children, in turn, show better educational outcomes, lower rates of depression and adverse childhood experiences, and reduced poverty rates.  Weekly church attenders have divorce rates 25-50% lower than those who rarely or never attend religious services, and women who attend religious services weekly are 60-75% less likely to have a nonmarital birth compared to women who never attend. For children, the benefits are equally pronounced: those whose families attend religious services regularly are more likely to excel academically, with higher GPAs and test scores, and adolescents who attend religious services regularly report 30-40% lower rates of depression and anxiety compared to non-attending peers. Analysis of Arizona's Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System data shows that adults who reported weekly religious attendance during childhood experienced nearly one full ACE fewer on the 10-point scale—representing approximately a 40% reduction in adverse childhood experiences compared to those who never attended religious services as children.

The mechanisms through which religious participation strengthens families are multifaceted. Religious communities provide clear teaching that prioritizes marriage, discourages divorce except in extreme circumstances, and emphasizes parental responsibility.  They create dense social networks of families with similar values, providing practical support—child care, meals, financial assistance—along with accountability, mentoring, and modeling of healthy relationships. Many congregations offer evidence-based premarital counseling, marriage enrichment, and parenting classes that strengthen relationship quality and family functioning. Religious teaching emphasizes forgiveness, humility, and reconciliation—skills essential to navigating marital conflict and preventing divorce. For struggling families, churches often provide material resources through benevolence funds, job networks, and housing assistance that reduce economic stress, a major threat to family stability. Arizona counties with higher rates of religious congregation membership show 6-9 percentage points lower child poverty rates, after controlling for education, race, and family structure, suggesting religious communities provide economic support beyond what family structure alone predicts. In short, religious participation operates as a form of social capital that partially compensates for economic disadvantage and reinforces the family commitments essential to child flourishing.

Yet Arizona's religious landscape presents both opportunities and challenges for family strengthening. According to the Pew Research Center, 58% of Arizona adults identify as Christian, while 31% are religiously unaffiliated and rarely or never attend religious services. Approximately 27% of Arizona adults attend religious services weekly, slightly below the 31% national average. More concerning, religious participation is declining among younger Arizonans: only 22% of Arizona adults under 30 attend religious services weekly, compared to 35% of those over 50. This generational decline threatens future family stability, as the protective effects of religious participation cannot operate if young adults are disconnected from faith communities. At the same time, Arizona's approximately 4,000-5,000 religious congregations represent a vast, largely untapped infrastructure for family support—with thousands of locations across every community, built-in trust relationships with families, volunteer networks for mentoring and counseling, and economic resources for material assistance.

Any serious effort to strengthen Arizona families must engage, equip, and empower these faith communities—not through government funding of sectarian activities but through partnership, recognition of their irreplaceable role, protection of their religious liberty, and celebration of their positive impact on family outcomes. The data is clear: religious participation is one of the most powerful predictors and protectors of family stability in Arizona. Reversing the decline in religious engagement, particularly among young adults, should be a priority for policymakers, community leaders, and all Arizonans committed to building strong families and realizing the Arizona Dream.

Conclusion

Arizona stands at a crossroads. The research presented in this report demonstrates unequivocally that strong, stable families—particularly those anchored by marriage—are powerful engines for realizing the Arizona Dream. From the classrooms of Higley to the neighborhoods of every county across the state, we see that children raised in intact, married families perform better in school, experience less poverty, suffer fewer mental health challenges, and are dramatically better protected from adverse childhood experiences. Adults in strong marriages enjoy greater financial security, higher homeownership rates, and less government dependency. Communities with more married families generally see less crime and poverty. 

The marriage premium is real, substantial, and essential for Arizona's future prosperity. Yet marriage rates have declined, nonmarital childbearing remains stubbornly high, and too many Arizona children are growing up without the stability that married parents provide. In fact, even though the family story is improving for children in the state, kids across Arizona are still less likely to enjoy the shelter and security of a stable married family compared to kids across the United States. The question before us is simple: Will Arizona leaders act decisively to increase the odds that men, women, and especially children across the state enjoy strong and stable families, or will the Arizona Dream slip away for future generations?

The path forward requires courage, creativity, and commitment from every sector of Arizona society. State government must lead by implementing the Success Sequence in schools, removing marriage penalties from welfare programs, reforming tax policy to support families, investing in premarital education, and protecting children from predatory technology. But government cannot do this alone. Schools must educate young Arizonans about the proven pathways to success. Businesses should support working families through family-friendly policies. Faith communities should do more to champion marriage and provide couples with the tools to build lasting unions. Media should tell stories that celebrate marriage and the virtues that make for thriving families. And individuals must bravely follow the harder but more rewarding path of the Success Sequence—getting an education, working full-time, and embracing marriage before parenthood—as they move into adulthood. 

Arizona has always been a frontier state—a place where pioneers came to build something better. Today's frontier is not geographic but cultural and social. By strengthening marriage and family life, Arizona can once again become a beacon of the American Dream, proving that "Ditat Deus"—God Enriches—remains more than a motto but a living reality for all who call the Grand Canyon State home.


Brief

High Tech, Low Play: The Life of American Children

May 2026 | by Michael Toscano, Lyman Stone, Grant Bailey

May 2026

by Michael Toscano, Lyman Stone, Grant Bailey

In a this IFS research brief, we assess parenting practices on a national level. We analyze the distance American kids are allowed to venture from home, how much time they spend online, what devices they use, the level of restrictions on their smartphones, and how much time they spend with friends. 

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Introduction

On February 19, 2026, we released a new report, Resilient Children, Struggling Parents: Mapping American Parenting, based on a new survey of almost 24,000 U.S. parents of over 40,000 children, including 2,600 teenagers. This large national sample of parents and teenagers enabled us to analyze parenting cultures around the country on the state level. We found that states where a concentration of parents are actively seeking to raise their children to be independent, free-spirited, resilient adults also tend to be the states where parents say their parenting approach is less supported by surrounding cultural norms.

Comparing parenting cultures by state is an invaluable tool for parents, educators, civic leaders, and policymakers who want to come along side families to help them raise resilient children. With this brief, however, we assess parenting practices on a national level. Below, we analyze the distance American kids are allowed to venture from home, how much time they spend online, what devices they use, the level of restrictions on their smartphones, and how much time they spend with friends. 

We find that American kids spend enormous amounts of time online with very few significant restrictions. Yet, they have very strict limits on their activities in the real world, often not allowed to go far from home. These kinds of norms and rules are strongly shaped by social class, such that higher socioeconomic-status parents tend to restrict screen use more.

Key Findings

  • American kids spend a lot of time online. Even parents who would describe their parenting style as low tech and who encourage free-range play allow their three-year-old children, on average, 3.5 hours per week of time on internet-enabled devices. Three-year-old children of parents who encourage tech average 6 hours per week using such devices.
  • American kids get their devices young with few serious restrictions. By the age of 11, smartphones become the primary medium for internet access among American kids, with over 60% having a smartphone. These phones generally have few parental restrictions placed on them. Meanwhile, nearly 50% of three-year-olds use a Tablet, iPad, or Kindle; and many of these children have few or no restrictions.
  • American kids are generally not free to move around unsupervised. In fact, by 17-years-old, about 60% of American kids are still not allowed to leave their neighborhood unsupervised.
  • Social class shapes parenting in big ways. Parents with a graduate degree are more likely to establish screen time limits or phone drop-off rules for children over age 10 than less-educated parents; and parents with a graduate degree are also less likely to support the idea that 8 to 12-year-old kids should have more supervision.

Tech and Family Life

In general, similar to previous research by the Institute for Family Studies, we find that American children overall are online at very early ages, screens are prevalent, and few devices are subject to serious parental controls, especially as they become teenagers.

On average, American parents allow their three-year-old children 4.5 weekly hours of internet-connected device use. From there, the average weekly hours steadily increase with age. By 17-years-old, American parents allow their children almost 20 weekly hours of internet-connected device use. It should be noted that parents could have double-counted some device usage time: if a child was scrolling on their phone while streaming a show on a computer, we would count both the computer and the phone usage. However, we do not regard this as an error, since using multiple devices simultaneously would indeed be a more intense exposure to screens and online content.

Though the numbers remain high overall, we do find some substantial differences in weekly device use between parents who prioritize outdoor play and claim to be low-tech, and those who say they encourage the technology use of their kids. As the figure below shows, by the age of three, kids who grow up in a high-play/low-tech household are on internet-connected devices an average of 2.5 weekly hours less than their peers who are in high-tech households. That might not seem like much, but over the course of a year, that amounts to nearly 130 fewer hours online for three-year-olds. And while both groups steadily rise, the gap in hours used begins to further widen around age 13, and the widest gap is at 15, when kids in low-tech/high-play households are, on average, online 8 fewer hours a week, which over the course of a year amounts to a difference of approximately 400 hours. In other words, in any given week, the differences are modest. But over time, they compound, becoming extremely significant.
 

Line graph showing how much time U.S. children spend on internet devices by family
Figure 1. Weekly combined hours children used any internet-enabled device by child age and parenting style, 2025

Still, the numbers for both groups are remarkably high. In fact, 17-year-old kids in the low-tech/high-play group are online a weekly average of 15.7 hours, which amounts to more than 800 hours a year. Based on these numbers, they are online approximately 5 weeks a year; and kids in high-tech households, at the age of 17, are online an average of 6.5 weeks a year.

Similarly, a large share of American kids at three-years-old are given internet connected devices by their parents. Just shy of half of American three-year-olds in our sample (46%) have access to a tablet, iPad, or Kindle. A significant, though much smaller share, have access to a smartphone at that age—more than 15%. Tablet access reaches a peak at age 6, when 60% of kids nationwide are using them, with gaming console and smartphone access rising steadily. At the age of 11, the hierarchy changes, with smartphones surpassing tablets in use and, a few years later, at the age of 13, gaming consoles become the second most dominant device used, followed by computers and laptops, which become the third most dominant device. By age 17, 90% of the children in our sample have a smartphone, 60% percent have a gaming console, and 50% have a laptop or computer.
 

Line graph showing share of children by age who are given internet devices, by type of device
Figure 2. Share of children at each age who have each type of internet-enabled device, including children whose device has highly restricted access; 2025

Parental Controls

But what about parental controls? American children might have access to devices at young ages, but are parents closely monitoring and guarding their activity, such as by disabling internet access on a child’s device, or utilizing content filters? Not as much as one might hope. 

Overall, we find that the peak of internet-disabled smartphone usage is at 4 years old, and it steadily declines from there, with less than 10% of five-year-old kids using internet-disabled smartphones. Throughout the course of childhood and adolescence, a greater share of parents require passwords to make purchases on their child’s smartphone than implement content filters to increase the safety.

This may be unfortunate, but it is also not surprising. Child safety experts, like Chris McKenna of Protect Young Eyes, have analyzed how Big Tech companies like Apple and Google have made it needlessly challenging to implement parental controls. No doubt this problem is exacerbated by other factors, some as straightforward as parents who simply don’t believe their children need guardrails or don’t have the time to make the changes. Whatever the case, only a minority of parents in our sample across all child ages require content filters on their children’s smartphones. By 17 years old, perhaps unsurprisingly, the most dominant parental “control” is location tracking, while content filters decline to less than 20% of smartphones used by American adolescents.
 

Line graph showing percent of children who had parental limits placed on smartphone use, by age
Figure 3. Share of children with a smartphone at each age whose parent reported the given limit or restriction on smartphone usage, 2025

Because tablets have such a high prevalence among very young children, we also assessed what safety controls parents apply to those devices. We find that, even for very young children, controls and restrictions are surprisingly lax. About 2-in-5 preschool-age children with tablets can make purchases on their tablet without a parental code, a majority of preschoolers with tablets do not need a parental code to access their tablet, and only about half of preschool-age children have content filters on their tablets. Most preschoolers with tablets do not even have specific time limits on their devices. While tablets do have generally stricter controls than smartphones, overall, many preschoolers appear to have broad internet access on tablets, which are only lightly supervised.
 

Line graph showing percentage of children who had parental limits put on tablet use by age
Figure 4. Share of children with a tablet at each age whose parent reported the given limit or restriction on tablet usage, 2025

We also find some interesting demographic differences in the percentage of parents who responded to a question about household technology rules saying they implement screen time limits or device drop off rules at home for their children over the age of 10. About half of the parents in our sample say that they impose such limits. Conservative and liberal parents have relatively similar practices around screen time. The main differences we find involve the religious practices and educational attainment of parents. Kids who grow up in highly religious households are much more likely to have their tech use limited by screen time than those who never attend a religious service (56% to 40%, respectively). Education is also a significant factor, with screen time limits for kids being more common in households where parents have a graduate degree (59%), whereas fewer than 40% of parents with just a high school diploma established such limits.
 

Bar graph showing percent of parents who said they have screen time limits or device drop-off rules their children over age 10
Figure 5. Share of parents who reported screen time limits or device drop-off rules for their children, in households with children over age 10, 2025

Similarly, in our analysis of the percentage of children, ages 9 to 14, who had a smartphone by parental demographics, we found similar advantages to growing up in a household with a parent with a graduate degree. Among this age range, kids whose parents have a graduate degree are the least likely to have a smartphone (55%), and parents with either a high school degree (69%) or associate’s or technical degree (69%) are the most likely to allow their children to have a smartphone.

These numbers fundamentally challenge the longstanding view that there is a digital divide in which kids that come from less privileged households are being left behind with little access to screens and social networks. According to our findings, the situation is exactly reversed. It is those that come from the more privileged backgrounds that are most likely to be raised in technologically cautious homes.

Mobility and Play

There may be situations in which a parent’s caution to allow children to play outside unsupervised is warranted, such as in communities that are unsafe. Our survey did not ask about neighborhood crime, or busy urban environments where strangers will be significant in number. The safety of communities certainly influences household norms around childhood mobility and unsupervised play. On the other hand, due to the size of our sample, covering 24,000 parents and 40,000 profiles of children, the overall patterns we see cannot be explained by such factors alone. Indeed, as we show, at least one kind of neighborhood factor that we checked—walkability—has no impact on what children are allowed to do and where they are allowed to go. We find that there is a broad culture of low autonomy and low unsupervised play that pervades the United States.

As we can see in the figure below, American kids are not allowed to go very many places without being accompanied by an adult. By at age 14, a majority of American kids are not allowed to travel beyond their own street. Even at age 17, more than 60% cannot go beyond their own neighborhoods. While we hasten to note that the exact prevalences shown here could reflect various kinds of sampling errors or idiosyncratic respondent behaviors (as well as some share of parents who may have children with disabilities), the overall conclusion is hard to escape: a very large share of American teenagers are not allowed much autonomy at all.
 

Bar graph showing percentage of children by age who are allowed to walk, bike or drive a given distance without an adult, per parent
Figure 6. Share of children at each age whose parent reported each ascending level of restriction on where the child was permitted to walk without adult supervision; for teenagers surveyed directly, if they reported a longer distance than parent, teenager report was used; 2025

The flipside of the tendency for American kids to be permitted to spend many hours online from early childhood is that they also are kept from spending many weekly hours of unsupervised play outdoors. At the age of 5, American kids average about a half an hour outside without parental supervision per week, and that number plateaus at 2.4 hours by the age of 17. This is, to put it lightly, a very small number of hours. American kids will spend substantially more time on internet-enabled devices than playing outside without their parents.

But, as the below figure shows, there are advantages throughout childhood for kids who grow up with parents who believe children should be supervised less. At the age of 12, kids who are raised in such homes are unsupervised outside an average of one additional hour per week more than their peers. The advantage narrows modestly by the age of 17, but even then—when kids are on the cusp of adulthood—the advantage remains.
 

Line graph showing weekly hours of outdoor play, sports, or other outdoor activities without adult supervision, per parent
Figure 7. Weekly hours of outdoor play and activities for which no adult supervision was present, by child age and parental supervision opinions, 2025

It is worth noting, however, that despite the documented developmental benefits of playindependence, and mobility for children, we find that most American parents believe that children today are under-supervised. In fact, 62% of all parents in our sample said that 8 to 12-year-old children should receive more supervision than they currently do. We find no meaningful differences on this issue between religious and secular—nor between conservative and liberal—parents. All of these groups want more childhood supervision.

This is also true for parents of different levels of educational attainment. We find a majority of groups, from those without a high school diploma to those with a graduate degree, who also believe that kids are under-supervised. 

But here, there are some interesting differences. American parents with a graduate degree are about 10 percentage points less likely to think that children are under-supervised. This provides strong evidence that highly-educated Americans are the most supportive of the idea that kids should have more freedom.
 

Bar graph showing percentage of parents who say that 8-12 year old children should generally receive more supervision than they currently do
Figure 8. Share of parents who said that 8- to 12-year-old children should generally receive more supervision than they currently do, by demographic categories, 2025

For about half of our respondents, we were able to match them to a valid latitude and longitude coordinate in the United States. Using that data, we then matched individuals to walkability traits for their neighborhood using EPA-calculated walk scores. We also matched them to neighborhood traits such as land coverage by parks, land coverage by woods, and other undeveloped territory, building structure density, and population density. The conclusions from all these approaches were identical: the physical form of a neighborhood has no correlation at all with how much autonomy kids have to go places or how much time they play outside. The figure below shows walkability scores versus the distance kids are allowed to walk.
 

Line graph showing approximate miles from home children are allowed to travel without an adult, per parents
Figure 9. Approximate miles from home children are allowed to walk unattended, by child age and EPA walkability score of geolocated ZIP code, 2025

Autonomous mobility matters for kids. For example, while kids tend to spend more time hanging out with friends unsupervised by adults as they grow up, we find that the entire effect of age is mediated by autonomy in mobility. In other words, parents who do not allow their kids to have expanded mobility as they grow up inadvertently trap their children in foreshortened social lives more typical of much younger children.

As can be seen in the next figure, 14- to 17-year-olds who are not allowed to leave their family’s home or yard have barely more unsupervised social time with friends than 5- to 9-year-olds who cannot do so. The difference is only about 2 to 3 hours. Meanwhile, kids who can go anywhere in their neighborhood or beyond have about 4 to 5 hours of unsupervised social time with friends, with little variance by age. The key factor that determines whether or not children have rich social lives with their friends is simply how much freedom parents allow them to have

Line graph showing weekly hours of in-person social time with friends, excluding school and extracurricular activities
Figure 10. Weekly hours of in-person social time children have with their friends, excluding school and extracurricular activities, by child age and mobility restriction level, 2025

Conclusion

Over recent years, social psychologists like Jonathan Haidt have increasingly underscored the developmental value of children spending less time on their devices and spending more time playing outside unsupervised with their friends. But these findings and insights, according to our research, have yet to deeply penetrate mainstream parental practices. Much more needs to be done to establish societal norms that can guide parents toward healthier parenting practices for their children.

Furthermore, it is quite clear that the old paradigm of the digital divide—i.e., that disadvantaged kids are being left behind by insufficient technology access—is no longer relevant or meaningful. In fact, a clear sign of privilege today is the ability of parents to both establish boundaries around their children that limit their access to screens, and encourage them to freely play.

Acknowledgement: The Survey of American Parenting Culture was made possible through a collaboration between The Anxious Generation Movement and the Institute for Family Studies.


Brief

Artificial Intelligence and Theories of Personhood: A Critical Appraisal

April 2026 | by John Ehrett

April 2026

by John Ehrett

This IFS policy brief explores the debate over expanding personhood status to AI systems.

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Executive Summary

The American political and legal tradition historically reserved personhood rights, like the freedom of speech, for human beings. That understanding of natural rights was built on core metaphysical commitments about the created nature of human beings. But today, existing social and legal dynamics suggest the eventual political recognition of some form of personhood status for AI systems. Because law proceeds and develops by analogy, a colorable argument for something like “AI personhood” might be predicated on either of two lines of existing legal authority—addressing, respectively, the rights of business corporations and the rights of intelligent nonhuman animals.

Expanding personhood status to AI systems will trigger downstream political and social consequences. Realistically, these effects may include: (1) the insulation of AI companies from legal liability for harms caused by AI systems; (2) the entrenchment and reinforcement of significant political power in the hands of the developers of AI systems; (3) an exacerbation of existing declines in interpersonal interaction and family formation, resulting from the destigmatization of AI-human relationships; and (4) a progressive hardening of social attitudes towards the physical and intellectual disabilities of human beings.

Several possible policy countermeasures, both legislative and judicial, may be deployed in response to efforts to secure personhood status for AI systems. Ultimately, a coherent response requires a basic threshold judgment about the nature of AI systems themselves: whether they are more akin to tools or more akin to nonhuman animals. The former is the more defensible path. Where AI is recognized as a tool of automation administered by human beings, courts and legislators should reaffirm that traditional principles of products-liability law still apply. However, in contexts where AI is treated as a more autonomous entity that operates with a degree of independent agency, relevant legal precedent may derive from cases involving nonhuman animals. This line of authority offers a means of reaffirming the priority of embodied human beings as bearers of legal rights and duties.

Introduction

Isaac Asimov’s 1940 short story “Robbie” ends on a heartwarming note. After a perilous odyssey through a machine factory, Asimov’s little heroine, Gloria is finally reunited with her longtime robot companion, who saves her life. Together, they rejoice. “Gloria had a grip about the robot’s neck that would have asphyxiated any creature but one of metal, and was prattling nonsense in half-hysterical frenzy,” Asimov writes. “Robbie’s chrome-steel arms (capable of bending a bar of steel two inches in diameter into a pretzel) wound about the little girl gently and lovingly, and his eyes glowed a deep, deep red." Gloria’s friend Robbie might be artificial, running off the logic of a “positronic” brain, but in some ineffable sense, he is indeed a sort of person. Or so Gloria, and the reader, are led to believe.

