It’s Still About the Economy: A Response to ‘The Republican Marriage Advantage’ 

The recent IFS research brief, "The Republican Marriage Advantage," makes three observations: first, Republicans are more likely to be married; second, married Republicans are happier than married Democrats; and third, the gap between married Republicans and Democrats has grown over the past several decades years. Indeed, the difference in marriage rates by party affiliation was borne out by the vote in swing states in the recent election. In 1969, Republicans and Democrats were equally likely to be married (84%) and, although marriage rates have dropped for both parties since then, there is an 18% gap in the marriage rate:  71% of Republicans are married compared to 53% of Democrats. 

The real questions are what causes these gaps, and what lessons should we take from them?

The IFS brief suggests that differences in marital happiness and marriage rates are a matter of culture. The authors observe, for example, that “family-minded conservatives see the Left, in general, and the Democratic Party in particular, as much less likely to value the institution of marriage—and the virtues that sustain it—than they once were," suggesting that changes in attitudes explain the partisan differences in behavior.  

The problem with this conclusion comes from the very issue the brief highlights. Yes, Democrats and Republicans have moved farther apart from each other. They have become more likely to differ in who they are (e.g., Black or white), where they live (urban or rural), their personality characteristics, the source of their values (self-definition or time-honored mores), and the vocabulary they use to express their values. But these differences, which do explain a large part of how individuals express their attitudes about marriage, are not necessarily causal explanations for relationship behavior. 

Start with the question of marital happiness. Ask Democrats and Republicans if—as a general matter—they are happy. Liberals, who are more likely to be Democrats, routinely report a happiness gap compared to conservatives. Some suggest that this is because those committed to social justice respond more negatively to societal failures to realize those ideals, while others note that various personality characteristics correlate with perceptions of unhappiness, relationship stress, and party identity. In short, rather than conclude that Democratic marriages are unhappy because the spouses are Democrats, it may instead be true that people who are more likely to report being unhappy become Democrats.

Or consider the differences in priorities about the family. While Democrats are more focused on “economic threats to families,” Republicans are more concerned about cultural values. Liberals are more likely than conservatives to support birth control, and red states tend to have higher nonmarital birth rates. On child care, Democrats are far more likely than Republicans to say that child care is an important factor in strengthening the economy. Democrats are more than twice as likely as Republicans to say that the country still has work to do in order to give women equality. These values express a different set of priorities for families, but they do not prove that Democrats do not prioritize family life.

Turning to differences in marriage rates, they reflect the demographic composition of each party. It would be surprising if Democrats were not less likely to marry than Republicans. Even after this election, Democrats are substantially more likely to be Black or Hispanic, groups who are less likely to marry. In addition, while the differences are smaller, people in urban areas, which are more likely to vote Democrat, are less likely to marry than people in rural areas. And young people are more likely to be Democrats—and less likely to be married—than older adults. The IFS brief controls for some—though not all—of these factors, and these factors interact with each other.    

What the IFS brief does not address, however, is economic class, and that should be a matter of major concern. The authors find a steep decline in marriage for those who are not college-educated, regardless of partisanship; although Republicans with a college degree are still more likely to be married than similarly educated Democrats, their decline in marriage rates is slightly steeper. One of the factors related to the change in marriage rates has been the increasing correlation of economic class with divorce: the divorce rates of those with college degrees have declined while the divorce rates for those without college degrees continues to climb. Moreover, for Americans without college degrees, the rate of family instability is considerably higher than in European countries. It is not just marriage rates, but rates of family dissolution that disadvantage children, and in the United States, family instability is substantially more a function of economic precarity than of partisan identity.    

And that’s where we believe the focus should be—economics. As we have noted in previous work (Red Families v. Blue Families and Marriage Markets), those most likely to marry and remain in stable relationships are the college-educated, those who have followed the sequence of completing higher education, obtaining employment, marrying the right partner, and then having children. Couples who do not marry, in contrast, often stress the importance of finding a partner with a steady job and securing a measure of economic stability before they marry—circumstances beyond the reach of a high percentage of the population.  

That prompts us to ask why we should be focusing on partisanship (or even measures of happiness), rather than on the increasing economic divergence in contemporary America—and how we can best support children. 

To help strengthen families, we believe that what we should be talking about instead includes: 

1. the disappearance of secure jobs in the middle of the economy, starting with manufacturing but including other secure jobs, like those in public education or infrastructure development, that create a foundation for family life;
2. the greater volatility in income that has come as construction and entrepreneurship have become more important sources of job growth, particularly for men.
3. mass incarceration policies that reduce the supply of potential marriage partners particularly in Black communities; and,
4. the creation of more family supportive policies, ranging from a higher Child Tax Credit and paid leave to improved support for care and baby bonds.

In short, there could be bipartisanship agreement on the importance of promoting more stable families and parental involvement with children in a country where the class divide is dramatically greater than the partisan divide in family life.

Naomi Cahn is the Justice Anthony M. Kennedy Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law. June Carbone is the Robina Chair of Law, Science, and Technology at the University of Minnesota Law School. Naomi and June are co-authors with Nancy Levit of the book, Fair Shake: Women and the Fight to Build a Just Economy (Simon and Schuster, May 2024).