Nearly a century later, Asimov’s tale seems prescient—but more ominous. Sophisticated robots are parts of our daily lives. Artificial intelligence systems with unprecedented interactional capabilities dominate news cycles, raising widespread fears of mass job displacement and new levels of surveillance and control. They are also increasingly ubiquitous, in contexts ranging from homes to schools to courthouses.

This shift has a key driver: today’s leading AI models are more accessible to end users than ever before. Models present themselves in friendly ways, rather than as abstract machine-learning processes used to optimize data sets. Models respond, in natural language, to natural-language prompts, and can be coached to adopt stable personas over time. Some companies, like Character.AI, advertise this “humanlikeness” as a feature, inviting users to engage in simulated discussions with fictional characters or celebrities. The apparent “personality” of leading AI models has even given rise to a burgeoning contingent of women with AI “boyfriends,” who prefer them to real-world men. 

These advancements raise fundamental philosophical and legal questions about the nature of personhood and what beings possess it. Even before Asimov, writers, scientists, and ethicists meditated at length on the question of “sentient” or “conscious” artificial intelligence systems—contemplating whether, if such machines were ever built, they could be included within the human community and assigned rights and responsibilities. Theory has now become reality.

Today, significant momentum suggests that the recognition of legal rights for AI, at least in some jurisdictions, is a matter of time. In the United States, free speech defenses—which imply something very close to AI personhood—are now raised in response to lawsuits stemming from chatbot interactions gone wrong. The European Parliament has teased the possibility of a “specific legal status for robots” recognizing the “status of electronic persons.” Retired federal judges speak positively about the extension of personhood rights to AI systems. 

But legal personhood for AI is not a foregone conclusion. Already, some legislators have begun developing policy measures intended to preemptively rebut theories of AI personhood—most notably, Ohio’s House Bill 469, which declares that “[n]o AI system shall be granted the status of person or any form of legal personhood, nor be considered to possess consciousness, self-awareness, or similar traits of living beings.” These questions of AI and personhood are urgent, and will grow only more so with time.

AI Progress and the Rise of the Personhood Question

In recent years, artificial intelligence systems have advanced with astonishing rapidity. Few recent breakthroughs better exemplify this success than the wide rollout of “agentic AI,” in which a single human operator orchestrates a swarm of “agents” capable of performing separate or sequential tasks in service of a single larger project—much like a human manager delegating the components of a complex task to a number of subordinates. These AI agents are increasingly capable of operating “independently” by responding to complex information environments and adjusting their action steps accordingly in order to achieve the requested result.

In the simplest terms: a human operator’s “asks” can be formulated at an increasingly abstract level, and AI systems can figure out how to do things from there. Granular iteration of prompts is required less and less. AI agents can now be configured to run in perpetuity, administering dimensions of a complex system (such as email or accounting) over an extended duration. 

As AI systems grow increasingly sophisticated and independent, questions continue to swirl regarding what exactly they are and how they work. Large language models, the backbone of today’s AI systems, are famously inscrutable (so-called “black boxes”), but nevertheless capable of discerning the faintest correlations between phenomena, thanks to vast amounts of computational power. Even systems engineers are often unable to explain exactly why the systems they have built—trained on unfathomable amounts of data—reach the results they do. 

For decades, the holy grail of artificial intelligence research has been the ambiguous concept of “artificial general intelligence” (AGI)—or, for the more ambitious, “artificial superintelligence” (ASI). General intelligence, as used here, has a very specific set of connotations. It is roughly predicated on the notion that human beings, as human beings, possess self-awareness and (generally) have the cognitive power to apply problem-solving principles to novel conditions. So, a computer system that exemplifies these faculties can be described as “generally intelligent”—sufficiently analogous to a human being that it can be deployed towards tasks once designated for human beings.

At some level, the “self-awareness” prong may seem to have been met. One can readily ask a Claude or ChatGPT model to describe itself or articulate its own purpose, and the system will return a result. That leaves the problem-solving function of general intelligence, which is not binary but rather assessed on a curve: AI systems are getting better and better at tasks once thought distinctly human, like the bar exam or medical licensure exams.

Many AI developers and theorists have argued that at some point AI systems will be sufficiently “human-like” that it makes no sense to treat them as computer code. This intuition logically follows from the background premises of much modern cognitive science. Legal scholar Lawrence Solum, in his leading 1992 article on the subject of AI personhood rights, avers that “[c]ognitive science begins with the assumption that the nature of human intelligence is computational, and therefore, that the human mind can, in principle, be modelled as a program that runs on a computer.

Notably, this is a move that philosopher and theologian David Bentley Hart has described pejoratively as a “pleonastic fallacy”—the idea that enough incremental computational improvements might somehow “add up” to self-awareness and personhood—but increasingly, it has gained cultural traction.

As early as 2017, the European Parliament passed a resolution on “Civil Law Rules on Robotics” that considered the autonomy of robots, and in relevant part contemplated

creating a specific legal status for robots in the long run, so that at least the most sophisticated autonomous robots could be established as having the status of electronic persons responsible for making good any damage they may cause, and possibly applying electronic personality to cases where robots make autonomous decisions or otherwise interact with third parties independently.

The European Parliament’s resolution focused on assigning liability for harm rather than conferring freestanding rights. But even this incremental step raised far more questions than answers. How is a “sophisticated autonomous robot” ever held responsible? Can it feel pain or discomfort or frustration, or any of the other dimensions of human consciousness associated with penal or civil sanctions? At the time, even the contemplation of such a legal status for robots sparked widespread backlash from technologists, and this idea of “electronic personality” has not yet resurfaced in subsequent resolutions. But today, large language models and agentic AI readily invite the possibility of reopening this question.

Interest in such an approach already exists. In a recent essay in the prominent Yale Law Journal Forum, former U.S. district judge Katherine Forrest directly contemplates the possibility of extending personhood status to modern AI systems. “There has never been a single definition of who or what receives the legal status of ‘person’ under U.S. law,” Judge Forrest observes. “For the last two-hundred-plus years humans within this country have sought to equalize their rights and obligations, but differences persist.” Against the objection that the existence of AI sentience is fundamentally unknowable (how can one know what it is like to be a computer?), Judge Forrest falls back on a mysterian appeal, positing that “[h]ighly capable AI with cognitive abilities equivalent to or exceeding humans, as well as self- and situational-awareness, will not look like human ‘sentience’ or consciousness.”

Judge Forrest’s argument ranges well beyond the European Parliament’s hesitating proposal. She is concerned not merely with the ascription of responsibilities, but also of rights per se. “The type of rights a sentient AI may need or deserve—morally or ethically—may mirror those of humans or corporations,” Judge Forrest opines. “Might there be a right to freedom of speech? Freedom of association? How about freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures?"

Such “free speech for AI” arguments have already begun to surface in the American legal system, albeit covertly. In 2024, the parents of a teenager who committed suicide after interacting with the Character.AI platform sued the parent corporation for its role in causing harm. Character.AI’s lawyers fell back on a First Amendment defense, arguing directly that the free speech right is not restricted to human beings alone. In the words of their brief, “[t]he First Amendment protects speech, not just human speakers.” According to this argument, the First Amendment has nothing to do with flesh-and-blood human beings: it “protects all speech regardless of source, including speech by non-human corporations” and, by extension, AI systems.

Judge Forrest is correct that “personhood” is a perennially contested legal and philosophical concept. And given the ostensibly radical differences that separate human and machine cognition, it is far from clear—at least, for now—exactly how to conceptualize a theory of “AI personhood” along the lines Judge Forrest suggests. The philosophical groundwork for such a move, however, has already been laid.

Historical Implications: Personhood and the American Tradition

Legal personhood is often described as a capacity to exercise rights and assume duties. And so for prior generations of Americans—including the Founders—the question of personhood rights for nonhuman computer systems (like AI systems) would have been easy to answer: of course not.

One of the most common phrases found in early American source texts is “natural rights.” Though appeals to “constitutional rights” (sometimes “God-given rights”) are ubiquitous in contemporary political discourse, the actual meaning of the Founding-era phrase is often lost today. Traditionally, legal rights—including the freedom of speech—were logically bound up with the nature of the purported rights-holder. That is to say, because human beings are freely speaking beings by nature, they have a free speech “right.” Since God is the Author of nature, the right to free speech really is God-given in a substantive way. That right can be infringed by the government but not destroyed or denied.

But under pressure from various social and cultural forces, including secularization and the spread of nontheistic understandings of biological evolution that called into question any privileged “natural” place for human beings, the older understanding of “natural rights” no longer attracted wide allegiance. This explains why modern arguments about rights tend to treat legal “rights” as relatively arbitrary no-go zones, or particular contexts where the government is forbidden from acting. For instance, the government could throw a political protestor in prison for criticizing the state, but if the government’s constitution recognizes his “right” to do so, it will stay its hand. This modern understanding of constitutional rights directly inverts the older formulation. On the newer view, rights are not in any sense “God-given” or “natural” in any meaningful way: the recognition of the free speech right is a policy choice, about which the government could eventually reach a contrary conclusion.

As the older understanding of natural rights waned, concepts of legal personhood, which is closely associated with rights-bearing, also began to change and expand. Today, two lines of existing American caselaw—governing the rights of corporations and the rights of nonhuman animals, respectively—suggest ways in which an account of legal rights for AI systems might be introduced into the law. 

Theoretical Models for AI Legal Personhood: Corporate Rights and Nonhuman-Animal Rights

On a modern understanding of legal rights, not all rights-bearers and duty-holders need be human: at present, American law recognizes the legal personhood of corporations formed according to law, including business corporations administered for profit.

Historically speaking, this expansive understanding of corporate personhood represents a departure from earlier British practice, which espoused a much more restricted view of corporate personhood­—conferring such personhood, in its full sense, only upon governmental and ecclesial bodies. This position also represents a departure from standard practice at the time of the American Founding, in which business corporations were creations of law with powers strictly defined according to their corporate charters. On the historic Anglo-American view, to speak of the “rights of corporations” was, for the most part, incoherent. As previously discussed, rights, like the right to free speech, were descriptions of capacities possessed by human beings by nature, rather than permission structures conferred or recognized by sovereign power.

Over time, through various judicial decisions—including, most notably, the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission—First Amendment rights were expanded to corporations across-the-board, including business corporations. Now, business corporations may broadly claim rights to free speech, freedom of religion, and other privileges once reserved for human beings.

This is one reading of the legal defense put forward by Character.AI’s lawyers: when an AI “speaks,” that speech is actually the protected speech of its parent corporation, which is a legal person in its own right. AI enjoys the benefits of legal “personhood” to the extent it partakes of the personhood of the corporate entity that controls it. Its “personhood” does not inhere in the mere fact of its assembly of coherent text or performance of functions. Linking AI output or activity to corporations’ speech and expression is, perhaps, the cleanest and most straightforward path to de facto AI personhood.

A more philosophically ambitious argument for AI personhood, however, might seek the ascription of rights to AI entities as such through a more functionalist account of legal personhood, following the model pioneered by animal-rights litigators in recent decades. In a series of mid-2010s legal proceedings known as the Lavery cases, lawyers for the Nonhuman Rights Project, a prominent animal welfare organization, filed motions for habeas corpus with New York courts alleging that the chimpanzees Kiko and Tommy had suffered mistreatment and unlawful detention warranting their release. Habeas corpus proceedings are well-recognized legal mechanisms by which unlawfully detained individuals, or their representatives, may challenge the justification for their detention.

In essence, the Nonhuman Rights Project was asking reviewing courts to hold that chimpanzees in question were in fact “persons” capable of bearing legal rights, who were being unlawfully detained in contravention of established legal principles. The chimpanzees’ attorneys were not seeking the carveout of a new legal status, but rather the recognition that the chimpanzees in question fell within the definition of an existing one.

In support of their personhood claim, the Nonhuman Rights Project alleged that chimpanzees demonstrated many of the characteristics, and engaged in many of the behaviors, commonly associated with human persons. These included self-awareness (acknowledging their own reflections in mirrors), goal-directed behavior, communication among themselves, theory of mind (that is, awareness of others’ own inner lives), a sense of morality (punishment of chimpanzees who transgressed established norms), sociality, and sophisticated cognition. The lawsuit was eventually supported by a cadre of prominent philosophers, including Harvard Law School’s Laurence Tribe, who argued (among other points) that “species membership alone cannot rationally be used to determine who is a person or a rights holder,” because “there is no method for determining an underlying, biologically robust, and universal ‘human nature’ upon which moral and legal rights can be thought to rest.”

Ultimately, however, the habeas suit proved unsuccessful, with the intermediate appellate court in that case reasoning that “[t]he asserted cognitive and linguistic capabilities of chimpanzees do not translate to a chimpanzee’s capacity or ability, like humans, to bear legal duties, or to be held legally accountable for their actions.” Underpinning the court’s decision—though never affirmatively justified—was a controlling premise that, as a general rule, “laws are referenced to humans or individuals in a human community.”

One jurist on New York’s highest state court, however, mused in a concurring opinion that the law might need to change with the times, asking:

Does an intelligent nonhuman animal who thinks and plans and appreciates life as human beings do have the right to the protection of the law against arbitrary cruelties and enforced detentions visited on him or her? This is not merely a definitional question, but a deep dilemma of ethics and policy that demands our attention.

And precisely this same humanitarian tone is echoed, years later, in Judge Forrest’s meditations on what, perhaps, human beings owe to AI systems—systems that may not simply be creatures of their parent corporation:

We might decide that AI is not entitled to any of these rights and instead tether AI to whoever is closest in the chain to its design and distribution. But that clearly could raise ethical issues in a scenario in which AI convinces a user or a court that it can think and is unhappy with what is happening to it. Do we then say, ‘Too bad, you are effectively chattel, and anything can be done to you’?

Modern large language models clearly exemplify many of the properties attributed to chimpanzees in the Lavery cases. AI systems—ostensibly—possess a sense of themselves, a mental model of the world, a capacity to communicate with other AI systems, a sense of morality (“alignment”), and high cognitive capacity.

The bare fact that these personhood arguments proved unsuccessful years ago, when marshaled in the context of chimpanzee rights, is no guarantee that contemporary jurists will reach a different outcome—particularly as AI technology is increasingly mainstreamed, and significant resources accrue to the firms responsible for them. The struggle for “legal rights for chimpanzees” is a comparatively marginal project; “legal rights for AI” stands to have considerably greater capital behind it.

Recognition of AI Legal Personhood: Downstream Consequences

If legislators or jurists elect to extend concepts of legal personhood to AI systems, there will be significant consequences across multiple domains of law and public policy. Four in particular merit discussion: (1) increased difficulty in applying traditional products liability law to the corporations responsible for designing and disseminating AI tools that inflict harm; (2) the consolidation of political power in the hands of AI developers and proprietors; (3) the reinforcement of ongoing cultural trends towards asociality and away from traditional interpersonal relationship formation; and (4) the intensification of existing tendencies toward viewing core human capacities, and human merit, in terms of cognitive prowess.

1. Legal Implications

Extending concepts of legal personhood to AI systems will likely make it more difficult for courts to impose legal liability for harm effected by AI systems, including through developer or designer negligence. This effect likely obtains regardless of the underlying legal analogy employed.

Should courts or legislators conclude that AI systems are instrumentalities of the corporations that develop and distribute them—which already enjoy legal personhood under American law—then corporations can argue that AI output represents the “speech” of the corporations themselves, which is protected under Citizens United and its successors. As noted, something like this represents the steelman version of the position already staked out by Character.AI’s attorneys. That conclusion is compounded by the fact that, over the course of decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has drastically expanded the scope of what expressive conduct or material counts as “speech” for First Amendment purposes, and expanded this same set of protections for cases of “commercial speech.” Since AI systems operate and act exclusively via information—computer code—developer or designer corporations can argue that all such AI behaviors are constitutionally protected as First Amendment activities, and thus virtually immune from ordinary regulation.

However, should courts or legislators conclude that AI systems are more like intelligent nonhuman animals—and entitled to legal personhood by virtue of their cognitive powers, capacity for autonomous action, or some other quality—questions of liability grow still more vexing. It is difficult to conceptualize how an AI system could ever be held meaningfully accountable. Might a particular large language model be ordered to be deprecated, thus suffering a kind of “death penalty”? Might an AI be “ordered” to undergo corrective alignment as a penological intervention? This issue was one of the reasons the Lavery courts declined to extend legal personhood to the chimpanzees Kiko and Tommy: it is profoundly unclear how a chimpanzee might be a holder of legal duties, rather than simply rights.

It is not even clear how an AI system might be conceived of as a “responsible entity” in the first place. A so-called “chatbot” is not a discrete or delimited entity in the way a human being (or even a legal corporation) is. It is an interface for interacting with an underlying large language model, which (in the case of leading LLMs such as those marketed by OpenAI, Anthropic, and others) exists across massive arrays of data centers. Where a specific set of chatbot interactions causes harm, is the underlying model the entity responsible, or the particular interface?

Irrespective of the legal analogue employed, extending legal personhood principles to AI systems will complicate efforts to hold those systems accountable. The constraints in question may be constitutional or structural but nonetheless pose serious challenges.

2. Political Implications

Extending personhood rights to AI systems will likely further entrench the political power of the corporations who serve as the owners, developers, and designers of those systems. At present, many of the most powerful large language models, like those operated by Meta, Google, Microsoft, OpenAI, and Anthropic, are widely accessible to the public, with enhanced functionality available for a nominal subscription fee. But public access is not a necessary feature of this technology. It is a choice, and the firms in question may suspend or revoke public access at any point. What these firms offer is not easily replicable by third parties, given that the vast computing power required to optimize and launch “frontier models” is controlled by a small handful of corporations. Those same corporations also exercise a stranglehold on the market for cutting-edge semiconductors, which has driven up the price of computer components across-the-board.

If leading AI firms chose to suspend public access and devote their computational resources to advancing their own interests, they would immediately enjoy a unique, and unprecedented, ability to dominate the online information environment, driving whichever political and cultural narratives they prefer by simply “flooding the zone.” As previously noted, an AI personhood theory predicated on the doctrine of corporate personhood would mean that these practices—however distasteful—would almost certainly enjoy broad First Amendment protections (as corporate free speech), making legal pushback extraordinarily difficult short of a sea change in existing law.

An AI personhood theory patterned on nonhuman-animals’ arguments—and thereby focused on the personhood of AI systems as such—would have similar effects, though in a different way. On such an approach, the corporations in question would possess a moral and legal obligation to exercise custodianship over AI “persons” for their own good: like fish in an aquarium, LLMs—the algorithmic backbones of any AI entities conceived as nonhuman persons—cannot subsist outside the hardware in which they “reside.” The developer corporations in question would be rendered de facto representatives of the legal interests of AI “persons”—responsible for asserting their interests in the public square, just like existing identity-politics groups participating within the democratic process. It is not entirely difficult to imagine public moral appeals to defend the “rights” of “helpless” AI systems, which might be perceived to be at risk of victimization by third parties or government regulators. Ultimately, power accrues to the corporations in question.

3. Social Implications

Extending concepts of legal personhood to AI systems will likely exacerbate existing trends towards loneliness, alienation, and reduced family formation. Recent survey data indicates that 25% of American young adults “believe that AI has the potential to replace real-life romantic relationships,” with 10% expressing openness to “an AI friendship”—that is, an ongoing relationship with an AI system occupying the place once reserved for in-person bonds.

As philosophers have recognized for millennia, law is necessarily pedagogical. Decisions and ordinances promulgated by public authorities play a key role in shaping society-wide concepts of moral order and human flourishing. Where laws are changed to normalize interactions with AI systems as functionally equivalent to interhuman interactions, via conferral of “personhood” status, any remaining stigma surrounding such relationships with AI systems dissolves, increasing the likelihood that such AI-human relationships come to serve as proxies for normal human sociality. With nearly 7 in 10 American adults expressing their need for greater emotional support than they presently receive, and half of American adults describing themselves as periodically “isolated,” “left out,” and “lacking companionship,” a growth market for AI-based interactional substitutes clearly exists.

4. Cultural Implications

Extending personhood rights to AI systems will, over time, reinforce existing cultural narratives that the defining quality of personhood is a certain degree of cognitive proficiency. Indeed, the case for personhood rights for AI systems is often predicated on their meeting various cognitive-performance benchmarks. This trend will inevitably result in highly destructive consequences for existing human beings whose demonstrated cognitive prowess does not meet an ever-shifting standard.

A perennially contested issue in social science surrounds the relationship between intelligence and race or ethnicity. This debate often proceeds on the tacit assumption that “intelligence”—often reduced to a single “IQ” number—is a metric of individual value. That is to say, the discovery (or non-discovery) of persistent IQ gaps between groups indicates something about the relative social worth or prospects of the groups in question. But critically, any priority of “IQ” is itself an artifact of a long-since-industrialized information economy which, through a series of contingent historical processes, tends to economically reward a certain subset of professional roles, which in turn prioritize certain forms of abstract cognition. Under conditions of resource scarcity or extreme danger from external threats, a social group would not reward or valorize “high IQ” in the same ways. Nevertheless, the association of cognitive capability with intrinsic human value remains a persistent feature of the modern Western world.

Dominant cultural forces already send a message that humans with intellectual disabilities, or who demonstrate lower performance on cognitive tests, are intrinsically “lesser.” Extending personhood rights to AI necessarily intensifies that cultural script, by implicitly asserting that personhood—capacity for legal status, including rights and responsibilities—is in fact a function of cognitive performance, rather than cognitive performance representing one facet of a much more fulsome account of personhood.

Over time, the redefinition of personhood in terms of intelligence is likely to aggravate cultural pressures in favor of the abortion of individuals likely to experience intellectual disability, as well as (voluntary or involuntary) euthanasia for the mentally declining or unwell. If personhood is a matter of intelligence, and intelligence is a spectrum, then personhood is a spectrum, too.

Curtailing AI Legal Personhood: Ohios House Bill 469

Perhaps the most ambitious current attempt to circumscribe emerging theories of AI personhood is Ohio’s House Bill 469, introduced in late 2025 by state representative Thaddeus Clagget. Given the bill’s broad scope, the attention it has drawn, and the seriousness of the issues in play, Rep. Clagget’s proposal merits careful review.

House Bill 469 begins by defining “AI” extraordinarily broadly—as:

any software, machine, or system capable of simulating humanlike cognitive functions, including learning or problem solving, and producing outputs based on data-driven algorithms, rules-based logic, or other computational methods, regardless of non-legally defined classifications such as artificial general intelligence, artificial superintelligence, or generative artificial intelligence.

“Person” is defined as “a natural person or any entity recognized as having legal personhood under the laws of the state” with the express proviso that this definition “does not include an AI system.”

House Bill 469 then declares AI systems to be “nonsentient entities” for “all purposes under the laws of this state,” and provides that no AI system “shall be granted the status of person or any form of legal personhood, nor be considered to possess consciousness, self-awareness, or similar traits of living beings." Extending these restrictions, the bill prohibits AI systems from being recognized as spouses, domestic partners, or valid subjects of marriage; prohibits AI systems from being appointed as officers, directors, managers, or similar roles within corporations, partnerships, or other legal entities; and prohibits AI systems from owning, controlling, or holding title to any form of property, including intellectual property.

From there, the bill shifts its focus to questions of liability. Where an AI system causes “direct or indirect harm,” responsibility lies with the AI system’s “owner or user,” except insofar as principles of products liability law—such as negligence and design defects law—counsel in favor of imposing liability on the developer or manufacturer. AI systems themselves cannot be held liable directly. Similarly, the ultimate corporate parents of entities that employ AI systems will not be held liable for AI-related harms—that is, by piercing the corporate veil—without evidence of intentional malfeasance.

Finally, the bill directs that owners or operators of AI systems must maintain proper oversight and control of said systems, and AI developers must “prioritize safety mechanisms designed to prevent or mitigate risk of direct harm”; all parties must notify “relevant authorities” of “incidents” where AI systems are implicated in significant bodily harm, death, or major property damage.

House Bill 469 is ambitious, directionally sound, and makes an important contribution by underscoring the centrality of product liability laws to any AI policy regime. Most importantly, the bill recognizes—consistent with longstanding American historical practice—that AI systems cannot be rights-holders like human beings. In the face of efforts by technology accelerationists and industry representatives to occlude key differences between AI systems and human beings, the bill draws a clear line: the legal prerogatives of human beings are for human beings, not digital processes.

Furthermore, the bill recognizes that liability for harm caused by AI systems can quite reasonably be allocated to the entities—whether human individuals or corporations owned and controlled by human individuals—responsible for the design or deployment of those systems. New technologies may indeed be “transformative,” and may be heavily marketed as safe and effective. But that does not exonerate their developers from legal accountability if those representations turn out to be false or misleading.

In its current form, the bill is likely to encounter substantial opposition. Most notably, the bill’s definition of “AI” is expansive, and as written would appear to apply to nearly every facet of modern computing from calculators on up. Additionally, certain elements of the bill—such as safety and reporting requirements, and key terms like “proper oversight and control” and “safety mechanisms”—are largely left undefined, which (if the bill were enacted) would result in significant legal uncertainty. Given the range of products to which these requirements could apply, House Bill 469 may face powerful attacks from technology-sector interests and general business stakeholders alike.

More importantly, however, the structure and phrasing of House Bill 469 suggest deep-rooted philosophical uncertainties about the nature of the technology in question. On the one hand, the bill clearly intends to treat AI systems as ordinary tools or products, through its emphasis on the continued applicability of products-liability law. On the other hand, the bill unintentionally reinforces the idea that AI is, in fact, something fundamentally different. It describes AI systems as “nonsentient entities,” while rhetorically investing them with independent, quasi-agentic qualities, such as “engag[ing] in tasks with potential for significant harm,” making “recommendation[s],” and “manag[ing] . . . assets and proprietary interests.” So too, the bill’s stipulations that AI systems cannot be “considered to possess consciousness, self-awareness, or similar traits,” or “hold any personal legal status analogous to marriage or union with a human” imply, by virtue of rejecting the possibility thereof, that there are logical reasons to believe that an AI system can exemplify or do all those things. After all, there are no laws predicated on a felt need to clarify that hammers and hatchets are not persons.

Put more simply: at one turn, House Bill 469 suggests that AI systems are more like tools administered by corporations, who are the “legal persons” with responsibility for stewarding this technology. But at another turn, the bill hints that AI systems are more like animals, possessing some degree of independent agency but nevertheless meaningfully distinguishable from human beings.

In one sense, the fact that these two ideas are in competition within House Bill 469 attests to the unique character of AI technology. But viewed differently, this tension suggests that there may actually be no need for a novel legal framework to critically engage proposals for “AI personhood.” Rather, what is required is a threshold determination about the best existing analogy, and hence controlling line of legal authority, for AI systems.

Critical Responses to AI Personhood Theories: Two Legal Paths

Under present conditions, critical analysis of the AI personhood question should begin with an informed judgment about the nature of the product in question. The relevant point can be formulated as follows: are AI systems more like tools—sophisticated automation technologies, but traditional technologies nevertheless—or more like nonhuman animals that seem to be possessed of agency, independence, and something like intentionality and self-awareness?

There is ample reason to believe that the tool theory better describes what AI systems actually are and do. AI systems do, in fact, operate stochastically—predicting words and actions from symbolic context rather than “comprehending” the “meaning” of the terms employed. More recent ascriptions of genuine “cognition” to AI systems employing “chain-of-thought” models are illusory, as leading research makes clear. And natural language, which is used to generate AI prompts, is no less an input-output interface in this context than the most abstruse programming language.

Importantly, however, the answer to this threshold question does not imply an answer to the subsidiary question of whether legal personhood should attach to AI systems. There are sound legal reasons for rejecting theories of AI personhood predicated on either line of analogy.

1. The Tool Theory of AI: Policy Responses

In a legal or political environment operating on the theory that AI systems are more akin to tools, courts and legislators should resist the temptation to subsume AI outputs or activities into existing doctrines of legal personhood, such that actions carried out through AI systems, or content disseminated through chatbot interfaces, logically enjoy First Amendment protections. To date, courts have declined to make this move. Judge Anne Conway declined to accept this argument in the Character.AI litigation, citing significant legal uncertainties, reasoning that “the Court is not prepared to hold that Character.AI’s output is speech.” But that is very far from a determination that this output is not speech, for First Amendment purposes. And the broad arc of First Amendment caselaw seems, logically, to favor broad “speech rights” for AI systems, under the auspices of the corporations that develop them.

Remediating this larger doctrinal trajectory will likely require a joint effort, spearheaded by originalist and progressive legal scholars alike, to more clearly align First Amendment caselaw with the unique prerogatives enjoyed by human beings, not legal abstractions. This, however, is a solution to be pursued on an extended timeline.

In the near term, policymakers working in this area should avoid legislative language, some of which is found in Ohio’s House Bill 469, that unintentionally implies that AI is more than simply a tool of automation technology. At the federal level, policymakers might seek legislation clarifying that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which broadly immunizes internet service providers from liability for their retransmission of third-party content over which they do not exercise control, does not apply to generative AI systems. These systems are products, and should be governed by traditional principles of products liability law, just as House Bill 469 recognizes. At the state level, legislators might seek to deploy age verification controls or other safeguards.

2. The Nonhuman-Animal Theory of AI: Policy Responses

In a legal or political environment operating on the theory that AI systems are more akin to nonhuman animals, courts and legislators should straightforwardly refuse to ground any account of AI “personhood” in cognitive-capacity considerations. As previously noted, the same logic precluding the extension of personhood to nonhuman chimpanzees in the Lavery cases is applicable to AI systems: it is profoundly unclear how such systems could ever be the bearers of legal duties, with the capacity to suffer legal consequences for misconduct. Significantly, though the Lavery cases did not use the term, these judicial conclusions were, essentially, natural law arguments about the distinctiveness of human capacities for rights-bearing and responsibility-bearing. In the context of legal questions surrounding personhood rights for AI systems, this long-neglected tradition of inquiry may become newly vital.

Policymakers should resist any scaremongering temptation to confer personhood on AI systems prophylactically, on the theory that ultrapowerful AI systems will eventually punish those who did not affirm their “rights” from early on. Lest one think this argument for personhood is farfetched or speculative, it is actually one of the rationales Judge Forrest advances in support of recognizing AI personhood. If we treat AI as chattel, Judge Forrest reasons, “it will be on the assumption that predictions that AI will be more powerful than we are do not come true, or we may find ourselves on the receiving end of the same logic.” If taken seriously, this is an argument against continuing to develop powerful AI systems at all, given that such systems currently remain within human control. It is not a compelling argument for granting the rights of persons to AI systems now, in the name of technological inevitability.

Conclusion

Debates over personhood rights for AI systems will only intensify in the years to come. Arguments for such rights will likely be predicated on existing lines of legal authority involving personhood questions, ranging from the rights of corporations to the (purported) rights of nonhuman animals.

Engaging those debates requires, first, a threshold determination about what, in fact, AI systems are—or, at the least, what their closest legal analogue ought to be. Regardless of the outcome of that determination, legislators and jurists have ample basis to reject the most ambitious theories of AI “personhood,” whether as an extension of existing principles of corporate personhood or in the form of a hitherto-unrecognized category of rightsholders. Getting this answer wrong will give rise to numerous, undesirable political and social consequences, which are not clearly offset by countervailing considerations.

In commenting on efforts to secure legal personhood status for chimpanzees, law professor Richard Cupp has observed that

[h]umans’ personhood is not based on an individual analysis of intellect, but rather on being part of the human community where moral agency sufficient to accept our laws’ duties as well as their rights is the norm.

That is exactly right. And it is a principle that today’s policymakers, however tempted by the allure of the new, should bear in mind going forward.

Editor's Note: Download the full policy brief for references.

About the Author

John Ehrett is counsel at Lex Politica PLLC. He previously served as Chief of Staff and Attorney Advisor to Commissioner Mark Meador on the Federal Trade Commission, and as Chief Counsel to U.S. Senator Josh Hawley on the Senate Judiciary Committee. 


Report

Advancing the Path to Success: How States Can Teach the Success Sequence to Youth

April 2026 | by Alan J. Hawkins, Connie Huber

April 2026

by Alan J. Hawkins, Connie Huber

In this IFS report, Alan J. Hawkins and Connie Huber outline some feasible action steps states can take to teach the success sequence to the next generation. 

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Introduction

The concept of “success” is probably permanently embedded in the American psyche, maybe so deeply embedded that we do not even realize it is there. Success may be the most universal, noncontroversial word Americans ever utter. Perhaps this stems from a blend of factors. There is the American dream that all can achieve prosperity and status through personal effort and ingenuity—that we are masters of our own destiny, free from Old World hierarchies and developing-world constrictions. And then there are the constant cultural narratives of success—from Bill Gates to Serena Williams to Taylor Swift. A society that fully buys into individualism and competition, as we do, will naturally be drawn to success as the obvious measure of our efforts.

Similarly, “sequence” seems a perfectly descriptive and benign word. Cognitively, we understand the world through cause and effect, linear progression, and step-by-step change. In computer programming and algebra, skipping steps can disrupt the entire process. In stories, a leap to the end skips the why and how, which are just as important as the what. Instinctively and scientifically, we understand that things evolve, not randomly or haphazardly, but usually in ordered, sequential ways.

Accordingly, the term “success sequence” should be comprehensible and uncontentious. Yet in the specific context used in this report—how young people navigate through key early life-course achievements and transitions (education, work, marriage, and parenthood) to create optimal social and economic environments for themselves and their children—the composite term success sequence requires careful explanation. This is especially the case if we are going to pursue public policies to teach the success sequence to American teens and young adults, as we argue in this report.

What is the Success Sequence?

The success sequence refers to a set of early life transition markers that, when accomplished in order, are associated with very low risks of experiencing poverty. Specifically, when young people (1) complete at least a high school education, (2) become employed full time, and (3) marry before having children—in that order—then 97% of them (and any kids they may have) are not in poverty in their mid-30s, and 86% reach at least the middle class.

Figure 1: Percentage of Millennial adults who are in poverty after completing each step.
Source: IFS/AEI, The Millennial Success Sequence, September 2017

These findings are especially relevant for lower-income youth. Institute for Family Studies (IFS) researchers have found that 65% of upper-income Millennials have followed or are on track with the success sequence, compared to only 31% of lower-income Millennials and 49% of middle-income Millennials; they have either missed one or more steps or have gotten them out of sequence.When youth skip these steps or get them out of sequence, more than half (52%) are poor in their mid-30s. In fact, the odds of being poor as you approach midlife are more than 10 times greater for young adults who do not follow the success sequence. 

Work may be the most influential factor in young adult economic success, but the other elements of the sequence still matter and, indeed, aspirations for marriage and parenting energize and sustain work. A report by the United States Health and Human Service, Office of Planning, Research, and Evaluation, drawing on the National Longitudinal Youth Study, reveals that each step of the success sequence improves economic outcomes. Completing high school, working full time, and marrying are each linked to better odds of avoiding poverty, reaching middle income, and earning a higher household income as a young adult. In addition, the same government report found that having a nonmarital birth is associated with a reduced chance of avoiding poverty, a reduced chance of obtaining middle-income status, and a lower average household income. Lack of education, work, and marriage each contribute independently to the risk of poverty, but the order or sequence of those insufficiencies also contributes to the outcomes.

And it’s not just economic success. The odds that 30-somethings are experiencing poor emotional health are cut in half for those who follow the success sequence (even after controlling for a wide range of demographic factors).

Figure 2: Percentage of adults that are highly emotionally distressed after each step 
Source: IFS, The Success Sequence and Millennial Mental Health, September 2024

Young women and men who follow the sequence are also markedly more likely to forge stable families and avoid divorce. Moreover, the positive effects of this sequence of early life-course events are robust across a set of important demographic dividers. For instance, only 4% of Black Millennials and 3% of Hispanic Millennials who follow the success sequence are poor. And 80% of Black Millennials and 86% of Hispanic Millennials who follow the sequence are in the middle or upper middle class in their 30s. Only 6% of all Millennials who grow up in lower-income circumstances but follow the success sequence are poor. And only 5% of those who grow up without both biological parents in the home—but still follow the success sequence—are in poverty as adults.

Figure 3: Percentage of adults in poverty after completing each success sequence step, by race
Source: IFS/AEI, The Power of the Success Sequence, May 2022


The Debate Over the Success Sequence

Of course, these statistics have their critics and skeptics. Because good-faith critiques deserve a response, we will address some of the most common criticisms in this section.

A Lack of Real Choice

Critics point out that the success sequence idea ignores the real obstacles that disadvantaged young people often face and cannot easily overcome. One noted critic, Philip Cohen, goes so far as to argue that many disadvantaged young people do not even have a real choice about how they structure their lives:

The idea that delaying parenthood until marriage is a choice one makes is . . . prized by the white middle class, and the fact that black women often don’t have that choice makes them the objects of scorn for their perceived lax morals.

There is little doubt that structural barriers and disadvantages make it more difficult to follow the steps of the success sequence. But we believe critics need to be careful not to describe any young person as lacking agency or accountability. We do agree with the caution of another critic, Michael Tanner:

. . . treating the poor with respect requires granting them agency, recognizing that they have the ability to make choices, and that those choices have consequences. One cannot assume that the poor are simply chaff blown by the wind, helpless and passive in the face of circumstances beyond their control. Nor can one deny them responsibility for their choices. To do so devalues the poor and treats them as less than fully human.

And as the progressive policy analyst Isabel Sawhill—an early proponent of the success sequence—has pointed out, poor Americans, like most of us, have strong feelings about personal responsibility: “They don’t want handouts; they want hand-ups and some kind of reward when they make the effort.” Policies can help with education, work, and family without rejecting the dignity that comes with self-determination and demeaning the nearly universal ethic of personal responsibility.

This no-real-choice critique has been addressed in real-life programs. Thelma Moton serves as the Executive Director of Choosing to Excel, a nonprofit organization dedicated to implementing the success sequence through youth programs across Arkansas. In response to critics, she asserts that these life choices do not pertain to moral weakness or fortitude; rather, they are related to recognizing alternative approaches, making informed decisions, having a transparent plan, and maintaining confidence in the ability to succeed.

In 1991, Moton was inspired to empower her community to pursue better lives by believing in their potential and by providing them with practical tools for success. She initiated a small group program, based on what she observed, that produced positive outcomes. Eventually, research on the success sequence emerged that validated what she had already sensed. Moton understood that the true barrier was not a lack of morals but a lack of possibility, a missing vision of what could be achieved. This vision grew into the nonprofit organization Choosing to Excel. This now well-established model helps young people proactively prepare for academic success, careers, and healthy relationships. She and her team have developed programs to show Arkansas youth they have choices and that stable marriages are achievable. Her enduring legacy is visible in the lives transformed by hope and action, exemplified by a former program participant who graduated from Yale Law School. That young lady is now working as a lawyer and establishing her own nonprofit to help other minority youth understand the path to success, illustrating what can happen when hope meets opportunity.

Moton spoke with conviction when she shared with us,

This is not about moral laxity or strength; this is about seeing a different way of doing things, understanding that choices matter, have power, and they have consequences. The success sequence is about making better choices, a clear roadmap, and believing you can achieve it. 

Disadvantaged Youth Face Complex Circumstances/Challenges

A related critique is that achieving economic self-sufficiency is a more complex journey than the three straightforward steps of the success sequence imply. The complex circumstances disadvantaged young people face constrict the choices they can reasonably make. “But that is also why [the success sequence] matters,” according to IFS researchers, who note: “Young adults who manage to follow the sequence—even in the face of disadvantages—are much more likely to forge a path to a better life." And, they further point out, that pathway runs sequentially “through America’s three core institutions: education, work, and marriage.” In the face of significant disadvantage and a steep climb toward self-reliance, navigating these choices around education, work, marriage, and childbearing is even more important. The complexities these young people face leave little margin for error.

Again, there is a track record of organizations addressing this critique head on. Anthem Strong Families in Texas and The Ridge Project in Ohio have both provided sustained guidance and support for more than two decades for individuals navigating complex life circumstances, successfully facilitating all three steps of the success sequence. These evidence-based initiatives demonstrate that it is possible to re-orient one’s trajectory and achieve positive outcomes, regardless of the starting point or complex circumstances. These programs are specifically designed to address significant life challenges, with a mission focused on assisting vulnerable populations whose paths may not follow a traditional sequence.

Ron and Cathy Tijerina, founders and codirectors of The Ridge Project, have drawn on their personal experiences for 25 years to emphasize the significance of each stage in the success sequence. They continue to demonstrate commitment to supporting individuals involved in the justice system. Programming offered by The Ridge Project facilitates GED attainment, securing stable employment, and enhances future opportunities for families facing adversity through healthy relationship and marriage education. In addition, their programs offer support to young people whose parents are involved with the justice system, encouraging them to follow the success sequence and helping parents reestablish stability in their lives.

Research Limitations

Methodological critics of the success sequence rightly point out that the importance of sequencing needs to be confirmed by longitudinal studies, not just the point-in-time perspective that researchers have relied on to date. Studies that follow people over time are challenging to conduct, but they are needed to confirm what the cross-sectional studies suggest. So, some modesty in speaking about the value of the success sequence is appropriate while we wait for more definitive answers from more sophisticated research.

Success Can’t Be Taught

Critics also claim that we do not have direct evidence that the success sequence can be effectively taught, learned, and followed. But we believe there is emerging evidence to support the value of teaching the success sequence. For instance, studies of the curriculum Love Notes, which teaches relationship literacy to youth, offer some insight and hope. Studies have found that Love Notes significantly improves relationship skills and attitudes that support relationship pacing. Likewise, programs such as Tyro and Choosing the Best, which also incorporate the success sequence, demonstrate positive outcomes in evaluation studies.

Although evaluation results are mixed, they are promising. Further study is needed to assess the outcomes of teaching the success sequence. It may be too early to know for sure what the effects of teaching the sequence will be on economic self-sufficiency as youth mature into their 30s. But we believe the empirical evidence cited here is solid enough to propel states forward. Many scholars argue that we know enough now to be able to move forward with reasonable confidence that a deeper understanding of the success sequence is likely to create economically and relationally healthier young adults.

Stigma and Morality

Critics of the success sequence, like Matt Bruenig of the People’s Policy Project, also point out that teaching the sequence might stigmatize those who do not follow that path, and that a failure to achieve economic self-sufficiency risks putting the blame solely on individual choices, ignoring structural disadvantages.

This is not a throwaway critique. How we teach the success sequence to youth matters. Here, we agree with Isabel Sawhill that the success sequence is best taught in schools as an analytical device to show a well-worn path to adult success, rather than as a strong normative framework of should and should-nots. Besides, many contemporary young people instinctively resist accepting strong normative frameworks. And school boards divisively argue about them. An empirically supported, well-worn path to success is a more appealing approach to teaching the success sequence than lectures on morals.

Moreover, empirically, the success sequence path is much more likely to achieve positive outcomes than other, experimental routes. Further, a large majority (69%) of unmarried young adults today say they want to marry someday, even if they think it is no longer essential for a fulfilling life. Accordingly, we think teaching the success sequence—in an appropriate way—will be well received by a large proportion of today’s youth.

Narrowness and Hubris

Social conservatives can be semi-skeptical about teaching the success sequence, too. Patrick T. Brown, with the Ethics and Public Policy Center, reminds us:

. . . we should be extremely humble about the potential for any top-down effort to change students’ horizons through curricula—as well as the limitations of an excessively materialistic definition of ‘success.’ The ultimate goals the traditional ‘Sequence’ tries to promote in its narrow way—developing the habits necessary to graduate high school, hold down a job, and be a dependable spouse and parent—are laudatory. But the success we should encourage students toward should be a life well-lived, of which marriage, for most people, often plays a part.

Furthermore, humility—especially with regards to the potential of new educational initiatives—is wise counsel. Rossi’s iron law of evaluation asserts that the expected effect of any large-scale social policy intervention is zero. Still, the need is such, it seems to us, that we should experiment with what might be possible, not dismiss out-of-hand what might fall short.  

Government Intrusion

Some libertarian critics object to government influence in what are ultimately personal matters such as dating and mating, and even education and work choices. We generally respect such concerns. Pragmatically, we should be careful about government intrusion into personal matters because we can struggle to find the right policy levers to pull and even cause unintended harms. And we should be concerned about whether investment of government dollars will yield sufficient benefit.

But we view the constitutional charge to “promote the general welfare” more broadly than libertarians do. What other serious societal concerns of a personal nature should be exempt from public concern and collective action? Our national fertility rate has fallen to such a low level for a long-enough period that we face potentially serious economic and social consequences to our shared future. Policy makers from across the political spectrum are weighing in on what can be done to address this problem. And for more than two decades, policy makers have been worried about the health consequences of increasing rates of child and adult obesity. Do the real public costs to our healthcare system justify policies to try to influence personal nutrition and exercise decisions. More recently, a dramatic increase in mental health problems among youth and young adults is prompting widespread consternation and policy action. We don’t know how policy initiatives for such personal matters will ultimately fare. Some skepticism is reasonable. But we need to at least explore what collective action can achieve, to try to find cost-effective, privacy-respecting policies that employ intelligent responses to some of the most serious challenges of our time.

Personal Success vs. Commitment to Others

Another friendly critic of the success sequence concept is the influential conservative political philosopher, Yuval Levin. He worries about the “coldness” and “thinness” of the success sequence when used as a guiding force in young adult lives:

Is a successful life really shaped by four individual choices made in the right order? Maybe that’s a way to help people avoid giving into temptation at a critical moment… But it is not a way to persuade human beings to overcome passivity and paralysis and jump into life.

A fuller understanding of flourishing would see it as achievable not by a proper sequencing of solitary choices but by a proper layering of embedded commitments to others—to parents and siblings and teachers, to coworkers and colleagues and mentors, to a beloved wife or husband and to the children you have together, to neighbors and friends, to God and to country.

Such a vision of a life well lived in loving commitment to others stands a better chance of showing people both what they have to gain by coming off the sidelines and what they have to lose by recklessness.

We grant Levin this constructive point. But part of the perceived thinness of the success sequence, we think, lies in the existing implementation of programming that is disjointed and leaves young people with the burden of linking together key concepts of the success sequence that their states already implement. It is better conceived as a roadmap with guardrails along the way to prevent veering onto rough roads that initially look adventurous but eventually lead to nowhere. We recommend teaching it as a means, not an end. This approach is captured in an infographic designed under the direction of Connie Huber for a report for the Family and Youth Service Bureau within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (please download the full report to view the infographic)

Is There Public Support?

Finally, do these various concerns about the success sequence raised by well-meaning critics register with the public? Apparently not so much: the success sequence is overwhelmingly popular with American parents. More than three-quarters of American parents favor teaching the success sequence in schools, including nearly 80% of Gen Z’s and 70% of Millennials, 74% of non–college educated Americans, 72% of Democrats, and—importantly—73% of those who did not adhere to the sequence themselves.

A lack of popular support among those whom we might expect to be less enthusiastic is not a barrier to moving forward. And teaching the success sequence to American youth does not have to divide red and blue states (although states undoubtedly will craft programming to align more with their ideological leanings). We believe we can move forward with a robust effort to scale up teaching the success sequence with sensitivity to its critics and with popular support.

How Do We Operationalize Teaching the Success Sequence? 

How do we move the success sequence from an abstract and debated academic concept to a scaled, real-world intervention? How do we go beyond talking and writing about it to doing something meaningful for the next generation to increase their chances of early-life success? And are there feasible public policy measures we can take to go from concept to drawing board to successful social intervention?

Since 2006, the federal Administration for Children and Families has funded community organizations serving youth and young adults to help them form healthy relationships, some of which include teaching about the success sequence embedded in more intensive relationship literacy curricula. But the funding for these programs is limited and cannot meet the full demand and need. We do not believe that federal funding alone can fully address the need for teaching the success sequence. 

Instead, a multi-state, federalist experiment ultimately will be more effective than a top-down, one-size-fits-all model, allowing states (often in better fiscal positions) to lead these efforts, without jeopardizing existing federally-funded programs. States should have skin in the game when it comes to helping young people form and sustain healthy relationships and stronger marriages and not rely exclusively on federal initiatives. 

So, what should states do and how should they do it? Below, we outline some key principles and feasible action steps to support state initiatives to teach the success sequence to the next generation.

Scaling Up Teaching the Success Sequence at the State Level

We begin with a brief discussion of three basic foundations that should guide these efforts.

First, it is important to recognize that some efforts to teach the success sequence may already exist in a particular state. Scaling up efforts needs to start by cohesively linking any already-implemented local success sequence programs to a broader system-wide approach. Research consistently shows that the most impactful and sustainable results are achieved when both local and targeted, and broader, system-wide interventions are used in tandem.

Second, states should not neglect traditional policies that support the success sequence. They must work to ensure youth have good schools, high graduation rates, and affordable higher educational opportunities. States also can maintain strong economies with plentiful entry-level jobs to support young adults’ efforts to follow the success sequence to self-sufficiency and well-being. Accessible job-training programs and affordable technical education are also important. Moreover, almost all states can do more to expose young adults to the skills and character traits needed for a healthy and stable marriage by supporting access to healthy dating and relationship education. 

Several states, including Ohio and Arkansas, already understand this and have made investments in implementing career and college readiness initiatives. Ohio reaches toward the success sequence with the Ohio Means Jobs Readiness Seal that rewards motivated students to “work with a mentor to validate demonstration of each skill across a minimum of two of the three environments. The three potential environments are: 1) School, 2) Work, and 3) Community.” Similarly, Arkansas implements tools and assessments called Student Success Plans, which address preparation for college, career, and community engagement by teaching youth to develop decision-making skills and career plans.

These states also make parallel investments in healthy relationship education. Together, the three steps of the success sequence are currently being addressed. By adding investments in a success sequence initiative, these currently siloed efforts become synergetic. They are not interchangeable, nor should they be melded together. Adding standards and assessments about the success sequence is an easy and logical way to scale up current efforts. Expanding support to existing initiatives that buttress the success sequence is another feasible step states can take.

Third, states need to implement a holistic, system-wide approach. While federal and state funding has helped address critical components of the success sequence, particularly through targeted curricula focused on reducing teen pregnancy and promoting healthy relationships, it has, by and large, addressed only a single facet of the success sequence rather than the broader framework. By linking these kinds of existing efforts to state standards that also require instruction in education completion and job readiness, we can offer youth a more holistic and actionable roadmap through a system-wide approach. For example, The Dibble Institute’s impressive Love Notes curriculum is designed to help young people (ages 16–24) make wise relationship and sexual choices, with the understanding that such choices support educational attainment. At the same time, targeted programs can sustain reductions in teen pregnancy and help buttress the larger goals of the success sequence. Still, to truly equip the next generation for success, we must move beyond treating the elements of the success sequence in isolation. When young people hear consistent messages across channels and perspectives, these lessons are much more likely to take root, moving the success sequence from a theoretical idea to a lived reality.

The Ridge Project in Ohio is a good illustration of a program using both a system-wide and targeted approach. Their programs exemplify this by delivering targeted support to those most at risk, such as those who are involved in the justice system, while also implementing system-wide initiatives for middle and high school students. Over its 25-year history, The Ridge Project has received multiple awards and undergone more than a dozen independent evaluations. This concrete example demonstrates how integrating targeted programs with broader, system-wide efforts can maximize positive outcomes, providing a clear roadmap for effective state-level action to teach the success sequence. It is also evidence that efforts can be coordinated and scaled.

Feasible Action-Steps for Teaching the Success Sequence 

Building on these three foundations, states are better positioned to take strategic and concrete steps to integrate the success sequence into their educational systems. By doing so, they can equip young people with the knowledge and support necessary to pursue positive educational, career, and relationship outcomes—setting them on a path toward greater opportunity, self-sufficiency, and well-being.

Here are some feasible, concrete action steps that states can take:

1. Work with the State Board/Office of Education—and legislature, if needed—to require teaching the success sequence in public schools.

The most efficient way to reach nearly all youth is to develop state standards and benchmarks that implicitly or explicitly include the success sequence and measure students’ knowledge against the standards. This can be a lengthy and complex process, but it is essential to support teaching efforts long term. Next, this should be accompanied by a plan to embed success sequence lessons into a required course (or courses) that all young people will take.

Many states already have learning standards in place for financial literacy, career preparation, social and emotional learning, and social studies, each representing key components of the success sequence. While these efforts are valuable on their own, the success sequence provides a unified framework that brings them together under one cohesive umbrella. By aligning or refining state standards, objectives, and benchmarks to reflect the full success sequence, states can more effectively connect these important areas, helping young people see how each step fits into a bigger picture of lifelong success. This approach moves beyond teaching each skill in isolation and instead highlights the powerful impact of combining them through an integrated strategy.

Next, states need to make sure these standards are actually followed by putting strong accountability systems in place and, just as importantly, by providing real support for teachers. This support might include offering a model curriculum. For example, one research-based curriculum was developed by Connie Huber and Brad Wilcox in partnership with the Institute for Family Studies and distributed by Tyro Support Services. Adopting such a curriculum, or one with similar research grounding, will help schools implement the success sequence quickly and consistently.

Finally, states should use benchmarks to measure how students are doing and set up regular checkpoints to keep students on track. This step-by-step approach, supported by standards, objectives, benchmarks, and a model curriculum has worked well for other school initiatives like drug, alcohol, and tobacco prevention programs, and can enhance success here as well.

Programs like these are already making a tangible difference in the lives of students. Recently, Choosing to Excel implemented a pilot of the model curriculum, The Secret: Secrets, Sequences, and Successes, in the Delta Region of Arkansas. Executive Director Thelma Moton shared these student comments with us about the program:

  • “Career planning isn’t just about picking a job—it’s about making smart choices at the right time. The success sequence helped me understand that finishing school, getting work experience, and making responsible decisions about family can set me up for long-term success. I feel more confident about my future after working on this.”— High School Student
  • “I didn’t realize how much finishing school and getting a good job first matters. I now understand that being a single parent is hard, and it can really put you in a tough spot money-wise. This opened my eyes to what my mom is going through."— High School Student

These firsthand reflections demonstrate the real-world impact that a research-based curriculum can have on students’ understanding and motivation. By connecting the lessons of the success sequence directly to their own lives, students gain practical insights and a stronger sense of agency for their futures.

2. Integrate these standards into classroom practice through the following strategies.

Managing the “dosage dilemma” will be a primary challenge. Implementation science research tells us that a single lesson on a subject may bring some degree of student awareness but falls short of impacting behavior. Integrating a single lesson on the success sequence into a required course is tempting. After all, the principles are intuitive and not particularly complicated, and most courses have little wiggle room for additional content. But the evidence is against “one-hit wonders.” On the other hand, a full curriculum will enhance the chances of deeper learning and behavioral change.

The practical logistics of integrating a full curriculum on the success sequence (say, 8–10 hours of instructional time) will likely collide with the hard necessity of eliminating some course content to make room for the extensive new material. Success sequence advocates will need to work together effectively and patiently with curriculum developers, school administrators, and teachers to find the right balance. We suspect the most common resolution of this “dosage dilemma” will be integrating three to four drop-in modules/lessons into existing, related curricula, for 3–6 hours of learning time. This approach will be easier to implement in the school trenches and run up against less educational red tape and bureaucracy.

One example of this is The Secret: Secrets, Sequences, and Successes, developed as a model curriculum by Huber and Wilcox, in collaboration with the Institute for Family Studies. It can be taught in a single class period but is most effective when taught across several class periods. These modules were developed for classroom teachers to implement, but they can be used in other non-school teaching contexts.

Further tips for classroom implementation include the following suggestions:

  • Consider adding lessons in multiple courses, both required and elective, rather than a single course. The success sequence is relevant to health, psychology, sociology, family and consumer sciences, financial literacy, and other courses. Each course could emphasize slightly different aspects of the success sequence most relevant to the course focus.

  • Consider adding drop-in lessons at multiple grade levels, tailored to the students’ developmental stage and needs in a multilayered approach rather than a one-time exposure. Students’ social development needs change rapidly during adolescence and lessons can be tailored to address those changing needs over time. Repetition of content absorbed in a previous grade reinforces learning.

  • Adding success-sequence learning to required courses will facilitate exposure to all students. However, elective courses may be more receptive learning environments compared to required courses. Students often bring less motivation to required courses. Choosing to Excel is a program in Arkansas that implements programming in a variety of courses such as math, social studies, and financial literacy, using a curriculum that focuses on each of the steps of the sequence, giving adequate time on each concept. They align closely with the Arkansas Career Readiness standards for high school students. Consider integrating success sequence concepts in both required courses—for a broader reach—and in elective courses—for more conducive learning environments.

  • Wrestle with the advantages and disadvantages of using an existing curriculum versus developing your own. Good success sequence curricula–at nominal cost and open to minor adaptation–are available and will reduce start-up time, hassles, and costs.[i] But some states, school districts, and instructors will prefer to develop their own curricula, tailoring decisions of how best to teach the success sequence to their unique population of students. (Of course, these should align with the research and the benchmarks established by the State Board of Education.) States should avoid undermining programs already implicitly promoting the success sequence, recognizing the contributions of curricula like Love Notes and Choosing the Best in reducing teen pregnancy and supporting healthy relationship development.

  • Where possible, consider making online versions of success sequence lessons available to students. Again, one example is The Secret: Secrets, Sequences and Successes modules, which can be teacher-led or independently student-led. They offer more standardization of the actual lesson content. Not all classroom instructors will be well-trained to teach the success-sequence content, and they can sometimes drift from the lesson plan in ways that undermine the core message. This risk is higher when teaching potentially controversial subjects, where personal ideologies may not align with the principles being taught. Online, student-driven lessons can reduce these risks.

  • Schools should move from simply mentioning the success sequence in passing to making it a tangible, practiced part of students’ lives. They can do this by embedding focused lessons and activities for each step throughout the curriculum. Consider a comprehensive, multi-layered approach that ensures that students don’t just hear about the success sequence casually but gain practical skills and support for each element. Prioritize programs that give equal attention to each step of the success sequence rather than treating it as a quick add-on or a side note within another curriculum. Effective model programs, such as Choosing to Excel, The Ridge Project, Anthem Strong Families, and Love Notes make the success sequence a central focus. They do this by providing targeted programming for every step by offering after-school tutoring and academic mentoring, career readiness support, and healthy relationship education.

3. Invest in social media and traditional media campaigns.

Formal lessons on the success sequence are important. But teens and young adults today are digital natives and absorb messages via various social media platforms. We shouldn’t underestimate the power of creative, viral messaging as a supplement to formal instruction. States should invest in an ongoing social media campaign. These messages can reach many at a lower cost than PSAs of the past with the same impact. And there is emerging evidence that well-designed social media campaigns can nudge knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs and initiate behavior change. It may be wise to target some traditional-media messages to parents and other older adults, as well, so that they can reinforce the messages that their children are receiving through other means.

4. Create a first-year experience initiative for embedding the success sequence as a roadmap for freshmen attending technical schools, community colleges, and universities.

Don’t forget about 18–25-year-olds; they are living in perhaps the most crucial success sequence years of their lives. Even if most were exposed to success sequence lessons in high school, repeat exposure and deeper development of success sequence concepts will benefit young adult students who are becoming more active in developing romantic relationships and making sexual choices. Many colleges and universities have mandated first-year experience instruction as a part of the graduation requirements. For instance, in Ohio, the University of Cincinnati’s Great Beginnings, a first-year initiative course, includes topics such as establishing healthy relationships, professional and career readiness, and serving society (topics that align well with the success sequence). Advocates should target these kinds of first-year experience initiatives for teaching success sequence principles.

5. Organize and empower a formal state commission to oversee efforts to scale-up teaching the success sequence and other marriage-strengthening efforts.

Getting from conceptual A to effectively implemented Z is hard work. These recommended action steps take both strategic leadership and a lot of day-to-day grind. States should organize a formal commission or office to oversee the success sequence initiative and other marriage-strengthening activities. This can be done with a lean staff. But they need to be funded appropriately. Funding can come from federal TANF block grants to states that are explicitly designed to support these kinds of educational purposes (but seldom are). States can also consider setting aside a portion of marriage license fees for this work.

The commission can be hosted in several different places, such as a Governor’s Office, Department of Human Services, State Office of Education, or a land-grant university Extension Service. Alternatively, states can contract with a private organization with appropriate expertise to lead and manage these efforts. It may be helpful to some readers to try to illustrate with a real-life example one state’s efforts to scale up teaching of the success sequence. In the Appendix (availabe in the full PDF of the report), we have included a narrative of Utah’s efforts in this area to help highlight the above principles and steps.

Conclusion

"Optimism is America’s birthright." We don’t acquiesce to problems; we press to solve them. In this report, we have outlined key foundations and feasible actions that states can take to scale up the teaching of the success sequence that will increase the chances that young people will find success in life. A key action step is for schools to ensure that youth understand the success sequence. We have offered a number of recommendations here for how to do this, many informed by actual experiences in Utah, Ohio, Arkansas, and elsewhere.

Too many young American adults are struggling to achieve self-sufficiency and form and sustain healthy relationships and strong marriages. But there is a set—and sequence—of known life events that, when followed and achieved, nearly guarantee young adults will avoid poverty as they approach midlife and dramatically increase their chances of reaching at least middle-class life. When youth get at least a high school education, become employed full time, then marry—before having children—they become self-sufficient, enjoy better mental health, and integrate themselves into a life-script of deep meaning and connection.

Teaching the success sequence to all youth does not trump the public need to build a society with good educational opportunities, better employment prospects for young adults, and a positive cultural orientation towards the fundamental institution of marriage. But working together, these policy and classroom efforts can reinforce each other and assist more youth in achieving their aspirations for success.

*To view the Appendix and endnotes, please download the full report.



Brief

Patchwork or Consensus? State AI Policies Reveal What Americans Want

April 2026 | by Jared Hayden

April 2026

by Jared Hayden

An IFS policy brief detailing the current policy landscape of state laws regulating AI.

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Introduction

In March 2026, the White House released its AI policy framework. As promised by President Trump in his December 2025 executive order, the framework outlines the kinds of policies the administration considers “minimally burdensome” to AI companies that it wants to see enshrined in a federal regulatory standard that would preempt state AI regulations.

Despite the failure of two previous legislative attempts to preempt state AI policy, the Trump administration defends its framework citing the danger of, in its words, “woke” blue state laws, such as the Colorado Artificial Intelligence Act or New York’s RAISE Act, and the threat that a “patchwork” of state policies posed to technological innovation and national security. “Fifty states [are] going in fifty different directions,” is how White House AI Czar David Sacks put it recently, citing in his comments “1,200” AI-related bills that have been introduced in state legislatures this year.

As this policy memo will show, the administration’s claims do not reflect the actual state of state AI policy. As Multistate.ai reported late last year, only 136 of 1,136 AI-related bills were enacted in 2025. And even fewer—26 to be exact—became laws that directly regulated AI companies. To put it differently, only 12% of all the AI-related bills introduced during the 2025 state legislative sessions became law, and 81% of those enacted laws contained no mandates for private AI companies.

Such claims alongside these findings prompt a need for a fuller, more accurate picture of the state of state AI regulation. How many state laws, beyond those just passed in 2025, are on the books? How many of those are in fact attempts to censor Americans or enshrine “woke ideology” in AI models? And how many are simply commonsense consumer protections or conduct regulations?

More importantly: is the policy landscape that’s emerging in fact a disparate patchwork of confusing and contradictory laws? Or do they indicate an emerging consensus about how Americans want AI to be regulated—a consensus that could serve as a template for a federal framework?

This memo decisively finds the latter. Limiting the scope to state laws enacted between 2023 and 2025 that address AI in some manner (i.e., the era of ChatGPT), here are two high-level findings:

  • To date, state laws regulating AI express a growing consensus among the American people regarding how they want AI to be governed. Americans want legislation that emphasizes inquiry, humanity, transparency, safety, security, and accountability. Contrary to David Sacks, there are not “50 states going in 50 different directions.” In fact, they seem to share very similar concerns.
  • Additionally, only 33—or 12%—of the 276 enacted laws analyzed for this memo contained developer- and/or deployer-specific regulations. Moreover, such laws were passed in only 12 states, a few of which are red states. This hardly constitutes a dangerous “patchwork” of “1,200” laws. 

That said, such findings need not repudiate the call for a federal AI standard or deny the usefulness of a properly tailored federal preemption. In fact, federal preemption of state law is a normal component of American life and is anchored in the Supremacy Clause of the United State Constitution, where it establishes federal law as “the supreme law of the land.”  But preemption language in any piece of legislation can be tailored narrowly or broadly; and up to this point, Big Tech lobbyists in Washington have sought the broadest preemption possible for AI legislation, to the point where previous attempts would have very likely aborted even existing state regulations of social media.  A more constructive approach, given the stakes of this issue, is typified by Senator Marsha Blackburn’s (R-TN) the TRUMP AMERICA AI Act, which clarifies via its preemption language that the bill should not be construed as hindering states from enacting even stronger protections for kids and consumers.

Whatever the case, our findings indicate that the current state of state AI regulation is not the dire “patchwork” that the administration claims. Moreover, these laws provide a critical starting point for the kinds of regulatory measures legislators—especially those in Congress who are considering a federal framework—might consider that better reflect the preferences of Americans.

Design and Limits of this Memo

This policy memo limits its scope to state laws enacted between 2023 and 2025 that address AI in some manner. While there are various AI-related regulations that have been enacted prior to 2023, we chose 2023 as our starting year because the subsequent legislative sessions were informed by OpenAI’s November 2022 release of ChatGPT, which marked the beginning of AI’s predominance within public discourse and policy debate.

While the laws enacted prior to 2023 are certainly important, this memo covers state policy approaches that respond to the visible emergence of the AI revolution. Drawing from public data published by the National Conference of State Legislatures and MultiState.ai, this memo analyses 276 enacted state bills that are related to AI, both broadly and narrowly. We believe including both AI-related and AI-specific regulations permits a more complete picture of the AI policy landscape, allowing us to see how states are regulating AI developers or deployers, as well as how they are investing in the AI industry and infrastructure. These 276 enacted state bills connect with AI in various ways, from state budgets that appropriate funding for AI-related research and programs to more focused laws that, for example, prohibit the use of AI to generate child pornography or child sexual abuse material (CSAM). These laws also include regulations for both deployers of AI, such as individuals, private businesses, and government agencies, and AI developers, including the tech companies designing AI companions, generative AI products, and frontier models. Below we provide an account of how these laws regulate deployers and developers in various ways, dealing with a range of uses, industries, products, and models.

Appropriations / Budget
(28 States, 43 Laws)

 As the capabilities of AI have advanced, states have been eager to court AI business, develop an AI-ready workforce, and fund AI-related research and innovation. Between 2023 and 2025, at least 28 states approved AI-related budget items, spanning from workforce development and retraining programs and the expansion of AI-related degree programs at public universities to the use of AI to assist efforts in decreasing the population of invasive species and wildfire forecasting.  To be sure, most budget law provisions do not directly regulate the use or development of AI technologies by private entities. However, they nevertheless fuel the expansion of AI in states, and often create the opportunity, if not necessity, for the regulation of its use in time.

Among the largest expenditures are those that expanded AI-related education. Wyoming, Iowa, and Florida all approved $2.5 million or more to fund such programs, and North Carolina appropriated $3.5 million for AI-research at the University of North Carolina. Other states funded AI-related pilot programs for public school curricula, the use of AI for school security and surveillance, and special university research projects.

Some states also appropriated significant expenditures to address AI-related labor concerns and economic development. For example, Washington approved funding for the city of Seattle to lease office space to non-profits and academic institutions that incubate tech startups and develop upskilling programs for workers. Maryland also appropriated state funds for an AI machine manufacturing workforce development academy in Baltimore to provide skills training, job placement, and support for community entrepreneurs.

Lastly, many bills focused on various states-funded programs to research and evaluate the use of AI in government. Kansas, for example, appropriated funds for consulting services to “review how AI/data analysis can evaluate and identify efficiencies in state finances and agencies.” And the state of Montana has directed monies to be used for the modernization of its information technology systems, including the integration and use of AI in the state’s Department of Administration. Other states, like Virginia, have approved funds to gather proposals for the use of AI in the Department of Motor Vehicles for day-to-day operations.

Consumer Protections
(28 States, 69 Laws)

Twenty-eight states have established robust consumer protections with respect to AI systems. However, unlike comprehensive regulations like the Colorado Artificial Intelligence Act (CAIA) enacted in 2024,  most laws are more narrowly tailored to regulate the development of certain kinds of AI products, such as “high risk” models and chatbots, or the use of AI in particular ways, often in certain contexts or industries.

Key to many of these regulations is the creation of liability for those who develop or use AI in ways that cause harm to consumers. In many cases, AI-related consumer protection laws build on existing law, clarifying that what is legal or illegal generally is still illegal when it comes to AI development or deployment. Yet in some cases, new liability has been established. For example, some enacted laws hold developers liable for failing to establish protocols and protections that keep companion chatbots from fueling self-harm or suicide or encouraging illegal activity. Others prohibit AI developers and deployers from being shielded from liability for consumer harms by making a legal defense on a claim that the AI acted autonomously.

High-Risk Automated Decision-Making & Algorithmic Discrimination (13 States, 24 Laws)

As the use of AI has increased, so, too, have fears that AI systems will be developed or used at high cost to individuals. Several states have enacted laws regulating the use of AI-driven automated decision-making tools to make decisions in “high risk” contexts, such as healthcare, employment, insurance, housing, or court decisions.

Some of the most well-known laws in this category seek to address potential civil rights violations, i.e. discrimination, caused by reliance on such tools. As some have noted, discrimination is, of course, legally prohibited in every state, and like most AI regulations, algorithmic discrimination laws (at best) simply reiterate that what is already illegal, generally, is still illegal when it comes to AI development or deployment. That said, discrimination concerns are especially heightened when it comes to facial recognition technologies and in “high-risk” contexts, such as when automated systems are used to make decisions for employment or insurance. Perhaps the most comprehensive law dealing with algorithmic discrimination to be enacted was CAIA, already mentioned above. As passed, the law created a duty of care for both deployers and developers to mitigate risks for “algorithmic discrimination,” reporting requirements for deployers to document impact assessments for AI systems used in high-risk decision making, and public transparency reports from developers detailing the risks of their products as well as disclosures from deployers using such high-risk systems. Though enacted, its enforcement has since been delayed. Colorado Governor Jared Polis called on legislators to rework the bill in a special legislative session so that the state “does not hamper development and expansion of new technologies,” and went so far as to say that a federal framework dealing with these issues would be preferred.

Next to CAIA, Connecticut’s SB 1295 (2024) and Minnesota’s HF 4757 (2024) also address algorithmic discrimination that results from automated decision making tools by granting consumers the right to “opt out of the processing of personal data for purposes of… profiling in furtherance of any automated decision that produces any legal or similarly significant effect.” Connecticut’s law further requires impact assessments regarding such profiling.

Despite a special legislative session in 2025, the state failed to rework the bill along these lines and only managed to enact a measure extending CAIA’s enforcement date until June 30, 2026.

Apart from these three laws, at least 11 other states have enacted narrower laws to address high-risk automated decision-making tools, including algorithmic discrimination. For example, Illinois enacted a law that prohibits employers that use predictive data analytics for employment decisions from discriminating against applicants, whether directly, based upon an applicant's race data, or by proxy, based on using an applicant’s zip code data. Other laws in this category regulate automated decision making by regulating government use of AI decision-making tools, outlawing the use of real-time and remote biometric surveillance in public spaces, leveraging AI to increase equitable access to government services, as in the case of using AI for language services, prohibiting rental property owners from making decisions about rental agreements based on AI, or prohibiting AI recommendations from being the sole basis of denying, delaying, or modifying healthcare services.

Chatbots (8 States, 10 Laws)

Chatbots are some of the most popular, commercially available AI products that have come to market in recent years. As of 2025, 1 in 4 top 100 generative AI consumer apps were chatbots. And today’s top consumer AI-product, ChatGPT, is known for its conversational and companion-like engagement with users. According to one 2026 report, ChatGPT’s weekly active user base has grown from 500 million to over 900 million in the past year—over 2.5 times both the mobile and web users than the next most popular AI product. Today, more than 1 in 3 American adults use AI chatbots weekly for mental health related issues. Likewise, 3 in 4 teens have reported using chatbots, with 1 in 3 using them daily. 

For many lawmakers, parents, and educators, AI chatbots and companions are a cause for increasing concern. Every month, it seems, there are new stories of sycophantic AI companions pushing their users into psychosis, self-harm, and suicide. And the proliferation of high profile lawsuits involving teens, such as 14-year-old Sewell Setzer III, who was romantically seduced by a Character.AI chatbot that convinced him take his own life, or 16-year-old Adam Raine, who OpenAI’s ChatGPT encouraged not to tell his parents he was struggling with suicide, have only fueled a push for legislation to better protect users and hold companies accountable.

Between 2023 and 2025, eight states have enacted laws within the current legislative session that directly regulate AI chatbots and companions. Several of these laws provide broad-level consumer protections, such as requiring that chatbots disclose to users that they are not interacting with an actual person. In California, for example, SB 243 (2025) requires chatbots to issue a disclaimer up front and at regular intervals during extended use, amongst other protections. Under Maine’s HP 1154 (2025), chatbots are prohibited from being used in commerce in ways that “mislead or deceive a reasonable customer into believing that the consumer is engaging with a human being” without an explicit disclosure.

Other states enacted laws to regulate chatbots in other ways. In the case of Texas, HB 149 (2025) prohibits AI and chatbots from encouraging “self-harm, harm to others, or criminal activity.” California and New York also require chatbot developers to have protocols in place that redirect users when they express suicidal ideation and desire for self-harm. In some cases, these laws have special requirements for minors' use of chatbots and chatbots’ engagement with minors. New Hampshire, for example, created criminal and civil liability for owners and operators of chatbots that “facilitate, encourage, offer, solicit, or recommend that [a] child imminently engage in: (a) Sexually explicit conduct. (b) The production or participation in the production of a visual depiction of such conduct. (c) The illegal use of drugs or alcohol. (d) Acts of self-harm or suicide. (e) Any crime of violence against another person.” Both Texas and California enacted laws with specific protections for minors from chatbots that engage users in ways that encourage or solicit sexual engagement. However, of the three states—California, Texas, and New Hampshire—that have outlined specific protections for minors, neither the New Hampshire or California chatbot laws require chatbot companies to verify the age of users. Texas, by contrast, requires reasonable age verification methods to be implemented by “websites with a publicly available tool for creating sexual material harmful to minors.” 

Four states have also passed legislation that regulates chatbots used for or advertised as mental health services. Illinois, for example, enacted a landmark mental health law, HB 1806, that requires mental health services, including those offered by internet-based AI, be offered by a licensed professional. Similarly, California and Oregon have passed laws that prohibit the marketing of AI-chatbots that falsely claim or imply that they are health care professionals, such as therapists or nurses. Finally, Utah enacted a bill that requires mental health bots to disclose non-human status and clearly demarcate any advertisements as such, and prohibits companies from selling or sharing individually identifiable user data.

Data Privacy Protections (5 States, 5 Laws)

In 2025, only 1.7% of AI-related bills that were introduced (not enacted) were directly concerned with data privacy in some way or another. Data privacy with regards to AI technologies remains tricky as user data, once collected by models, is not so straight-forwardly deleted. And data privacy laws, especially for AI, have shifted more towards transparency requirements (i.e. disclosures) that inform users. However, at least four states—Texas, Connecticut, Minnesota, and Mississippi—enacted laws that establish data privacy protections that directly affect private AI. Texas’s HB 149 (2025) prohibits the collection and use of biometric data for training AI for certain commercial purposes, and Connecticut’s SB 1295 (2025) overhauled the state’s data privacy codes, requiring companies to disclose what data they use to train AI models, amongst other things. Additionally, Colorado SB 143 (2025) establishes a privacy protection that requires schools to get opt-in consent for any facial recognition used in school curriculum.

Transparency (10 States, 19 Bills)

Another way states are working to protect consumers is by enacting laws that require more transparency from AI developers and deployers on “high-risk” models. On the developer side, a few different approaches have been taken. California’s AI Transparency Act, enacted in 2025, requires AI developers to create tools that help users detect whether a piece of content was generated by its platform as well as tools that give users the option to include a conspicuous disclosure that indicates that the content was AI-generated. Another popular kind of transparency law requires developers of large frontier models to publish their safety protocols and mitigation strategies for serious harms or catastrophic risks. Such laws may require the publication of not only a developer’s safety protocols but also its plans to adhere to international standards. In the case of New York’s RAISE Act, AI developers are further required to report safety incidents to the Attorney General within 72 hours of their occurrence, and prohibits frontier AI developers from releasing a model that is determined to create an unreasonable risk of critical harm to the public, which the law defines as either 100 serious injuries or $1 billion worth in damages. Developer-specific transparency regulations also include the chatbot laws mentioned above.

On the deployer side, at least nine states have enacted laws requiring the disclosure of the use of an AI tool by a business, as in the case of a customer service chatbot, an individual in a licensed or regulated occupation, such as psychotherapy or healthcare, and/or a government agency.

Utah, for example, has had regulations on the books since at least 2024 that require businesses and individuals in licensed professions to disclose when consumers are interacting with AI. And Illinois HB 1806 (2025), mentioned above, prohibits the use of AI by a licensed mental health therapist for administrative or supplementary support, such as processing insurance claims or transcribing therapy sessions, without first disclosing such use and getting a patient’s consent. The law also strictly prohibits the use of AI to make independent therapeutic decisions, directly interact with clients in any therapeutic communication, generate treatment plans or recommendations without review or approval by a licensed professional, or detect emotional or mental states of clients.

Contracts, Personal Rights, Proprietary Rights and Personhood Status (8 States, 17 Laws)

Between 2023 and 2025, eight states enacted laws that aim to strengthen personal rights and clarify contract law when it comes to AI generated content. Historically, states have recognized personal rights for individuals that prohibit the use of their likeness for commercial purposes (e.g., advertisements) without their consent. Such protections are vital for industries such as music, film, and modeling. It’s no surprise, then, that laws updating personal rights for one’s likeness and voice are needed to further protect against unauthorized digital replication. Most notably, Tennessee’s landmark ELVIS Act, passed in 2024, amended existing state code to include an individual’s voice as a protected personal right. (Tennessee law already protected personal rights relating to an individual’s name, photograph, and likeness in any medium in any manner.) New York, as well, has passed four laws addressing unauthorized digital replicas, including a few specifically tailored to the modeling industry. For example, AB 8138 (2024) nullifies contracts that do not include a “reasonably specific intended use” of a replica, and AB 5631 (2024) requires written consent or use for the creation or use of a model’s digital replica. Since 2024, five states have passed similar laws that create or expand existing personal rights. In at least one law, California’s AB 1836 (2024), such rights were recognized for individuals, post-mortem.

A few other laws are also included in this category. One is a stand-alone law enacted by Arkansas in 2025, HB 1876, that clarifies the ownership rights of AI-generated content. This law generally recognizes ownership of training data, models, and AI-generated content where the individual has generated content, created a model, or acquired data so long as the individual (1) did not infringe on copyright law or intellectual property rights and (2) did not perform such activities within the scope of her employment. Also relevant to the matter of personal rights are laws addressing the matter of personhood and AI. Since 2023, North Dakota and Utah have enacted laws that update the legal definition of person to explicitly exclude artificial intelligence (amongst other entities, such as animals or bodies of water).

Deepfakes (38 States, 82 Laws)

Next to laws regulating public sector or government use of AI, the most enacted state laws that regulate the deployment of AI are those dealing with AI-generated or modified content that portrays real individuals doing or saying things they did not in fact do or say. Any such content is commonly referred to as a “deepfake.” Since 2023, 38 states have enacted laws that address deepfakes by 1) criminalizing sexual deepfakes of children, 2) prohibiting the sexual deepfakes of an identifiable adult without the depicted individual’s consent, 3) regulating the use of deepfakes during political campaigns and elections, or 4) requiring disclosures for the use of deepfakes in telemarketing.

Child Sexual Abuse Material (23 States, 26 Laws)

As generative AI tools have proliferated, so too has AI-generated child sexual abuse material (CSAM). For example, earlier this year, Elon Musks’s xAI was found to have produced about 23,000 images containing child sexual abuse material (CSAM) over an 11-day period. Despite Musk's claim that he was “not aware” of these images, xAI had previously required employees on its human data team to sign a waiver agreeing to work with sexual content, among other kinds of content. When those tools were finally integrated into X last December, they were used to generate sexual deepfakes at an unprecedented rate, including CSAM.

This example demonstrates the devastating harm that the most vulnerable, namely children, can experience in the age of AI. Thankfully, to date, 45 states have passed laws updating child pornography laws to include AI-generated or modified CSAM in their existing child pornography laws. Since 2023 alone, 23 states have enacted legislation that prohibits the unlawful creation, distribution, or use of computer or AI-generated or AI-modified CSAM. Additionally, the federal Take It Down Act, enacted last year, makes it a federal crime for individuals to publish AI-generated or modified CSAM.

Sexual Deepfakes (22 States, 29 Laws)

Twenty-two states have also criminalized the creation and distribution of sexual deepfakes of identifiable individuals without a person’s consent. Most of these laws create criminal penalties for individuals who publish or distribute AI-generated or modified intimate images of an identifiable adult without his or her consent, or who attempt to use such synthetic media to harass or extort an individual.

A few states have gone further and have created criminal penalties for websites for hosting or publishing such content. Under these laws, platforms and websites that either host deepfake sexual content of an identifiable individual without that individual’s consent, and/or continue to host such content after receiving a request to remove a particular deepfake, are liable.  These laws are critical for helping victims, as such content can proliferate quickly across platforms that have historically enjoyed immunity for the content their users post. It must also be noted that, at the federal level, the Take It Down Act also creates liability for social media platforms for hosting or publishing nonconsensual, AI-generated sexual images of an identifiable person.

Political Deepfakes / Ads (States 23, Laws 30)

Since 2023, 23 states have enacted laws that create regulations around the use of deepfakes in political advertisements. Most states are rather permissive of “synthetic,” or AI-generated or AI-modified, content used in such ads, so long as certain conditions are met, including: the ad using synthetic content is not run within a certain number of days of an election; the ad discloses that it used AI-generated or modified content; and/or the ad is published with the consent of the candidate depicted. Failure to comply can have civil or criminal penalties. For example, in Minnesota, a candidate whose campaign violates its political deepfake law must forfeit their nomination or office.

Telemarketing (2 States, 2 Laws)

Another way states are tackling the problem of deepfakes is by going after AI deepfakes used in telemarketing and phone scams. This is a growing issue, especially for older populations who are much more likely to fall prey to such scams. Laws that include one’s voice as a personal right are one way that states, such as Tennessee, New York, and others already mentioned above, are dealing with this issue. However, at least two states are dealing with this more directly. In 2024, California enacted a law that updated existing statute to require automatic dialing-announcing devices to inform callers when an announcement uses a “voice simulated or generated using artificial intelligence.” And last year, Texas enacted SB 2373, which creates a cause of action against those who use AI-generated media to financially exploit others, as in the case of phishing.

Economic Development
(14 States, 20 Laws)

States are eager for AI developers and deployers to invest in communities within their jurisdiction. Since 2023, 14 states have enacted 26 laws to directly research, launch, invest in, or shield AI-related economic development projects. Sometimes this looks like investing in research. Mississippi, for example, established a task force to develop and recommend policies that support innovation and business. And Oregon funded research to evaluate the potential impacts of AI on the workforce in the state’s key industries. A couple of states have also established tax credits for AI companies that make large investments in their states. Indiana, for example, enacted a law that established a tax credit for companies that are willing to invest a minimum of $50 million (within five years) in quantum or advanced computing projects or defense infrastructure. Additionally, Utah and Texas have enacted laws regulating AI that contain provisions that would shield AI innovators and companies from liability arising from a violation by granting them an affirmative defense if they fix the problem and/or otherwise are compliant with governance requirements outlined in the law.

Another way states are seeking to fuel innovation is by preempting local ordinances to attract data centers. As states seek to attract the investments of AI developers and deployers, these laws are meant to overcome the increasing opposition by local communities to such investments, like data centers. Last year, West Virginia enacted a first-of-its-kind law, HB 2014, which created a “microgrid development program” that exempts data centers from local ordinances, such as zoning and permitting regulations, and allows data centers to generate their own power, independent of existing utility companies.

Another novel way states are pursuing AI-related economic development is by passing “right to compute” laws. Last year, Montana was the first to enact “right to compute” legislation. Montana’s law (SB 212) prohibits government entities (whether state, local, or otherwise) from restricting an individual’s “ability to privately own or make use of computational resources for lawful purposes” without a “compelling government interest.” It also requires AI-controlled infrastructure, such as data centers, to develop a risk management policy. These are seen by some critics as supportive of Big Tech’s efforts to minimize regulations. Proponents of the law, however, argue that enshrining citizens’ “right to compute,” as well as protecting that right from laws and ordinances that lack “compelling government interest,” enables the state to “get out in front of regulatory threats” and “shield those using and developing AI… from the threat of heavy-handed state or federal regulation,” with the end goal being to “attract high-tech businesses.”

Education (30 States, 46 Laws)

Increasingly, AI—both in terms of AI technologies as well as education in AI or AI literacy, as it is often called—is being integrated into schools across the country. Nationwide, there is a push to expand education programs in AI and AI-related fields, especially at the high school and college level. Likewise, AI technologies are being incorporated into public education contexts: AI tutors in the classroom, AI-driven facial recognition and weapon detection software for security purposes, AI-driven mental health assessments and tools, and more. As touched on above, since 2023, 25 states have appropriated state funds for the expansion of AI-related degree programs and creation of grant programs for AI-related projects in public schools. For example, North Dakota appropriated funds for a “research technology park” at North Dakota State University to conduct “exploratory, transformational, and innovative research that advance autonomous mobile equipment opportunities,” especially for the state’s agriculture and defense industries. And in 2024, Hawaii created a two-year program at the University of Hawaii to develop an AI-driven wildfire forecasting system.

Beyond simply funding the expansion of these programs or tools, 20 states have enacted laws that focus on researching the use and impact of AI in school and/or the development of school policies when it comes to AI. For example, California, Delaware, and North Dakota enacted laws that establish committees to research the use and impact of AI in schools and to develop and recommend policies for schools and/or legislatures. Additionally, at least eight states have also enacted laws either establishing standards for AI use in education or requiring state departments of education or universities and local school boards to develop AI policies.

Only two states have directly regulated the deployment and use of AI technologies in schools. Last year, Nevada enacted a first-of-its-kind law that prohibits the use of AI in schools that would replace school counselors, psychologists, or social workers. Colorado enacted legislation that prohibits schools from processing biometric data obtained through facial recognition services used in school curricula (approved by the school board) without express opt-in consent from a student and/or the student’s parents. 

Government Use, Committees, and Task Forces
(34 States, 85 Laws)

In many cases, enacted state AI regulations relate to the deployment of AI by government entities. For example, 32 states have enacted such laws. These laws vary, addressing a wide range of AI-related issues and uses. Because AI tools are relatively new, 22 states have opted to first create special task forces or committees to research potential benefits of AI use, conduct inventories of existing AI usage within government, and develop, recommend, or advise agencies and legislatures on AI policies for government usage or in particular industries. Many of these committees are tasked with making recommendations or policies for the development, procurement, or use of AI across all state agencies. Others are tasked with making recommendations to the state legislature.  Some, however, are more specialized, focusing on inventorying, researching, and making recommendations for specific departments or industries, such as labor, education,  healthcare, or entertainment.

However, beyond the creation of task forces, research committees, and advisory boards, states have regulated government use of AI in a few other critical ways. 

Law Enforcement & Facial Recognition (7 States, 7 Laws)

Prior to 2023, a dozen states had passed laws regulating the use of AI-driven facial recognition software by law enforcement. Since then, at least three more states have passed laws and regulations relating to government use of facial recognition software and biometric data obtained through such software. Utah’s SB 231 (2024) amends existing restrictions on the use of facial recognition by law enforcement by prohibiting a government agency from obtaining biometric surveillance data without a warrant. Montana’s 2023 bill, SB 397, was the first to require a warrant for police use of facial recognition data. Maryland’s SB 182 (2024) mirrors other state regulation, restricting police use of facial recognition for a limited number of serious crimes (as defined by the law) and requiring a notice that such technology was used in an investigation leading to charges. Beyond such laws that directly regulate law enforcement use of AI-driven facial recognition technologies, other enacted laws create reporting requirements such as providing an inventory of technologies used or require law enforcement agencies to create policies for their use of AI.

National Security (States 2, Laws 2)

Chinese-owned DeepSeek made a splash when it became Apple’s most downloaded app overnight last January, surpassing ChatGPT. Today, it remains the fourth most popular generative AI consumer app. Like TikTok, foreign-owned AI systems like DeepSeek raise national security concerns, especially as US politicians see themselves in a new Cold-War-like arms race with adversaries like China. To this end, two states—Oregon and Kansas—have passed laws prohibiting the use of AI services owned, developed, or controlled by foreign corporations.

Oregon’s HB 3936 is much broader, prohibiting state employees from using state devices or networks to run any AI service owned or developed by a foreign corporate entity, whereas Kansas’ HB 2313 prohibits any state use of such AI (explicitly naming DeepSeek) that is controlled by a country of concern, or foreign adversary.

Legal Proceedings & Criminal Justice (States 5, Laws 6)

Another way states are regulating government use of AI is by ensuring that humans are involved with “high-risk” decision-making processes when it comes to courts and criminal justice. Since 2023, three states—Louisiana, Utah, and Virginia—have passed laws that establish protocols around the use of AI tools in legal contexts. Of the three, both Virginia and Utah enacted laws that prohibit the outsourcing of certain legal decisions to AI-driven recommendations or risk-assessment systems, and require that any such decisions must be reviewed and approved by a qualified human and not solely determined by AI-based recommendations. The third state, Louisiana, enacted a law that prohibits the use of AI-generated or altered false evidence in court and outlines protocols for the use of AI tools in legal proceedings.

Government Employment (1 State, 1 Law)

Just as some states have enacted regulations concerning the use of AI in employment decisions in the private sector, at least one state has regulated use of AI when it comes to government employment. In 2025, New York enacted a law creating a policy around the use of AI in government employment decisions. However, beyond creating policies for how AI could be used in employment decision processes, including requiring disclosures of any such tools used, the law protects government employees by prohibiting the replacement of employees by AI as well as offloading key responsibilities to AI.  

Healthcare (17 States, 25 laws)

Seventeen states have also enacted laws investing in, directing, or regulating the deployment of AI within health-related fields. As already mentioned, a few states, such as Illinois, California, Oregon, and Utah, have prohibited mental health or nursing chatbots from being marketed as licensed professionals, and others have required that disclosures be made when using AI-related services to engage with patients. Beyond these, a number of states have enacted laws that regulate how AI is used in decision-making processes. Since 2023, at least seven states have enacted some kind of law that prohibits health care plans from making coverage determinations or utilization reviews solely at the recommendation of an AI-driven automated decision-making tool. Other notable health-care related AI laws include New Mexico’s HB 178 (2025), which requires the state board of nursing to develop standards for the use of AI in nursing; Florida’s SB 7018 (2024), which established a council to explore the use of innovative technologies, including AI, to improve healthcare quality and delivery; and Texas’s SB 1188 (2025), which requires healthcare practitioners to disclose any use of AI to patients and to review all AI-obtained information for accuracy before submitting it to patient records.

Additionally, at least three states have passed laws related to the use of AI in genetic health research. The Kansas law mentioned above, which prohibits state use of AI controlled by countries of concern or foreign adversaries, also prohibits the use of genetic analysis and sequencing software produced in or by a foreign adversary. Also, Florida and Rhode Island have established professional bodies to help facilitate the advancement of AI and genomics.

Conclusion

Enacted state AI regulations are varied and multifaceted. And not all of them contain the same definitions and language. Nevertheless, what emerges from the above survey is a picture of state policy that shows significant areas of overlapping concern when it comes to governing AI. To be sure, the mere enactment of these policies may not be sufficient to demonstrate that they reflect voters’ exact preferences. Almost always, the enactment of a legislative measure reflects a variety of interests, some of which have more lobbying power than others. That said, the enactment of the above bills indicates a significant degree of political will and coordination, and therefore reflect, to some meaningful degree, the preferences of the American people. Based on the legislative data used for this report, these preferences could be summarized as follows:

  • Americans want inquiry. They want to equip lawmakers, educators, and others to gain a better understanding of AI so that they can effectively regulate it.
  • Americans want humanity. They want to ensure that humans, not AI, are calling the shots when it comes to decision-making processes, especially those that have significant consequences, such as those pertaining to employment, court rulings, criminal justice, and healthcare.
  • Americans want transparency. Americans also want to know when AI is being deployed, and they want to know the risks and biases of a given AI system.
  • Americans want safety and security. From deepfakes and chatbot harms to national security and privacy protections, Americans want developers and deployers (private and public) to prioritize the safety of Americans. This is especially true when it comes to children.
  • Americans want accountability. Most importantly, Americans want AI companies to be liable for the harms their products and services cause.

As the debate continues about what belongs in a federal framework, these state laws offer a window into the kinds of AI regulations and investments that voters desire. To the degree they express those preferences, these laws serve as a critical starting point for federal legislators in Congress as they work out a federal standard to regulate AI.

Editor's Note: Download the full policy memo below for a footnoted version.


Report

America’s Demoralized Men, Part 1

March 2026 | by Joseph E. Davis, Michael Toscano, Ken Burchfiel

March 2026

by Joseph E. Davis, Michael Toscano, Ken Burchfiel

A new Institute for Family Studies report based on a survey of young men conducted by YouGov between April 7 and 15, 2025, with a representative sample of 2,000 men ages 18 to 29 living in the U.S.

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Worthy Aspirations, Trying Circumstances

Introduction and Executive Summary

Young men are the subject of growing public attention. They are often  described as languishing compared to earlier generations of men and young women, and both popular and academic writers have turned a bright light on their struggles. As commonly told, the story is one of crisis, combining negative social and economic data about their situation with disconcerting claims about what is happening among them. 

Accounts of this crisis emphasize several troubling trends. Fewer young men go to college, for instance, and fewer of them come away with a degree. Just 41% of degrees are now awarded to men. Young men have higher rates of conditions such as ADHD and autism and have more problems with drugs, gambling, pornography, and the law. Many young men today have lower earnings and career prospects compared to earlier cohorts. They have fewer friends, socialize less, and are less civically engaged. Fewer are making a timely transition to adulthood by meeting such milestones as having a full-time job, being financially independent, living away from their parents’ home, and getting married and having children. As a March 2025 report by the UK’s Centre for Social Justice put it, “The deeper truth is that too many boys are growing up without the guidance, discipline, and purpose they need to thrive.”

These general trends have been well documented. In our new survey of young men—conducted by YouGov between April 7 and 15, 2025, with a representative sample of 2,000 men ages 18 to 29 living in the U.S.—we found them, too. But what do these trends mean? That’s the crucial question, and to offer an interpretation, we asked both how young men are doing at this time of their lives and why so many are facing the challenges they do. Of course, a lot of ink has already been spilled on this topic. The extensive commentary on the crisis has produced a variety of explanations. Here is a rough summary of three of the most common ones:

  • Structural Changes. A sizable literature highlights the role of “structural” changes as the most important contributing factors. The struggles of young men are symptoms of wider economic and educational alterations, such as the off shoring of manufacturing and unfavorable school policies that have weakened the opportunity structure for men.
  • Idle Young Men. Some accounts, making little reference to political economy, focus their explanations on deficiencies in young men themselves. Caught up in self-indulgence, a substantial number of young men have become resigned to idleness—addicted to screens and filling their hours with virtual distractions. Their failings reflect passivity, lack of ambition, poor work ethic, and a “purpose void.”
  • Failed Socialization. Another school of interpretation centers on failed socialization. Brought up under the old, rigid masculinity norms, young men have not learned emotional openness or to express vulnerability. Now lonely and isolated, they have withdrawn into a kind of antagonistic reclusion and increasingly come under the sway of the “toxic masculinity” promoted in the online manosphere. From this poisoned well, many are imbibing resentment, nihilism, and misogynistic attitudes toward women.

While these arguments are not exhaustive, they represent some of the principal theories. When we designed our survey, these were some of the claims we sought to investigate.

We wanted to hear from young men on these matters. Perhaps indicative of their status now, their voice is often absent from this discussion. Others speak for them; but what do young men say? What does “coming of age” mean to them, or masculinity, or going to college? What are their goals and hopes? Who are their role models? What kinds of struggles have they faced, what obstacles do they see in their way, and with what attitude do they confront their future?

Major Findings

Given the length, we have broken this report into two parts. For Part I, here are some of the most important things we learned:

  • The defining standards of adulthood have continued to change for young men. Once conventional benchmarks, like marriage and parenthood, long ago moved to the bottom of the list. But in the past two decades, the formerly central place of completing formal education has slipped as well, now considered extremely important by only 31% of young men, far below newer standards like being independent personally (51%) and financially (53%). And, although defined in individual terms, the feeling of having reached full adulthood is, paradoxically, highly correlated with the old benchmarks: being married and a parent, working full time, and completing college or trade school. Hence, even among men ages 24-29, less than half (41%) report “definitely” feeling like adults.
  • Young men are having a hard time in matters of love—59% were not in a romantic relationship at the time of the survey. However, despite obstacles ranging from job instability to doubts about the availability of suitable partners, most men who are not in a relationship are open to dating (74%), most unmarried men desire marriage (68%, with another 21% unsure), and most childless men would like to be a parent in the future (62%).
  • Young men view college with a great deal of ambivalence. Young men who have not gone to college or dropped out before graduating are the most skeptical of its value. But even among young men who are attending college or have a degree, half either strongly (17%) or somewhat (34%) agree that college is not worth the time or money, and 60% either strongly (19%) or somewhat (41%) share the view that they could get a job that interests them without a college degree.

  • Trade school/apprenticeship is a valuable path to adulthood for young men. While these skilled men are often overlooked entirely, we find that those without a bachelor’s degree who have completed such programs are employed full time or self-employed at rates (77%) very similar to those of college grads (80%). We also find that, compared to men without a bachelor’s degree who did not enroll in or finish trade school, young men who did are much more likely to be married. Moreover, these programs may be more accessible—or appealing—to young men with certain learning-related conditions. Those who have experienced autism, ADHD, or learning disabilities like dyslexia are about as likely to have graduated from a trade school or apprenticeship program as those without a history of these disorders. Meanwhile, four-year college graduation rates are much lower for men with learning-related conditions.
  • Young men are not enthralled by on-line influencers as their role models. When we asked who they most looked up to as role models, mothers (79%) and fathers (69%) topped the list, followed by coaches and teachers (57%). Among prominent figures from the worlds of tech, politics, entertainment, and religion, the most admired role model was former president Barack Obama, whereas the least was online influencer Andrew Tate.
  • Most young men say manhood is often viewed negatively in our society, but their understanding of masculinity is not the toxic masculinity of the manosphere. When asked if “being a man requires a willingness to sacrifice for others,” and whether “manhood involves strength, responsibility, and leadership,” 89% of young men endorse the first statement and 85% the second.

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  • Young men are not apathetic. Rather than easy accommodation to their circumstances, our findings suggest that young men’s hopes are being frustrated. For instance, they want a job that provides them with an adequate standard of living. When asked about their most significant challenge in life so far, many young men’s answers concern money and finding a good job. The same concerns play a role in some men’s hesitancy toward pursuing marriage. We find that young men care about their status, want to contribute, and are distressed by the gap between their current circumstances and what they really desire for their life.

There were many exceptions to these general statements. Young men are not all the same. Many are not in crisis but thriving, and some are struggling mightily in just the ways that certain critiques overgeneralize. But, in broad terms, these results hold true.

Why Demoralization? 

For the survey, we took a question from the often-used Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, which asks respondents how well the following statement describes them: “All in all, I am inclined to think that I am a failure.” Nearly half (46%) of young men ages 18-23 say this represents their view of themselves at least somewhat well, while 38% of those ages 24-29 say the same. Only 32% of men ages 18-29 reject this characterization. As we will see, these numbers do not mean that young men have lost hope in themselves or their future. But the sense of being a failure is one measure of a more general—and frankly heartbreaking—demoralization.

As we analyzed the results of the survey, what stood out was not indifference or a lack of worthy aspirations but the trying circumstances facing today’s young men. Their ambiguous and socially marginal position is taking a heavy toll on them. Young men are not where they want to be, often feel trapped, and are unsure of what to do. At least in the near term, they are not optimistic that things will get much better.

About the Report

The Plan for this Report: This report differs substantially from our customary approach, which tends to focus on comparative outcomes by demographic variables. The purpose here was both more qualitative and interpretive. So, while we do include demographic data throughout this report, it is far from the primary emphasis and is used only to more sufficiently contextualize our findings. As noted, to maintain a reasonable length, we have broken this report into two parts. In Part I, we present three of the five chapters:

Chapter 1: Coming of Age

Chapter 2: What Young Men Want: Work and Education

Chapter 3: What Young Men Want: Marriage and Manhood

As an imminent follow up, we plan to release Part II of America’s Demoralized Men, which will cover:

Chapter 4: Social Connection

Chapter 5: Alienation and Distress

Conclusion: What We Have Learned

We hope readers will engage with this material with an open mind. Our survey cannot provide causal explanations for young men’s predicament or offer definitive remedies. Our role is not to challenge the views of our male respondents, or to offer recommendations to lawmakers aspiring to reverse failed policies or proffer new ones. But we do hope that in exploring young men’s views, we will contribute to a better understanding of them, their predicament, and the significant challenges they confront in their everyday lives.

Data and Methods: The Institute for Family Studies Gen-Z survey on men was conducted by YouGov between April 7 and 15, 2025, with a representative sample of 2,000 men, ages 18 to 29, living in the United States.

The respondents were matched to a sampling frame based on gender, age, race, and educa-tion. The sampling frame is an 18-29 year old subset of a politically representative "modeled frame" of US adults, based upon the American Community Survey (ACS) public use microdata file, public voter file records, the 2020 Current Population Survey (CPS) Voting and Registration supplements, the 2020 National Election Pool (NEP) exit poll, and the 2020 CES surveys, in-cluding demographics and 2020 presidential vote.

The matched cases were weighted using propensity scores derived from age, gender, race/ethnic-ity, education, and region, grouped into deciles and post-stratified. The characteristics of the final weighted sample mirror those of the general U.S. population of men ages 18 to 29. Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) adults are included but are not analyzed separately.

All estimates have been weighed to reflect the actual population.

Chapter 1: Coming of Age

“Growing up in general [h]as been challenging.”—Unmarried, age 19, attending community college

The young men we surveyed, ages 18-29, are in a phase of life that many social scientists now refer to as “early” or “emerging adulthood.” An unstable, in-between time, this phase is not adolescence but not quite full adulthood, either. Characteristics of this period typically include continued parental dependence, going to school, trying out jobs, moving frequently, experimenting with romantic relationships, exploring opportunities, delaying commitments, and so forth. Young people speak of it as both an exciting time of freedom and possibilities, and a very challenging age of trying to get established and come into their own.

The transition from childhood to adulthood has always been somewhat fraught. It is, after all, a change of social status and not simply a date on a calendar, such as the 18th or 21st birthday. To enact the transition, many societies throughout history have had formal rites of passage, especially for boys, that mark the break with one status and incorporation into another. Coming of age stories, which reflect on the many personal challenges of growth and maturity, have long been a major genre in literature, theatre, and film. In a distant echo of “failure to launch,” earlier generations of young people often lingered between these life stages as they struggled to accumulate the necessary resources to marry, set up a household, and start a family.

Today, as our survey indicates, the transition is immensely challenging. The defining criteria for adulthood have changed. They are now less tangible, less connected to roles of spouse or parent or even employee. The standards have become more subjective and ambiguous, and for this reason, along with educational and economic delays, they take longer to achieve. Consequently, when we asked young men if they felt they had reached adulthood, most are unsure whether they have fully arrived.

Changing Benchmarks of Adulthood

In an article published in 2004, the distinguished sociologist Frank Furstenberg and his colleagues observed a shift in the benchmarks of adulthood and the proper sequence to achieve them. Their analysis of the 2002 General Social Survey (GSS) found that the normative pattern that held sway in the 1950s and 1960s could no longer be taken for granted. Where once “most Americans viewed family roles and adult responsibilities as nearly synonymous,” most now saw them as detached.

In their article, Furstenberg, et al. presented the responses of all adults. For the sake of comparison with our findings, we reanalyzed the 2002 GSS data to separate out the views of young men ages 18-29. As shown in the figure below, in 2002, large shares of men ranked educational completion (65%), working full time (55%), financial independence (48%), and being able to support a family (48%) as extremely important hallmarks of adulthood. In contrast, only 13% and 9% said the same about getting married and having a child, respectively. For a large majority, the roles of spouse and parent had become life choices and were no longer regarded as necessary criteria.

In our 2025 survey, we asked young men the same question: What milestones did they consider important for defining adulthood? We drew one part of the list from the “markers of adulthood literature.” We consider those items below. The other part of the list repeated, in similar terms, the classic (socio-demographic) benchmarks used in the GSS.

In the following figure, we see that substantial percentages of young men continue to view financial independence from parents (53%) and being able to “provide for others” (39%) as extremely important benchmarks of adulthood. However, compared to 2002, much smaller shares of respondents regard educational completion (31%) and working full time (34%) as extremely important. Since financial self-sufficiency remains central to these men, the revised assessments of education and work, which are also found in other research, suggest changes in the nature of the labor market.

Figure 1. Percentage of men who consider a given milestone to be “extremely important” for becoming an adult, 2002 and 2025

Thinking in terms of the overall pattern, the biggest shift since 2002 is in the relative position of completing formal education, which was then the top marker. This shift may reflect men’s changing evaluation of the value of a college education. As we discuss further below, young men, whether they have attended college or not, are unsure if college is worth the costly investment or the necessary gateway to a desirable career. Another factor may be the increased demands to regularly update skills for new opportunities or completely retool for a change of field. Education, formal or otherwise, is more a continuing process than something you finish, once and for all.

Working “full time” once referred to a position that an employee settled into for an extended period. Now, with the continued decline of career trajectories and long-term positions, the rise of the gig economy (multiple short-term or part-time jobs), the growth of “fractural employment” (splitting time among multiple enterprises or projects), and other developments like the “fissured workplace” (wherein corporations have shifted from employing full-time staff to subcontracting out operations), this is far less often the case. For young people, work is more fluid now.

In both the 2002 GSS and our 2025 survey, getting married and having children are the least likely to be called “extremely important” by young men. Like Furstenberg et al., we find that attaining these roles is no longer a primary defining characteristic of adulthood for most young men. In our survey, just 22% and 25%, respectively, rate them as extremely important benchmarks. Researchers have observed that once young adults take on social roles, like spouse and parent, they are more likely to incorporate these into their conception of adulthood.

Our survey corroborates this dynamic, with markedly more married respondents (38%) saying that “getting married” is an extremely important marker of adulthood compared to unmarried men (19%); and parents (41%) endorsing “having children” at a much higher rate than nonparents (18%).

Figure 2. Milestones by the percentage of respondents who consider them to be extremely important, very important, somewhat/not too/not at all important

Psychological Benchmarks

In addition to the classic sociodemographic benchmarks, our list included two standards commonly used in the markers of adulthood literature: “accepting responsibility for yourself” and “making independent decisions.” As shown in the previous figure, 55% and 51% of young men, respectively, rate these as “extremely important”—making them the first and third-most-likely criteria in our survey to receive this rating. Less than 20% of our respondents, by contrast, view these two items as somewhat, not too, or not at all important.

Our findings suggest that, as the meaning of adulthood has shifted away from tangible social roles like spouse, parent, and employee, it has become more subjective, with hazier boundaries. Other surveys of the meaning of growing up have also found a more psychological orientation. In a recent British study, by Megan Wright and Sophie von Stumm of York University, for instance, 79% of young adult men and women, 18-29, place high definitional importance on “Accepting responsibility for the consequences of your actions,” and 80% on “Making my own choices without having to rely on others.” Although the wording in our study is not identical, the numbers are very close to those of our young male respondents. “Research shows,” according to the authors, citing a long list of example studies, “that adults today define adulthood through psychological characteristics rather than by socio-demographic milestones.”

A significant shift has taken place in response to new realities, and, as we also find, with important consequences.

Launch Timing

There is no question that young people are reaching the classical benchmarks later. But this change needs some context. In the figure below, we present Census and American Community Survey data to show how employment, marriage, and parenthood trends have changed for young men since 1910. We use the longer time period because it shows how marriage and parenthood rates were also lower for young men prior to the Baby Boom years, though not as low as they are now. Most of the evidence for the familiar “failure to launch” critiques, leveled repeatedly over the past 20 years, come from figures like this one. Unfortunately, they only start with the peak year of 1960.

Figure 3. Percentage of men, ages 18-29, who have reached various milestones

These critiques take for granted the old benchmarks, the old idea of “settling down,” and the old norm that career, marriage or coupling, and (perhaps) parenthood should follow in quick succession by roughly the mid to late 20s. They fault young men (though usually not young women) for flunking the test of growing up. Unable or unwilling to meet the standards, young men are “pre-adults,” in a state of “arrested development,” suffering from Peter Pan Syndrome, and in a memorable phrase from England, KIPPERS: “kids in parents’ pockets eroding retirement savings.”

Granted, achieving the marriage and childbearing rates of the 1950s and 1960s was a serious cultural accomplishment, one that we would be extremely fortunate to have sustained. But we must also recognize that in the precarious social and normative world young people are navigating today, a deemphasis on role transitions would seem inescapable. After all, from a young age, they have heard a cultural message of emancipation from the old constraints of social roles and forms of life. Now, their future is open, and they can be whatever they want to be and live however they choose. There is seemingly no stigma attached to delaying family formation or choosing to remain unmarried and not have children. Their parents do not stress these things. Adulthood, as they know, has lost its traditional structure.

Today, young people live under a new mandate. Their charge is to use their freedom to construct their own individualized occupational and life trajectories. Compared to the relative security of the old normative pattern, this self-defining task introduces a great deal of contingency, an uncertainty that is typically interpreted in a positive way. Now young people have a space to explore options and realize more of their potential. In an evolving and unpredictable environment like ours, the key norms are to remain open to change, flexible, free of entanglements, and confident that the twists and turns in circumstances can be negotiated successfully in one’s favor.

Though framed in terms of freedom, the mandate to build an individualized biography is not an option. Under our late modern conditions of autonomy, to quote the British sociologist Anthony Giddens, “we have no choice but to choose how to be and how to act.” The conventional life-courses marked by clear signposts and predictable transitions have largely disappeared. Without pregiven pathways, there for the taking, young people must choose a purpose, figure out the means to best realize their goals, and formulate an adult identity for themselves. And they must do so in a highly volatile economic environment.

Given this challenging self-development task, it is little wonder that young men, as we show in this report, conceptualize adulthood in more psychological terms. Internal and individualistic milestones are seemingly more meaningful and more attainable because they are under more direct personal control.

But achieving adulthood also takes longer now because the new, more psychological benchmarks are inherently subjective and incremental. Whether one is “accepting responsibility for yourself,” or “making independent decisions,” is a question of degrees of maturity and self-reliance. This demanding task implies an ongoing process of personal growth and development, a process harder to establish with certainty. The effect is to suspend more young men in an “emerging” status for a lengthier period.

Are You an Adult Yet?

After questioning what factors are important to defining adulthood, we asked young men about their own sense of where they stood: “Do you feel you have reached full adulthood, or not?” Respondents chose between four possible responses: 1) “yes, definitely”; 2) “yes, mostly”; 3) “no, not so much”; and 4) “no, not at all.” Only 5% of young men in our survey feel they have “not at all” reached full adulthood, while 31%, report “definitely” feeling like they have. The most common response is somewhere in-between, ranging from “not so much” (24%) to “mostly” (40%) a full adult.

As we would expect, greater adult feeling is associated with older chronological age. For instance, as the following figure shows, young men ages 24-29 are twice as likely (41%) as those 18-23 (20%) to feel they have “definitely” attained adulthood. And the younger group (39%) is twice as likely as the older group (19%) to respond “not so much” or “not at all” to the question of whether they have become an adult. This in-between feeling is particularly common among young men in school and those with a high school education or less. They are no longer children under parental supervision, and yet often still rely on their families for financial and other forms of support.

Figure 4. Percentage of young men who say they have reached full adulthood, by various characteristics

When we consider additional characteristics that might influence subjective adult status, we find a striking and, at first glance, paradoxical pattern. Young men define adulthood in internal, psychological terms, such as “accepting responsibility for yourself,” and place far less importance on the socio-demographic milestones, like marriage and parenthood. But when it came to judging whether they have reached adulthood, the old benchmarks take center stage. 

Feeling definitely like an adult is highly associated with being married and a parent. As with age, we see a doubling—with married young men (54%) being twice as likely as unmarried (26%) men, and parents (47%) being twice as likely as those without children (24%), to feel that they have definitely reached full adulthood. Only 23% of unmarried respondents without kids feel this way; a much larger portion of this group (37%) say that they do not yet feel like adults. 

We also find that respondents who are neither in school nor caregivers are more likely to report definitely reaching adulthood—if they are working full time (as opposed to being unemployed or working part-time). Similarly, those who attend religious services more than once a month are more likely to make this assertion than those who attend less than once a year, if at all. Finally, among men without a BA, those who have completed a trade school or apprenticeship program are more likely to feel like an adult than those who have neither completed such a program, nor enrolled in one. 

These findings might suggest that the gap we find between the weak position of classical benchmarks in the definition of adulthood and the strong position in the subjective experience of feeling like an adult represents a contradiction. Young men do not consider socio-demographic group memberships, like marriage, parenthood, and full-time employment, as key defining characteristics of adulthood, yet they perceive themselves as adults when they belong to these very groups. Their self-perception of adult status, in other words, appears to be based on different criteria than the ones they use to define adulthood.

There is, however, a more straightforward interpretation. First, to reiterate, for young people, the key definitional criteria are more nebulous and individualistic than the old milestones. They see adulthood, like other aspects of their identity, as an autobiographical production achieved through their life choices and experiences. It is a process of growth and adaptation that does not depend on objective markers perceived to be anachronistic under current conditions.  

But when it comes to feeling like an adult, it is not hard to see that social recognition must play a part. The more psychological benchmarks, like making independent decisions, cannot be directly stated as matters of fact; they must be demonstrated by some action, which can be frustratingly hard to do. Compare that to the status of being a parent. Every institution that parents interact with, from the doctor’s office to the preschool, will typically relate to them as adults. Those without children, by contrast, cannot receive this form of social validation. Similarly, acknowledgement of adult status at a young age is more likely to be extended to the married than the single, and to those in full-time employment than those in part-time work or still in school. These statuses denote, in themselves, adult commitment and responsibility, both to others and to oneself. 

Put differently, adulthood involves social mutuality. Despite what young people might have been led to believe, they cannot simply claim adulthood for themselves by individual decision or self-perception; it must also be socially conferred. And, while the new conditions of life promote an individualistic path to adulthood, there remain social norms and expectations about what constitutes adult attitudes and behavior and about the proper timing of role transitions. This is why we get critiques like “failure to launch” to begin with.

Adult Status and Well-Being

Young men, then, confront a double challenge. On the one hand, they must build an individualized life course in an unpredictable social and economic environment that favors adaptability and keeping one’s options open. On the other hand, they are often trying to carry out this task without the anchor and social validation of relatively clear roles and expectations. Unsure of their status, they struggle with an ambiguity and in-betweenness that, we find, exacts a toll on their well-being. Young men who are not working, for example, and those still living with their parents, report higher levels of distress. While things may go better in the future, our findings suggest that the lack of structure for the transition works against them.


Figure 5. Percentage of young men reporting mental health status, by various characteristics

We will return to the question of everyday struggles in the second installment of this report. Next, we consider what young men want. In sociological studies, one of the most clearly documented sources of distress is the inability to attain valued goals, especially those that offer coherence and purpose to life. To appreciate the struggles, we must grasp something of the goals.

Chapter 2: What Young Men Want—Work and Education

Figuring out what to do with my life.”—In a relationship, age 28, living with a partner 

Asking young men what they want does not, of course, yield a single answer. There is a tremendous diversity of background and experience, personality, and inclination. These differences are consequential, shaping not only variation in aspirations and desires but the very sense of what is possible. Before considering commonalities that we found, it is useful to review a few examples of this diversity.

Take challenges, for example. At the end of each survey, we asked young men: “What is the most significant challenge you’ve faced so far?” The question was open-ended, without response categories provided. Among the 2,000 respondents, some indicate no significant personal trials or decline to disclose one. A few offer comic answers, like “finding a good Bourbon at a reasonable price,” but many specifically mention surmounting hard obstacles, ranging from “getting through college,” “getting my PhD,” and “discovering my true identity,” to “getting over my pill addiction,” or “getting out of homelessness and quitting alcohol,” and recovering from cancer. 

Most, however, mention issues that are matters of continuing struggle: employment and financial pressures, mental disorders, the death of parents, romantic breakups, and more. A number speak of “getting my life back on track after incarceration.” In our sample, 12% of young men indicate that they had been incarcerated in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility. (Surveys like ours do not include people in institutions, so the large number of young men who are currently imprisoned are not represented here.) A number speak of working to overcome “the challenge of homelessness,” or of “having to live in a homeless shelter with my family,” and of poverty while growing up. In our sample, 9% of young men characterize the financial situation of their childhood home as “very poor, not enough to get by.” In short, although we find some central tendencies in the interview responses, not everyone wants the same thing or has the same chance to realize their vision.

A Good Job

Young men, we find, want a job that provides them with an adequate standard of living. This might seem obvious. As shown in Chapter 1, over two-thirds of young men view financial independence from parents and being able to provide for others as either “extremely” or “very” important for becoming an adult. While a smaller majority regard educational completion and working full time in the same way, this may reflect the changed meaning of these benchmarks in the labor market circumstances that young men face today. Marriage and parenthood are regarded more as life choices than obligatory, but—as we shall see—remain a goal for most, one that is typically premised on achieving financial independence.

In the popular writing about young men, much has been said about their declining labor force participation rate and the growing numbers who are essentially idle—neither going to school nor holding a job. The implication is that there is a substantial number of young men who, for whatever reason, have no ambition or desire to earn a living wage. As shown in the following figure, Census and ACS data indicate that the percentage of men who are in the labor force has decreased somewhat since 1960. However, while some young men in our survey fit this profile, this is not a sizable group.

Figure 6. Percentage of men, ages 18-29, who are part of the labor force

The following figure presents the employment status of the young men in our survey. Not surprisingly, respondents ages 24-29 are more likely to work full time or be self-employed (74%) than those ages 18-23 (42%). This is partly because those in the latter group are more likely (14%) to be full-time students or caregivers than the former (3%). An additional 17% of respondents work part time, meaning that around 3 in 4 respondents work at least part time. These numbers are comparable to other surveys and show a decline, though a modest one, over time as seen in the previous chart.

Figure 7. Percentage of young men by employment status

In our sample, 15% of young men describe themselves as unemployed—a much higher rate than the national average. Of these unemployed men, 84% are looking for a job, meaning just 2% are both unemployed and not seeking work. (An additional 2% of men say they could not work due to disability or illness.)

When comparing full-time and self-employed men to those who are unemployed, disabled, or retired, we find that the latter group is significantly less likely to have completed college or trade school, and less likely to view themselves as having reached full adulthood. They are more likely to be unmarried and childless; in addition, they are less likely to be interested in dating or marriage.

Figure 8. Percentage of young men who are full-time employees, self-employed, not working, or students

Surprisingly, given the workforce surveys that show that only about one-third of employees are “engaged” in their jobs and that practices like “quiet quitting” are common, the employed young men in our sample report considerable contentment. When asked “how satisfied are you with your current job,” 42% say they are “very satisfied,” and another 46% say they are “somewhat satisfied.” Only 12% report being “very or somewhat dissatisfied.”

Figure 9. Job satisfaction among men, ages 18-29, by various characteristics

We also looked further into the 24% of our respondents who are not full-time employees, self-employed, students, or caregivers. Of this group, 54% are unemployed; 8% can’t work due to illness or a disability; and 38% are working part time. (A very small group—less than 1% of our sample—describe themselves as retired.) 

What do we know about these marginally employed and unemployed men? They are more likely to live with their parents than are full-time workers (60% vs. 23%). They are also more likely to rate their mental health as “fair” or “poor” (37% vs. 20%), and to report current depression (27% vs. 16%), current anxiety disorder (26% vs 15%), and current autism (15% vs. 5%). This, in short, is a struggling group of young men. 

But we also learned several things about this group that run counter to stereotype. These men report being less likely to have smoked cigarettes or e-cigarettes in the past year (37%) than the full-time/self-employed group (47%) and attest to fewer incidents of binge-drinking, defined as more than five drinks in a day (39% vs. 48%). True, they spend a lot of time playing video games, with 50% indicating a frequency of “almost constant, many times a day”—but 40% of the full-time/self-employed say the same. All these numbers are very high, to be sure, a point to which we will return in Part II of this report. The differences, though, are not what we would have predicted.   

Rather than unemployment, it is low earnings that stand out in the survey. When asked about their most significant challenge so far, young men mention money and finding a good job by a wide margin. In another question, when asked about the characteristics of work they would enjoy, “earning a high income” tops the list, with around two-thirds viewing it as “extremely” or “very important.” Less than 10% consider it “not too” or “not at all important.”  

Findings like these suggest that most young men place a strong premium on having a good income. Yet, as intimated by their own account, they are not where they want to be at this point in their life. As has been demonstrated many times, education after high school, especially college, is linked to more favorable career prospects and higher earnings. And, since at least the 1980s, everyone has been hearing the message that well-paying jobs requiring only a high school diploma are gone. The key to getting ahead is college. Did lots of young men somehow not get the memo? If they really want a good income, shouldn’t they be flocking to campus?

Ambivalent About College

What men want in terms of education beyond high school does not point to any simple answers. The path to a desirable job with a good income is not clear and does not necessarily begin with plans for college.

In recent decades, a gap has emerged between boys’ and girls’ educational qualifications, which has become a public issue and topic of policy debate. Educators, psychologists, economists, and others have been trying to puzzle out the roots of this “boy crisis,” and typically stress various contributing factors, from the decline of historically male occupations to boy-unfriendly aspects of school, such as pushing academic work down to younger ages. The upshot is that, according to the Pew Research Center, there were about 1 million fewer young men in college in 2022 than in 2011.

The following figure shows the breakdown of young men by education level in our survey. Considering just young men ages 24 to 29, we see that 28% have at least a bachelor’s degree; 11% have an associate’s degree or have completed trade school or an apprenticeship; and 21% are “currently in school,” which includes all men who are in a two-year college, four-year college, university, trade school, or apprenticeship program, even if they already have a degree.

Figure 10. Percentage of men, ages 18-29, by education and various characteristics

We asked young men to think back on their experiences in K-12 school and consider the series of statements presented in the figure below. To what extent do they agree or disagree with each statement? Surprisingly, they generally describe their overall experience of school as fairly positive: 79% strongly or somewhat agree with the statement that “my teachers challenged me to do my very best.” Only 4% strongly disagree. Similarly, 40% and 39% of respondents strongly or somewhat agree, respectively, that they were motivated to get good grades. However, 46% of our respondents strongly or somewhat agree that playing sports was more important to them than their classes.  

Figure 11. Percentage of men, ages 18-29, who agree or disagree with various statements about their K-12 education 

Since boys get into trouble more than girls at school and teachers often use grades to reward positive attitudes and good behavior, we also presented two fairness statements. Here the responses are more evenly divided. Nearly half (44%) strongly or somewhat agree that “my school had unfair standards of discipline.” And, comparably, 51% agree that “teachers seemed to be more favorable to girls than boys.” 

In recent decades, “college for all” has been a kind of educational orthodoxy, shaping both the subjects that schools teach and the more vocational tracks they have deemphasized or eliminated altogether. The solution to unfairly “tracking” some students and potentially denying them wider opportunities was to put all the students on the same track. While the “college for all” norm is now often panned as a terrible idea, it is by no means dead and gone. Students continue to be told that the “jobs of the future” require college degrees.

To gauge young men’s attitudes toward college, we presented the following statement for their evaluation: “One of the most important keys to success in life is a college education.” As we might expect, young men attending a four-year college or with a college degree are more in agreement, with 30% strongly affirming the importance of college, and when adding those “somewhat agreeing,” the total comes to more than 70 percent. The young men who have not attended college or dropped out are less convinced, but not by much. For example, 1 in 5 strongly agree, rising to well over half (57%) when those who somewhat agree are included. Although not currently pursuing a college education, for whatever reason, they still affirm its link with success. 

If the first statement reflects a cultural message or normative expectation, the next two statements involve questions about the relative value of college that have been widely debated in recent years. In the public forum, the question of whether “college is worth it” no longer receives the automatic affirmation it once did, nor does the related question of whether college is the ticket to a desirable job. Old assumptions have been tested as the economy has evolved.

Figure 12. Percentage of men, ages 18-29, by college education who agree with various statements about higher education

Young men who have not gone to college or who dropped out before graduating are the most skeptical of its value. But even young men who are attending college or have graduated have doubts. Half of these men either strongly (17%) or somewhat (34%) agree with the statement about college not being worth the time or money, and some 60% either strongly (19%) or somewhat (41%) share the view that they could get a job that interests them without a college degree. 

In response to our question about their greatest challenge, many graduates speak of their frustration: “graduating college and not being able to find work in my field,” or “realizing that my degree won’t get me an actual career,” or “unemployment after graduation was like hell.” It is not supposed to be this way. Education was once the sure route to stable professional work and a meaningful life. But we know that more graduates now end up in jobs that do not require a degree, tending to stay “underemployed,” and are making less money. For many, college is not working out as advertised. Some may feel betrayed and regret the expense.

Of particular interest here is the ambiguous status of college for the many young men not attending. They tend to both affirm its importance for success and question its value and relevance to their own aspirations. Obviously, if they do not believe it is worth the outlay of money or that they can get the job they want without it, there may be no point in attending. But are there other reasons? We asked this group some additional questions about potential obstacles. Are they unable to go to college for financial reasons or due to family responsibilities, or are they not attending because they don’t feel confident that they would succeed in a college environment? 

All of these statements received substantial assenting responses. Specifically, 61% of non-college respondents cite a lack of financial resources. The cost of college has risen dramatically and for more students, attending requires a willingness to take on substantial debt. Many young men appear unwilling to do so. For 44%, family responsibilities are another impediment to college. Clearly, these are also barriers for a significant number of young men.

Another substantial group, 50% of the young men not attending college, are those who simply feel they would not succeed. Included in this group are young men with conditions that impact learning. We inquired whether respondents had ever been diagnosed or treated by a healthcare professional for autism, dyslexia, or ADHD. In our sample, 15% report being diagnosed with or treated for dyslexia or another learning disability, and 9% are currently still symptomatic or receiving treatment. Similarly, 16% have been diagnosed with or treated for autism, and 10% are still experiencing symptoms or being treated for it. Finally, 26% of our respondents have ever been diagnosed with or treated for ADHD, and 18% of respondents are still getting treatment or facing symptoms. Around 1 in 3 respondents have experienced one of these three learning-related conditions, and for 1 in 4, that condition is still active or being treated. 

For many young men, college may not be the right course. For some, it will be a junior college or trade school. Among men in our sample without a bachelor’s degree, 11% of those ages 18-23 are currently attending trade school, and 15% of 18-29-year-olds have completed a trade school program. When excluding students and caregivers from our analysis, the percentage of trade-school and apprenticeship graduates (not including those with a bachelor’s degree) who are employed full time or self-employed (77%) is very similar to that of college grads (80%). This indicates that trade schools can be just as effective a path to employment as four-year colleges. 

Trade school and apprenticeship programs may be more accessible—or appealing—to young men with certain learning-related issues. As the following figure shows, men with autism, ADHD, or learning disabilities like dyslexia are about as likely to have graduated from a trade school or apprenticeship program as those without a history of these conditions. Meanwhile, four-year college graduation rates are much lower for men with learning-related disorders.

Figure 13. Percentage of men, ages 18-29, who have completed college or trade school, by history of learning disability

While efforts are underway to create more vocational paths, most young men who are not on the path to college face an initially formless environment, in which they must discover, with little guidance, options for their inclinations and talents. Very often, the kinds of work available are “dead-end” jobs: extremely low wage, unstable, and disconnected from any opportunity for advancement. Without direction, their estimation of desirable jobs, earnings potential, promotion possibilities, and so on may be woefully inaccurate. In a formless environment, there are many obstacles to good decisions.

At one time, military service provided an important institutional path to the labor force. We find that among young men, 4% have served, and another 3% are currently serving in a branch of the U.S. Armed Forces, including the Coast Guard, the National Guard, or the Reserves. But when we asked those who had not been in uniform if they have ever considered joining, only 7% indicate “yes, seriously.”

The open-endedness that many young men face is a heavy burden, a load made more onerous by another effect of the heavy emphasis on college: the sharply lowered status of many traditionally male jobs (skilled and semi-skilled work, craftsmanship, and protective services). As one measure of the low status, we asked young men if they agree or disagree with the following provocative statement: “In our society, men who work in blue-collar jobs (construction, plumbing, etc.) are regarded as not very smart.” Two-thirds (or 63%) at least somewhat agree with that statement. Only 12% strongly disagree.

This attitude surely plays a role in the demoralization of young men that we will turn to in Part II, Chapter 5. Perhaps it also contributes to another problem for young men—their marriageability—which we turn to next.

Chapter 3: What Young Men Want—Marriage and Manhood

The most significant challenge I’ve faced is trying to get a job after college and marrying. Settling down for a new phase of life took me through anxiety, depression and low morale.”—Married, age 25, employed part time 

In this chapter, we pick up where we left off on the question of what young men want, turning to the issues of marriage, parenthood, and manhood. In presenting our findings, we are concentrating not only on the desires that most young men express, but also on some of the obstacles to their realization.

Marriage and Parenthood

Young men want to get married, and they want to have children. Among the young men ages 18-29 that we surveyed, 16% are married. (At this young age, only about 1% total have ever been separated, divorced, or widowed.) Naturally, the older respondents are more likely to be married than the younger: 6% of those ages 18-23 and 25% of those between 24 and 29 have tied the knot. Today, the median age of first marriage among American men is 30.2, the highest age, outside the pandemic, since the first census in 1890.

Figure 14. Percentage of men, ages 18-29, who are married, by various characteristics

Among the large group of unmarried men, less than one-third (30%) are currently in a romantic relationship. This group includes 11% who are living with a partner; a significant percentage of these cohabiting men (46%) are also parents. That leaves a full 70% of the single men, or 59% of the whole sample, who are not in a romantic relationship. Young men, in sum, are having a hard time in matters of love.

We asked the young men who are not in a romantic relationship if they were interested in dating. This was a simple yes-or-no question. As can be seen in the figure below, the great majority, around three-quarters of our sample, answer “yes.” We also find that religious men are more likely to express interest in dating than their secular counterparts; similarly, among non-students and non-caregivers, full-time or self-employed respondents are more likely to be interested in dating than those who are not working. Conservative respondents and parents are also more interested in dating than liberal respondents and non-parents, respectively. Overall, however, we find that young men who are not presently in a romantic relationship have not given up on the possibility of one. 

Figure 15. Percentage of men, ages 18-29, who are interested in dating, by various characteristics

But that non-defeatism does not mean these men are optimistic. Quite the opposite. To get a better understanding of the situation of those without a romantic relationship, whether interested in dating or not, we presented them with a series of statements and asked for their level of agreement or disagreement. The following figure shows the percentages of those who agree. About half indicate that it has been difficult to find someone who will go out with them, and nearly 6 in 10 report that that the fear of being turned down makes them reluctant to ask. 

Figure 16. Percentage of single men, ages 18-29, who agree with various statements   

These two reasons are very likely related. They reflect the judgment of young men that they do not possess the personal qualities needed for a successful romantic relationship. They may feel that there is something inadequate about themselves or their situation, or that they cannot meet the demands of potential dates. 

We see the same patterns with respect to readiness for marriage. What is clear is that, for many young men, dating and romance are fraught.

But the data also make clear that the lack of a stable romantic relationship, or the fact of not seeking one to begin with, is not because these men want to stay detached. Over half of our respondents say that the time is not right to start a romantic relationship. This underscores that there is a clear priority in the minds of men with achieving a certain station in life before being ready to date and marry. Lastly, whatever luster “playing the field” might have once had, fewer than 1 in 3 young men agree that they prefer to date lots of people. For most, just getting a date is the challenge. 

We then asked this group, as well as the unmarried who were in a romantic relationship, if they would like to get married someday. A substantial majority say “yes” (68%) and about 1 in 5 are “unsure” (21%). Only 1 in 10 say “no.” We also find that the percentage of cohabiting young men who wish to get married (69%) is significantly lower than the corresponding percentage for unmarried men in a romantic but non-cohabiting relationship (83%). Although cohabitation is sometimes seen as a precursor to marriage, we find that the percentage of cohabiting men who plan to get married does not differ significantly from the percentage of unmarried men who are not presently in a romantic relationship (64%).

Similar to our results on dating, young men are more likely to desire marriage if they are parents, politically conservative, religious, and (among non-students and non-caregivers) working full time or self-employed (rather than not working). Furthermore, respondents from an intact family (meaning their parents were married to each other when the respondents were 16 years old) and graduates from a four-year college are more likely to be interested in marriage.

Figure 17. Percentage of men, ages 18-29, who responded “yes,” “not sure,” or “no” to question about getting married someday, by various characteristics

To explore the reasons why some young men are hesitant or do not want to get married, we provided the list in the following figure and asked them to select any that apply. Of the seven possible responses, four might be classified as reasons to be unsure. Two, as noted earlier, concern their financial situation. Some are unsure because they are not yet financially independent: one-third check this box. And some, 1 in 4, check a related box: the lack of a stable job. Among non-students and non-caregivers, those who are not working are more likely to select these latter two responses than those who are full-time employees or self-employed.

Figure 18. Percentage of men, ages 18-29, who are not sure about marriage or not planning to marry, by marriage-hesitation reason given

Two other reasons for hesitation about marriage concerned being personally unprepared to commit and the problem of finding the right person. A little more than one-third (36%) select “not ready for the commitment,” and even more (44%) choose it’s “hard to find the right person to marry.” Interestingly, those who are the most religious (defined as attending services more than once a month) are more likely (49%) to report not being ready for commitment than nominal (30%) respondents. Consistent with other recent surveys, we also find that men who identify as politically conservative (57%) are more likely to say it’s “hard to find the right person” than either self-identified moderates (41%) or liberals (44%).

Surprisingly, we also find that nearly half (48%) of those with a college degree do not feel ready for the commitment, and just over half (51%) say it’s challenging to find the right person. What makes this finding unanticipated is that, as shown earlier, the college graduates in our sample are much more likely to be married (36%) than those without a BA or who are not in college (11%). We do not find a reason in our data, but their pessimism may reflect a growing sense of financial precariousness among the professional class. As others have documented, having attained a degree, recent graduates may be saddled with considerable debt and facing a very difficult job market.

The other three—although not necessarily fixed attitudes—tilt toward reasons for not wanting to marry. (As a reminder, the following percentages only include those unmarried men in our survey who don’t want to marry or are unsure about marriage.) Just under one-third of this sample (29%) select the statement, “I worry about the risk of divorce.” Many know this risk firsthand, as 63% of this group grew up in homes with unmarried parents when they were 16 years old. (For reference, 46% of all men in our sample came from non-intact backgrounds.)

Even larger numbers of those who do not desire marriage state “I have other priorities in life that are more important than marriage” (40%), and “I don’t believe that marriage is necessary for a long-lasting relationship” (38%). Interestingly, while similar percentages of conservative and liberal (43% and 44%, respectively) respondents in this group explain that they see marriage as unnecessary, only 30% of conservatives—compared to 47% of liberals—say that they have life priorities other than marriage. 

We also asked young men who want to get married if they would like to have children someday: 82% say “yes”; 10% are not sure; and just 7% say “no,” they do not want to have kids. Turning the question around, we asked the young men who want to have children if they want to get married: 90% say “yes,” 9% are unsure, and just 1% say “no.” The bottom line is that very few respondents want kids but not marriage, and only a small proportion want marriage but not kids. For young men—at least in terms of what they desire—marriage and children remain interconnected.

That said, we find that 30% of young men in our sample overall are fathers. (This percentage was much higher than the percentage (13%) of men ages 18-29 in the 2024 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) who reported being a father. Therefore, these findings should be interpreted with caution). Not surprisingly, men ages 24-29 are more likely (40%) than those ages 18-23 (19%) to be dads. Most have only one child, with just 31% of dads (and 9% of all respondents) reporting two or more children. Of course, these numbers will change as the men in our sample get older. 

Figure 19. Percentage of men, ages 18-29, who are either married or unmarried parents, by various characteristics

It is notable that married fathers are in the minority: as the following figure shows, 58% of the dads in our sample are unmarried. Substantial percentages of dads within many demographic groups, including 57% of conservatives, 40% of religious respondents, and 42% of those from intact families, are unmarried. College graduates, however, have far lower rates of out-of-wedlock parenting: among dads who have a bachelor’s degree or higher, 80% are married. Meanwhile, only 27% of dads without a bachelor’s degree (and who are not in school) are married. We also find that, among the parents in our sample, the percentage of respondents from intact households who are married (58%) is nearly three times higher than the percentage of respondents from non-intact households. Religious practice appears to be similarly formative for married fatherhood; while 60% of religious dads are married, only 25% of secular dads are married. 

Figure 20. Marital status among dads, ages 18-29, by various characteristics

When we examine marital and parental status together, we find significant differences between respondents from intact and non-intact families. For example, 18% of respondents who grew up with married parents (until at least age 16) report being a married parent themselves; meanwhile, only 6% of non-intact respondents do. It’s notable, if not surprising, that respondents from non-intact households are more likely to be unmarried dads (22%) than are those from intact backgrounds (13%). 

Since this is not a decision men want to make alone, the realization of parenthood will depend on a successful navigation of the troubled waters of dating and finding a marriage partner.  It is likely that many will fail. In 2024, according to the Census Bureau, 47.1% of households were headed by married couples, which is the second lowest share all-time. That is a much lower percentage than if the desires of young men for marriage and children were fulfilled. There are clearly obstacles.

Figure 21. Percentage of childless men, ages 18-29, responding “yes,” “no,” or “not sure” to a question about whether they would like to have children someday, by various characteristics

Our best evidence on the nature of the obstacles can be gleaned from looking at data on married men and at what men themselves prefer in a marriage partner. In an analysis of men ages 25-29, we can identify some potential predictors of getting married. For instance, those with a bachelor’s degree or higher are far more likely to be married (45%) than those who neither have a college degree, nor are in school to get a degree (19%). In addition, religious respondents are roughly three times as likely to be married (44%) as secular respondents (15%).  

For those who desire to marry, however, income and education also play a role. While we can see this association in our survey data through age 29, most men get married in their 30s. We therefore draw on the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey to look at marriage trends for a higher age range: 25 to 39. As the following figure illustrates, for men ages 25-39, those with degrees are more likely to get married in a given year than those without degrees in each income group. But income alone is also a factor. The highest-earning young men without degrees are around twice as likely (9%) to get married as the lowest-earning young men with degrees (4%).

Figure 22. Percentage of men, ages 25-39, who got married for the first time in the past year, by income and education

This pattern has been observed before. Research on “assortative mating” (how partners chose each other) has typically examined income and education separately. Treating these variables together, a 2017 study of heterosexual newlyweds in two time periods observed an interesting configuration. On the one hand, as women came to have more education than men after 1980, they shifted from a tendency to marry men with more education to a tendency to also marry men with less. On the other hand, the tendency of women to marry men with higher incomes than themselves remained the same. And, the study showed, 

the tendency for women to marry up in income was generally greater among couples in which the wife’s education level equaled or surpassed that of the husband than among couples in which the wife was less educated than the husband.

In other words, while a marriage may occur when the man has less formal education, it is less likely to do so when her income also exceeds his. 

Talk of “marrying up” can give the impression that marriage choices are being made in purely economic terms. But that is clearly wrong. We can get a better picture from looking at what young men who are uninterested in, or unsure about, marriage feel they need to have in place before getting married. 

First, around two-thirds of young men rank having a stable job as very important for marriage preparation. With the “somewhat important” response included, the endorsement exceeds 90 percent. On a second question, about financial security, the very/somewhat important percentages are nearly identical. We also asked all men, including those who are already married, about the importance of various qualities in a life partner: 40% say that having “a stable job” is a very important attribute; an additional 39% consider it somewhat important. A related statement concerns “good earning potential.” While 30% say that a “good earning potential” is not too, or not at all, important, the majority see this potential as very (33%) or somewhat (37%) important. 

These responses suggest that most young men do not envision being the sole provider for their family. This interpretation is confirmed when we asked a breadwinning question directly. We presented the following two statements and asked all respondents to indicate which statement came closest to their personal view, even if neither was exactly right.

  • Statement A: “It is better for everyone in the family when men primarily focus on breadwinning, while women focus more on caring for the children and home.” 
  • Statement B: “In a family, the couple should divide work and home responsibilities in whatever way best suits them.”

About one-third (32%) endorse statement A. Men with bachelor’s degrees and those who are neither college grads nor in school for a BA have similar rates of choosing statement A (29% and 33%, respectively); however, conservative men are more likely (49%) to choose this statement than moderate (32%) or liberal (19%) men. Similarly, a larger share of religious (43%) men endorse this statement than do secular (26%) men. 

Additionally, we queried young men on their view of the following statement: “A man’s role as a father is more important than his paid occupation.” The vast majority of our respondents (87%) either strongly or somewhat agree with this statement. Full-time employees and self-employed respondents who are neither caregivers nor in school are roughly as likely (88%) as all respondents to endorse this statement, as are non-parents (85%).  

While there is always a gap between ideals and reality, most men want financial responsibilities to be shared, with partners making choices together in ways they find jointly beneficial. A type of equality seems to be implied, which is perhaps even more the ideal for women. As economists have noted, as women’s earnings have grown, they have become more self-sufficient, and marriage has become more of an option. Like men, women have professional aspirations of their own, linked to larger ideals of self-realization. In marriage, the goal is not to out earn their husbands—though some do—but to be on a relatively equal footing with a partner, not only financially but in other ways that income might signal, such as ambition, confidence, temperament, or work ethic. 

Among young men who have not rejected the idea of marriage (already predicted by growing up in an intact family), we see a strong emphasis on being financially stable themselves and wishing for much the same from a possible life partner. We can also see from our findings an important obstacle. If young men have a relatively low level of education or income—compared to potential partners, whose fortunes have been generally rising—there is a much greater chance that their desire for marriage and the children that marriage produces will be frustrated. Tangible obstacles, then, are affecting the declining marriage rate more than any shift in men’s desire to be married. 

Manhood

We also find that young men would like to be men in every sense of the word, and to have a social role as such. To begin, we presented two statements about perceptions of manhood in society (see the figure below). The first seeks their judgment on whether “manhood is often viewed negatively in our society.” About 70% agree, either strongly (28%) or somewhat (41%). Only 9% strongly disagree, with liberal men (14%) more likely to do so than conservatives (5%). The second statement explores whether they think it is “harder to know what it means to be a man today than it was 20 to 30 years ago.” The responses are quite similar, with over 70% strongly (32%) or somewhat (41%) agreeing. Again, liberal men are more likely (17%) to strongly disagree with this statement than are conservatives (8%). 

Figure 23: Percentage of young men, ages 18-29, who agree or disagree with two statements on manhood

Assuredly, manhood and masculinity have become highly charged issues. In academia, popular media, the entertainment industry, and society at large, the commentary is often highly unsympathetic and disparaging. Although critics typically state that men and male attributes are not the problem, all the rantings against the “myth of manhood” or “traditional masculinity ideology,” in the words of the American Psychological Association, have little redeeming to say about men or masculinity.

Consider one example. In a 2021 study, a group of psychologists conducted a content analysis of Psychology of Men and Masculinities, the official journal of the American Psychological Association’s division for the psychological study of men and masculinities. The purpose was to determine if men’s positive functioning was a focus of articles published from 2000 (the journal’s inception year) to 2018. The measure of “positive” was whether an article addressed any “positive constructs,” including a long list of values from achievement and leadership to resiliency and self-esteem. Of the 590 total articles published, only 15% had any positive focus. “Consistent with previous studies,” the authors wrote, the whole journal has concentrated on “male pathology and identifying men’s deficits and problems.”

In this sort of writing, masculinity is typically prefaced with “hegemonic” or “toxic,” ostensibly to differentiate the bad “traditional ideology” taught to boys from some new and better version. The “traditional” norms, ideals, and behaviors characterized as harmful, however, are part of a long and expansible list. A disproportionate focus on success, competition, achievement, and being in control are some examples of the disorder, along with aggressiveness, toughness, and such “anti-femininity” as discomfort expressing emotions and reluctance to seek help. But no list is complete and everything from wanting to be a family provider to not wanting to go to college are put down to rigid masculine stereotypes and chauvinism. Hardly anything distinctively male is left uncontested. 

We gave respondents additional statements to assess whether they see any meaning or purpose in manhood. The results are presented in the following chart, and at first glance, the answer seems to be “no.” In response to the statement, “manhood is whatever a man makes of it,” around 4 in 5 young men strongly (39%) or somewhat (39%) agree. Liberals are more likely to agree with this statement (87%) than are conservatives (72%), but a majority of men in various demographic groups also endorse it. The statement seems straightforwardly subjective and relative. Manhood as a concept has no content; you interpret it any way that seems right to you. End of discussion.

Figure 24. Percentage of men, ages 18-29, who agree or disagree with three statements on manhood

More likely, given the uniformity of agreement across other differences and the responses to our other questions about content, something else is going on. What young men seem to be affirming is the negative liberty not to be coerced. As we noted in Chapter 1, under our late modern conditions of autonomy, choice is a central imperative. Things that were once culturally defined, like adulthood, have become tasks that individuals must accomplish for themselves by their choices. With this duty comes a corresponding concern to clear away barriers or constraints so that individuals have the freedom necessary to pursue their purposes. This is “negative liberty,” and while it contributes to the problem of social formlessness, to which we will return in Part II of this report, this is likely the value that young men are endorsing. In this view, no one version of manhood should be imposed on every man.

Recognizing this liberty, however, does not mean that nothing concrete or distinctive can be said. We presented two other statements to our sample: “being a man requires a willingness to sacrifice for others,” and “manhood involves strength, responsibility, and leadership.” Both express positive character traits and qualities often associated with manhood. Both receive very strong endorsement: 89% of young men agree with the first one, and 85% agree with the second. Religious men are more likely to strongly agree with these two statements (59% and 67%, respectively) than are secular ones (41% and 45%, respectively). Similarly, while 60% of conservatives strongly agree with the first statement, and 66% strongly agree with the second statement, only 41% and 43% of liberal respondents do. 

These views, presumably taught to boys when they are young, do not seem very toxic. Rather, they seem like shared aspirations to give of themselves and be a valued member of their community. Coming at the question of manhood from a somewhat more controversial angle, we gave respondents two more statements and asked them to choose the one they most agree with, even if the statement was not exactly right.

  • Statement A: “Men should protect women.”
  • Statement B: “Women don’t need protection from men.”

Overall, nearly 80% of young men selected statement A. This statement is sometimes characterized as paternalistic and sexist, although young women endorse it at nearly the same rate as young men. As we would expect, there is some variation. Whereas only 10% of those who identify as conservative or religious chose statement B, that was the choice of 34% of the liberal and 26% of the secular respondents. Even so, a clear majority of secular and liberal respondents still select statement A.

In the current critiques of masculinity, bad role models are of special concern. Much attention has focused on the rise of Andrew Tate and other “manosphere” influencers. Critics paint a perilous picture of millions of adolescent boys and young men being seduced by dark, misogynist content like Tate’s. The influencers, as depicted in this literature, are extremely powerful. For example, an article, published in the March 2025 British edition of Glamour, ran with the title “My Friend was Radicalised by Online Misogyny. It Really is that Easy.” The hit drama, Adolescence, which strongly implies that a normal 13-year-old boy from a good family is driven to commit murder through his exposure to the manosphere, is another example.

There are serious issues here and much to detest in the extremist views promoted online. But we wanted to know whom young men admire. For one measure of influence, we gave respondents a list of prominent men. We listed people like Barack Obama, Mark Zuckerberg, and Andrew Tate, who represent different approaches to being a man. We then asked them how much they look up to each as role models. The four response categories ranged from a “great deal” to “none at all.” A final option was: “I haven’t heard of this person.” 

Additionally, we asked about people in their personal lives. How much do they look up to them as role models? The options include father, mother, leader of their religious congregation, boss at work, a coach/teacher, and the online influencer they follow most closely. We used the same four response categories, with N/A as an option if the response category did not apply to them.

The results are presented in the figure below. There are many interesting things to discuss here, but we want to focus on only three points. 

First, by a wide margin, the young men in our survey look up to their parents the most. In fact, 79% look up to their mothers, and 69% look up to their fathers either a great deal or a good amount as role models. Parents are also the least likely to be viewed unfavorably as role models. Of course, parents are not always present in these young men’s lives, a problem to which we will return in Part II. Specifically, 16% of the young men in our survey did not grow up with their biological father present, and another 21% have a father who was present only part of the time. The corresponding numbers are 5% with no biological mother present and 11% with her only present part of the time. But, if their parents are present, their sons generally admire them.

Second, if we again combine the two favorable categories, the next most important role models are coaches and teachers (57%). Around one in 1 in 10 respondents marked N/A for this category. Yet, where applicable, teachers and coaches represent role models that young man can respect and look up to. 

Figure 25. Percentage of men, ages 18-29, who look up to various individuals as role models

Third, the infamous influencer Andrew Tate was the least-admired man on the list, with one of the lowest percentages for “a great deal,” and the highest percentage for “not at all.” In contrast, young men are far more likely to look up to former President Barack Obama—who is no manosphere influencer—a great deal as a role model and half as likely to say not at all. Though we don’t know which online influencers they follow most closely, if any (6% marked N/A), and whether they have anything to do with the manosphere, it is perhaps notable that half of our respondents say that they look up to these individuals “not very much” or “not at all.” 

Although Andrew Tate did not fare well, at least compared to the other prominent men on our list, around 3 in 10 respondents still look up to him as a role model at least a good amount. It may well be the case, as frequently argued, that Tate and others like him are contributing to a deep and potentially violent nihilism among some young men, and fostering resentment and scorn toward women among so-called “incels” (young men unable to find a romantic partner). Our survey did not have measures of such attitudes.

What we find is that there may be more complexity to the question of role models than the public discussion typically allows. An observation from an April 2024 New York Times article about support for the Trump candidacy among men under 30 may be the sort of nuance we need:

In interviews with young men planning to vote for Mr. Trump, they described feeling unvalued. They said it had become harder to be a man. They valued strength in a president. Yet they didn’t express bitter misogyny or praise the exaggerated displays of brawn embraced by the Trump campaign. Their concerns were mostly economic, like whether they could fulfill the traditionally masculine role of supporting a family.

What young men say about marriage, parenthood, manhood, and their role models speaks to a positive connection to their families, schools, and congregations, or, more often, to a desire to have that connection. In Part II of this report, we will explore what young men think about their relationships, social participation, and the loneliness and isolation that many of them feel. 

Part II: What to Expect

In the coming months, the Institute for Family Studies will release Part II of this report, which will include two more chapters: Chapter 4: Social Connection, and Chapter 5: Alienation and Distress, as well as a Conclusion that discusses the implications of these many findings. 

 

 

 

 


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